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ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis which hit Southeast Asian countries in July 1997 had a significant 
impact on the countries' economies and forced governments in the region to undertake 
programmes of financial restructuring in order to reduce weaknesses in banks' 
balance sheets, stabilise currencies and, most importantly, to improve the soundness 
of the banking and financial sectors. The main aim of such policies was to restore 
confidence and help meet the ongoing challenges associated with financial innovation 
and globalisation. The causes and consequences of the Asian crisis have been studied 
extensively in the past decade. However, the literature on the impact of the post-crisis 
crisis restructuring programmes on bank efficiency, performance and competition, 
and their evolving relationships, remain rather limited and inconclusive. This study 
aims to shed some light on these interrelated aspects, with particular reference to the 
experience of six of the countries mostly affected by the crisis - Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand - during their recovery period (1999 to 2005). 
Results from the efficiency analysis, carried out by means of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), show evidence of efficiency improvements in the region thereby 
indicating a positive impact of the restructuring programmes on the banking sector. 
Between 1999 to 2005 most of the countries in our sample actively followed policies 
of either closing failing institutions or fostering mergers. As a consequence, bank 
concentration in the region increased, raising the issue of the impact of the 
restructuring programmes on the competitive structure of banking markets. We found 
that, despite increased concentration, competition (assessed by the Panzar-Rosse H-
statistic) also increased leading us to conclude that the structural changes in South 
East Asia improved the region's banking industry performance without resulting in 
banks enjoying excessive market power. These lessons from the Asian crisis may 
prove valuable in the light of current re-structuring of global banking systems in the 
light of the 2008 credit crisis. 
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CHAPTERl 
Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
The importance of banks' role in supporting economic development is crucial, 
especially in developing economies. Over the past few decades, the need to improve 
bank resilience towards global economic uncertainty has increased. Developments in 
banking sectors around the globe have put financial sectors on ale~ especially in 
areas relating to improved efficiency, productivity and profitability of the banking 
sector. Financial sectors have altered their purpose and have emerged as a host that 
spurs incentives and controls constraints faced in the economy. Ultimately the 
financial sector seeks to enhance resource allocation and should also aim to improve 
diversification measures that should ultimately enhance risk management and improve 
profitability, at lower cost (Demirgiic-Kunt and Levine, 2008). 
However, developments in the financial sector may suffer distortions through 
experiencing a financial crisis. An economy could suffer from deep recessions and a 
sharp fall in economic growth as a result of fmancial collapse and this may be 
infectious across a region. This is what happened to the Asian economy in mid 1997. 
The region was struck by a financial crisis that started in Thailand and spread further 
causing financial distress that spurred major reform programmes aimed at 
emphasising financial sector stability. Crises, therefore, encouraged the South East 
Asian countries' agents to implement prudent action towards recovery and to attempt 
to shield the financial sector against any disruption in the future. During the past few 
decades, the region has adopted financial restructuring in order to keep their 
economies stabilised and to create a more favourable operating environment. More 
than ten years have passed since the crisis and Asia now demonstrates notable 
changes. although it is currently facing new challenges, as the recent global crisis 
continues to disrupt the region's stability and is slowing down the restructuring 
process. 
I 
In order to avoid a repeat of the failures that occurred in the 1997 financial crisis, 
policy induced refonns as well as changing banking sector strategies were 
implemented to improve fmancial sector efficiency further, via consolidation and 
other activities. The structural transfonnation that took place during and after the 
crisis brought broader changes in supervisory and policy regulations. Increasing 
efficiency, productivity and improving competitiveness in the sector, while building a 
stronger economy, were the goals of these changes. 
1.2 Aims of the Study 
There is a significant body of empirical literature on the assessment of bank 
efficiency, measured using either parametric or non-parametric methods. As a whole, 
the literature has focused more on developed economies (especially the US and EU) 
and study of Asian banking systems is relatively scarce. Although there is a vast 
literature that evaluates the Asian financial crises, especially its causes and 
consequences, cross country studies on the impact of the Asian crisis (and on bank 
competition and efficiency issues) are somewhat limited. 
This study aims to fill this gap in the literature focusing on five crises affected 
countries during the period 1999-2005. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand 
were chosen as they are among the worst affected countries with similar economic 
features, whereas South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea), as the eleventh 
strongest economy in the world, was included to show how the crisis spread through 
the region and even countries that previously had relatively robust economies could 
be effected. We collected data from the Bankscope database, World Bank reports, 
International Monetary Fund's data (IMF) and several bank annual reports as well as 
developing our methodology from the previous literature for our empirical 
investigation on efficiency and competition in these banking markets. 
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The main research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1) What was the impact of environmental variables I on the efficiency of Asian 
banking sectors after the 1997 financial crisis? 
2) Did increased concentration in the sector bring about increased profitability but 
decreased efficiency of South East Asian banks? 
3) What is the impact of post-crisis financial restructuring on competition in the 
banking sector of the selected Asian countries? 
Countries in the Asian region have enjoyed steady growth and strong economic 
performance for several decades. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand had a GDP growth of around 8-9 per cent per annum from the beginning of 
the 1990s. The Asian financial crisis began in Thailand and then spread to other 
countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines. The foreign 
exchange market failure, during the period of financial turmoil, eroded investors' 
confidence and triggered a sharp drop in currency values. The situation worsened as 
further currency devaluations, stock market crashes, soaring inflation and severe 
economic recession increased capital outflows. Much has been said about the factors 
contributing to the financial crisis, including: over reliance on short term foreign 
capital, excessive investment in real estate, inadequate financial supervision and 
politically motivated credit allocations that resulted in growing non performing loans 
(Kim, 2007). 
As soon as the crisis hit in mid 1997, these countries took immediate action towards 
recovery. The IMF played its part as a supportive agent in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand 
and Philippines, whereas Malaysia rejected IMF support. These actions included 
several drastic measures, especially focused on fostering stability in the financial 
sectors, such as: (i) reforming financial sectors through mergers and acquisitions (to 
avoid further bank collapses and helping to create stronger banks); (ii) improving 
transparency and regulation; (iii) strengthening corporate governance and allowing 
more competition (changing the entry policy, and allowing more foreign banks entry). 
I These refer 10 exlernal I en,"ironmenlaJ factors outside the control of banks' management 
3 
These changes provide us with a framework to analyse their links to promoting bank 
efficiency and improving bank competition. Overall these actions appear to have had 
a positive effect, as all the countries concerned (to varying degrees) regained their 
growth development and created healthier financial systems. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The following section provides a summary of the methodological approaches applied 
in this study. In order to address the aforementioned three main research questions, we 
concentrated on three main approaches. To tackle the first research question~ that is to 
investigate changes in bank efficiency, we applied the non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to examine bank efficiency pre and post-
crisis. Our samples comprise commercial banks operating in Southeast Asia (SEA) 
over the period 1999-2005. Following the work of Fried et ale (1999), we employ 
empirical techniques to separate out external factors that influenced the performance 
of banks. By using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and utilising the input slacks 
or output surpluses approach, we obtain a measure of technical efficiency adjusted for 
differences in the operating environment. Traditionally, DEA deals with the 
measurement of relative efficiency of Decisions Making Units (DMUs), neglecting 
external variables that influence the ability of management to transform inputs and 
outputs. In typical DEA studies, slacks and surpluses are relegated to the background 
at best and are neglected at worst. However, Fried et ale (1999) proposed that the 
inclusion of slacks, along with the measurement of technical efficiency erE), could 
help deal with differences in the operating environment across production units. Our 
approach is based on the four-stage methodology proposed by Fried et ale (1999), 
whereby we account for the impact of environmental variables in a DEA-based 
model. Given the structural changes in the post-crisis environment described earlier, 
our aim is to incorporate the influences of external variables on SEA banking 
efficiency measurement. In so doing, we allow for slacks or surpluses due to the 
environment variables and use these to calculate adjusted values for the primary 
inputs. In other words, the new radial efficiency measures incorporate environmental 
variables. 
4 
To address the second research questio~ we revisit the traditional Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) approach. The SCP paradigm posits specific causal relationships 
between market structure, conduct and performance. In particular. market structure 
determines conduct and conduct in tum determines performance. Profound structural 
changes took in the banking sectors of SEA countries following the 1997 crisis. A 
wave of consolidation (largely driven by M&As) and the ensuing rapid increase in 
market concentration that took place in most countries generated concerns about the 
rise in banks' market power and its potential detrimental effects on consumers' 
welfare. In this part of the analysis, we test the market power (Structure-Conduct-
Performance and Relative Market Power) and efficient structure (X-efficiency and 
scale efficiency) hypotheses for our sample of banks in the five SEA countries. We 
use the results of the previous Data Envelopment Analysis estimation to obtain 
reliable efficiency measures (technical and scale efficiency). We present evidence 
which contributes to the structure and performance literature in line with recent 
developments and expand the analysis on concentration, competition and 
performance. 
In order to address the final research question, we examine competition in the banking 
markets by employing the panzar and Rosse approach (1977, 1987). The panzar and 
Rosse (PR) model distinguishes between oligopolistic, monopolistic and perfectly 
competitive markets. The panzar and Rosse H-statistic is calculated using a reduced 
form revenue equation and measures the sum of elasticities of the total revenue of the 
firm with respect to the fmn' s input prices. Rosse and panzar (1977) show that the H-
statistics are negative for a neoclassical monopolist or collusive oligopolist, whilst a 
monopolistic competitor will gain H-statistics between 0 and 1 and a value equal to 
unity implies a perfectly competitive market (all tests only hold if it can be shown that 
banks / firms are operating under long-run equilibrium). The panzar and Rosse H-
statistic approach has been widely used in previous studies for assessing competition 
in banking markets in the context of the New Empirical Organisation (NEIO) 
literature. 
5 
1.4 Structure oftbe Tbesis 
The thesjs is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background on the 
financial crisis that hit, among other countries, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. This chapter reviews the actions taken by each country to 
improve resource allocation, the changes made to the banking system to improve 
resilience and some of the important consequences individual countries faced. This 
chapter also gives a summary of policy changes, including the merger and acquisition 
programmes. Chapter 3 provides a review of literature on the impact of financial 
reforms on banks efficiency, concentration and competition in banking markets. In 
particular, this chapter discusses the major caveats in the existing literature, which 
serves to establish the motivation for our empirical study. 
To place the following empirical analysis into perspective, Chapter 4 presents the 
theoretical concepts of efficiency and the approaches used in measuring efficiency. 
For the purpose of this thesis we employed the non-parametric DEA approach to the 
measurement of efficiency. It also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this 
approach and highlights the necessity to apply slacks in the empirical analysis of 
efficiency. This chapter also provides an empirical investigation of bank efficiency in 
the SEA region after the 1997 financial crisis which accounts for slacks and 
environmental variables, using the aforementioned non-parametric approach. 
Building upon the empirical results of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 investigates the impact of 
market structure on bank performance by using the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
framework. 
Chapter 6 looks into the relationship between competition and efficiency. This 
chapter examines competition levels during the period of study and whether the DEA 
efficiency scores obtained in Chapter 4 have a significant impact on the competition 
in the investigated region. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings and draws some general conclusions 
and policy implications. It also points out some limitations of the study and offers 
suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SOUTHEAST ASIA BANKING FROM 
CRISIS TO RECOVERY: A BRIEF REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction: Economic Background 
Banking remains the dominant fmancial segment m Southeast Asia (SEA), with 
banking sector assets accounting for almost 60 percent of GDP on average (The 
World Bank, 2006). Among the Asian emerging economies, the banking sector was 
considered one of the fastest growing parts of the economy and increased significantly 
in importance in the three decades up to the crisis. On average, Southeast Asian 
(SEA) economies have grown at almost eight percent per annum since the 1960s. The 
increasing pace of financial market liberalization in these countries has also increased 
competitive pressures. Banks have had to adapt to, and operate in an environment that 
has become increasingly more integrated2• In such an environment efficient banks will 
have a competitive advantage and those that remain inefficient may be driven out of 
the market. When banking systems fails, public confidence and the whole economic 
system are severely affected. In the event of a crises issues of capitalization, 
governance, risk management and operational inefficiencies become paramount in 
any policy decisions that seek to re-organize and create more stable banking systems. 
T bl 2 1 B ki C·· P . d a e • an n2 nSls eno S . . 
Coun~!l' Crisis Period 
Indonesia 1991-1992, 1997 
Korea 1997 
Malaysia 1985-1988,1997 
Philippines 1981-1987,1997 
Thailand 1983-1987,1997 
. . Source: Beck et al., Bank ConcentratIon and Cnses (August 2003) 
Table 2.1 illustrates the crisis periods presenting the years in which each country 
experienced a banking crisis (Beck et al., 2003) 3, whereas Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
:! The challenges faced by Asian banks as they grow are focus to four main categories. (I) global integration of the 
financial markets; (2) financial liberalization and increased competition; (3) maintenance of asset quality. (4) 
innovation and technological change (Yam. ( 1997) 
J In 1990 the world economy was disrupted globally with the beginning of the Gulf War, which resulted in the 
1990 spike of oil prices. Indon~ia ~rady e~pcrienccd tigh~ ccono.mic ~ivities .since 19?1 glo~ ccono~y 
depression when facing higher mflatlon and In.tcrcst rates with an mcreasmgly high. ~ficil K~ 5 banking 
system is owned either by the government or business conglomerates. Government heaVily mtervened In the 1%Os 
through 1980s. in bank management of fund allocation. and limited the incentive for the Korean bank to enhan« 
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growth of domestic product per capita (GOP) for the selected countries from 1986 to 
2007. 
Figure 2.1: GDP Annual Growths (%), 1986-2007 
15 ---
10 
5 
o ----r-
1986 1987 1988 1989 1m 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 I 
-5 ---------------
-10 --- - - - - -- --- -- -----
-15 
Source: World Development Indicator (2007) 
T bl 220m . I E h R t R th A . C" C a e . ICla xc ange a e egames ID e sian nSls ountnes . . 
Indonesia November 1978 - June 1997 Managed Floating 
July 1997 - December 2000 Inde pende ntly Floating 
Kore a March 1980 - October 1997 Managed Floating 
November 1997 - December 2000 Independently Floating 
Malaysia January 1986 - February 1990 Limited Flexibility 
March 1990 - November 1992 Fixed 
December 1992 - September 1998 Managed Floating 
September 1998 - December 2000 Pegged Arranged 
Philippines January 1988 - December 2000 Independently Float 
Thailand January 1970 - June 1997 Managed Floating 
July 1997 - December 2000 Independently Floating 
Source : IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions (several issues). 
, \ 
4 
--+- Indone D 
Korea 
Mala, tl 
Ph ilippine 
Thailand 
their banking managemt:nt techniques. In 1990s, Govt:mment interventions were reduced and allo'\' ed ban ks to 
have greater dt:cisions in banking management. This situation creates exces -ive di vers ifi cation to huild a ~If­
contained empire rather than to generate profit (Soon Suk. Yoon et aI. , 20(4). Malays ia ' s steady economi c gro\\th 
had a sudden la.ll in 1985-1986 due to a sharp drop in world commodity prices. As a result real output was stagnan t 
ilnd Malaysia fdl deeply into recess ion_ MaJays ia's recovery plan began in 1986 through 1988 and regained its 
growth . For the Philippines. the economic and po litical cri sis in the 1983-1 985 peri ods and the depict ion of the 
count ry's natuml resources coincided with the increasing promincnce of li bcrnJi Lati on as the ewnomie po lic) 
fmmc work for both the devc/oped lUld the develo ping world (08uli -la 2003).ln the yctIIS 1980- 1985. Thlli llUld WlIS 
in u period of macroeconomic adj ustmcnl cwnomic uncertainty and hardshi p. 1986- 1996. were considered as 
years of high cWllomic growth . 1997-2003 was thought of as a period of crisis. econom ic di -tre 'S and rcCll\ ef) 
(PholphinJl. 20(5). The Inter eMS (1 997-2003) can alSt1 be de fin ed by the time ph tL~ c:\pcrienced h~ cri~i ... -
Il.Il'cc tcd countries L" di scussed aho c. 
4 I Icm an dCl. tUld Montiel (200J ). 
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Table 2.3: Key Economic Indicators 
Korea 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Real GOP growth 9.5 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.5 -5.5 
Inflation 8.6 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.5 
Current Account Balance I 
-0.9 -3.1 -1.6 0.2 -1.3 -2.1 -5.0 -1.6 11.7 
Indonesia 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Real GOP growth 9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.0 4.65 -13.7 
Inflation 7.8 9.4 7.5 9.7 8.5 9.4 7.9 6.6 60.7 
Current Account Balance I 
-2.8 -3.5 -2.3 -1.6 -1.8 -3.4 -3.4 -1.8 4.2 
Thailand 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Real GOP growth 11.6 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.9 8.7 6.4 -0.43 -8.0 
Inflation 6.0 5.7 4.1 3.4 5.1 5.8 5.9 5.6 8.1 
Current Account Balancel 
-8.3 -7.8 -5.7 -5.1 -5.7 -8.1 -8.0 -2.1 12.8 
Malaysia 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Real GOP growth 9.56 8.6 7.8 8.3 9.3 9.3 8.6 7.7 -6.7 
Inflation 2.8 2.6 4.7 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.5 2.7 5.8 
Current Account Balancel 1.9 -8.5 -3.6 -4.4 -6.1 -9.7 -4.4 -5.9 13.2 
Philippines 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Real GDP growth 3.04 -0.6 0.3 2.1 4.4 4.7 5.9 5.8 -0.5 
Inflation 14.1 18.7 8.9 7.6 9.1 8.1 8.4 6.0 9.7 
Current Account Balance l -6.1 -2.3 -1.9 -5.6 -4.6 -2.7 -4.8 -5.3 2.4 
I Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GOP). 
The selected countries experienced high economic growth at an average of eight to 
nine percent since the early 1990s except for the Philippines which experienced a 
sharp drop in the early 1990s (Figure 2.1). The Philippines were struck by a world 
economy slowdown starting in the 1980s and political crisis that continuously 
adversely affected economic performance. In the early 1990s the economy contracted 
again but with a stimulus package delivered by the IMF, the economy regained its 
strength in mid 1990s. Major structural reform involved dismantling monopoliess and 
promoting privatization. 
In mid 1997, SEA was put under pressure by financial crisis which in turn made an 
enormous impact on all the affected countries (lndonesi~ Kore~ Malaysi~ 
Philippines and Thailand) and they experienced negative annual growth by 19986• 
SEA countries were seen to engage effectively in pegging their exchange rates against 
~ During President Ferdinand Marcos. the Philippines expended the number of public secto~-enterprises which 
were considered as government mandated monopolies creating 'crony capitalism'. The action created corruption 
and recession in the 1980s and brought severe financial difficulties among those enterprises and undennined the 
viability of the big govemment-owned banks and led to an economic crisis until the early 19905 where the 
economy tell deeply into recession with -I pen:ent ofGDP growth in 1991. 
6 Indonesia (_1%). Korea (-7%), Malaysia (-7%). Philippines (-1%). and Thailand (-1%) (World Development 
Indjcator 2007; Figure 2.1). 
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the US dollar, even when the dollar appreciated against the yen by 50 percent from 
mid 1995 to the end of 1997. This led to a loss in trade competitiveness and export 
shares, widening current account deficits. At the same time the region was impacted 
by other external factors, namely the cyclical slowdown in world trade and low 
growth in Japan between 1996 and early 1997. Overcoming the impact of the crisis 
proved costly, and according to a study by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000), the most 
expensive casualties in the 1997 financial crisis were Indonesia followed by Thailand. 
Several actions were taken for recovery including bank recapitalization plans, capital 
injections, deposit guarantees, liquidity support, regulatory forbearance and debtor 
bailout schemes (V odova, 2008). 
Obtaining an accurate assessment of the significant banking structural changes as well 
as broader economic developments resulting from the crisis are important, as they 
enable policy makers to make appropriate regulations and policies to create a more 
efficient and stable banking industry. As a consequence, an empirical investigation of 
the regions experience of the 1997 financial crisis, and the impact on bank efficiency 
and competition is important especially as banks play a prominent role in the credit 
intermediation process. In addition, past literature has found banking crises may also 
lead to disruption in the real economies and failing banks tends to be inefficient 
(Berger and Humphrey 1992). 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the development of the SEA 
banking sector. The chapter is organized as follows. A brief account of the SEA 
banking sector before and after the crisis in each selected country is presented in 
Sections 2.2 to Section 2.7. The approach to banking sector reforms and the measures 
adopted by the affected government will be analyzed in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 
presents the present global crisis and is followed by the concluding remarks in Section 
2.10. 
2.2 Southeast Asian Banking Sectors 
Before the financial crisis in J 997. SEA banking structures were based on either state 
owned or privately owned banks. According to Laeven (2005. pp.l) commercial 
banks in these countries have traditionally been linked through ownership of other 
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financial institutions, such as merchant banks and finance companies. In Korea, banks 
were often owned merchant banks; in Thailand, banks frequently owned finance 
companies; and in Malaysia, banks holding companies often included commercial 
banking, investment banking, asset management, and insurance companies. Whilst the 
crisis has led some banks to focus on more traditional banking activities, other banks 
have continued to expand the range of their services, with increasing focus on income 
from fee-based activities. 
The state also played an important role in terms of bank ownership. These institutions 
generally had the most government backing or obtained subsidies to protect them 
from failing or having to withdraw credits because of poor financial condition (Berger 
et al., 2006). The economic culture of 'managed development' allowed strong 
linkages between government, banks, and the corporate sector, and led to implicit 
guaranties against future failure (Gochoco-Bautista et al., 2000). Without proper and 
appropriate supervision the process of state involvement may have distorted 
incentives to adapt to new challenging environments and adversely affected the banks 
performance. 
The Asian crisis emphasised the need for the banks to balance their development roles 
along with sound operational performance. The 1997 financial crisis also ended the 
liberalisation trend in the region and since then a restructuring programme 
immediately started which ended in early 2002 (William and Nguyen, 2005). The 
restructuring programme involved government interventions with major changes 
including; (a) bank acquisition by the state, (b) failed and unviable banks were 
asked/forced to close, (c) compulsory purchases and assumptions and transferring 
assets to healthier banks, creating larger core banks, (d) removing bad assets to state 
owned and managed asset management companies, and (e) providing capital 
injections to recapitalise banks (Williams and Nguyen, 2005; Lindgren et al., 2000). 
Other major measures included; (a) reprivatisation, (b) wider access for foreign 
owned banks by allowing foreign banks ownership, (c) replacing underperforming 
bank management, (d) providing new managerial incentives, and (e) other 
restructuring activity. 
Some have argued that various early warning signals may have helped predict the 
crisis and such indicators would enhance the ability of the involved country to manage 
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and resolve banking crisis and facilitate in lessening the consequences to the banking 
sector and economy as a whole. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), for instance, discuss 
early warning signals, arguing that: 
'The greatest barrier to success is the well-entrenched tendency of policymakers and 
market participants to treat the signals as irrelevant archaic residuals of an out-of-
date framework, assuming that old rules of valuation no longer apply. If the past we 
have studied in this book is any guide, these signals will be dismissed more often than 
not'. 
Vodova (2008) classifies several macroeconomic indicators as early warning signals: 
(1) real GDP growth; (2) investments; (3) consumption; (4) rate of inflation; (5) 
exchange rate and its changes; and (6) domestic credit provided to private sectors. 
Having said this, it is by no means certain whether such 'signals' were monitored by 
policymakers in the respective countries in the run-up to the crisis. In general, there 
appeared limited monitoring and misperceptions of the performance of the economies 
that no doubt contributed to the onset of the systemic banking crisis. The impact of 
the SEA crisis could probably have been much smaller if the region implemented 
more reliable accounting and greater disclosure standards serving as an early warning 
sign for banking institutions. This led to the recommendation post-crisis that 
concerted national and international efforts should be made to develop and implement 
international accounting and reporting standards, compliance with which should be 
monitored and enforced. (Yao, 2008, pp.l). 
The following section will briefly illustrate the experience of selected crisis-effected 
countries. A strong banking system is essential to a country's economic growth and an 
efficient financial system will definitely help to mobilise the financial resources and 
better allocation of resources. The core functions of the banking system in an 
economy were (the obvious) reasons why Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand needed to rapidly restore their banking systems post-crisis. The following 
provides a snapshot of the economic and financial features of the SEA countries under 
study. 
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2.3 Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the most vast and densely populated countries in SEA. Indonesia' s 
fmancial system comprises banks and non-bank fmancial institutions. The Indonesian 
financial system is dominated by banking intennediation or indirect finance, and the 
banking system consists of commercial banks which account for almost 99 per cent in 
terms of total asset to the banking system. Throughout the 1980s, state-owned banks 
dominated the banking sector. The soaring oil prices in the 1970s had generated 
greater revenue for the country for further economic development. This enabled the 
financial system to capitalize on the abundant funds provided through foreign aid. At 
the beginning of 1982, Indonesia was overwhelmed by world economy recession and 
the plummeting price of oil. As a result the country's revenues dropped and the 
economy faced stagnation. The government implemented drastic measures by cutting 
government expenditure, borrowed from private banks, floated bonds on the Euro 
market and took loans from the World Bank as well as assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The banking system experienced large structural changes even before the 1997 crisis 
and this involved five stages: (i) the rehabilitation period (1967-1973) to restore the 
economy from high inflation; (ii) the ceiling period (1974-1983) where interest rate 
ceilings were applied; (iii) the growth period (1983-1988) following banking 
deregulation in June 1983 which removed interest rate ceilings; (iv) the acceleration 
period (1988-1991) following the impact of extensive bank refonns in October 1988; 
and (v) the consolidation phase (1991-1997) in which prudential banking principles 
were introduced, including capital adequacy and bank ratings (Batunanggar, 2005). 
Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia underwent major structural changes in the 
banking sector which consisted of (1) privatisation; (2) mergers and consolidations; 
and (3) increasing the role of foreign banks. 
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2.3.1 Indonesian Financial Institutions 
The following section will look into the Indonesian banking refonns phases since 
1966. 
1) The Indonesian banking system 1966 - 1982: 
The financial sector during this time was considered a subsidiary of the state because 
banking capital was fmanced by the Central Bank and the government. During this 
period, the fmancial system was transformed. Refonns introduced in April 1974 
aimed at stabilizing the financial and monetary sectors. Through various monetary 
measures, the Bank of Indonesia managed individual monetary policy against 
excessive domestic monetary growth and regulated deposits and lending rates. The 
banks utilized their excess funds (through increased oil export prices in the 1970s and 
greater foreign reserves) by lower lending rates. The distribution of funds was focused 
on priority sectors in conjunction with various government programs. These measures 
enabled the banks to utilize their function as an agent of economic development. with 
the support of Bank Indonesia. The government's balanced budget policy was 
introduced as part of action to reduce the high inflation rates in 1978 until 1982 and to 
reduce a large fiscal deficit. Indonesia's revenue fell dramatically due to the decline in 
world oil prices in 1983 and started its economic reforms strategy to gain growth and 
financial sector stability. 
2) Indonesian Economic Reforms 1983- 1991 7 
Indonesia's economic performance improved between 1970 and 1981 at an annual 
average rate of 7.4 percent. The country steadily sustained inflation at a lower rate and 
the economy went through an expansion from the increase in export oil prices in 1973 
and 1979. In 1982 Indonesia faced a world oil prices crisis and the economy 
contracted which had an adverse effect on GDP growth, in tum creating significant 
inflation. The situation worsened when the dollar depreciated between 1982 and 1986. 
having an indirect impact on the economy as a whole. The government acted by 
implementing a reform program with the objective of liberalizing the banking sector 
as well as other trade and regulatory reforms. The program started with deregulation 
which focused on; (1) exchange rate management~ (2) various monetary and financial 
7 Resosudarmo and Kuncoro. (2006). 
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reforms; (3) reformulation of fiscal policy: and (4) revised trade policy and other 
regulatory reforms. 
The financial system reform program began in 1983 through to 1990 and 1991. The 
aims included liberalizing the financial sector, allowing the private banking sector to 
open more branches with requirements including: extending their activity to other 
cities than just Jakarta and reducing commercial bank reserve requirement8. The main 
changes in the economic reforms of the 1980s permitted a greater degree of 
competition between state and private banks. In October 1988 further deregulation of 
the financial sector removed restrictions on bank competition and allowed more joint 
ventures between private and foreign banks. The underpinning deregulation, guided 
by the World Bank and IMF aimed to promote competition in the financial sector and 
improve management effectiveness in the banking and non-banking sectors (Hamada, 
2003). It was also important that new prudential regulations were introduced aimed at 
enhancing sound bank management practices. The financial reforms were successful 
in promoting financial sector expansion along with growth in the economy. 
3) Period ojjinancial expansion: 1992-19979 
following the implementation of extensive bank reforms in October 1988 and by 
tightening Indonesia monetary policy in 1991, the banking sector grew rapidly. 
Further reforms packages concentrated on a few areas; (i) promoting fairer 
competition among banks by allowing new entry, more access to networking, closer 
relationships between state and private banks and allowing banks to make decisions 
independently; (ii) introduction of prudential regulations through the introduction of 
international banking rules including the Basle Capital requirements of 1988: (iii) the 
introduction of a wider array of money market instruments and; (iv) implementing 
floating interest and exchange rates. These improvements were impaired by a lack of 
enforcement from Bank Indonesia as well as a lack of commitment by bank 
management. The gro\\th in number of banks and branches increased the complexity 
in banking operation. Banks increasingly promoted more diversified products such as 
deri\'ati\cs but failed to participate in improving their supervisory and bank 
managcment skills in accordance with development in the banking industry. As a 
8 RC"lI"lIdanll11 ami KUlKlIr(l. (.:( l()() 
Q lIamada. (20tH): Balunang$ar (2005) 
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result, Bank Indonesia faced difficulties in tracking problem banks and ev~ntually 
some banks started experiencing financial problems in the mid-1990s. 
4) The crisis 1997 
The comprehensive financial reforms in 1988 built up several vulnerabilities in the 
banking sector pre-crisis. Besides having poor supervision and a lack of corporate 
governance and management, the industry also faced liquidity management 
weaknesses which can be seen through large volatile deposits in the composition of 
bank's funds and excessive ratios of loan to deposit (Batunanggar. 2005). Rinakit and 
Soesastro (1998) concluded that, based on their survey in Indonesia the liberalization 
and globalization reforms caused turbulence in the economy by increasing the 
domination of foreign enterprises and witnessed deterioration of the small and 
medium sized enterprise sector. A study by Hill (1997) indicates that the impact of 
liberalization and deregulation created conglomerates and monopolies, enlarged 
inequality and poverty, expanded regional disparities, and led to the demise of many 
small firms. The crisis that hit Indonesia in mid 1997 was seen as providing an 
opportunity to redress this problem and the government began to introduce fiscal and 
monetary measures to cope with the crisis quite early on. Furthermore a substantial 
numher of large government-sponsored and private infrastructure projects were 
cancelled for balance-of-payments reasons. 
Meanwhile, the adoption of a tight monetary policy by Bank Indonesia to reduce 
speculative attacks on the Rupiah, further tightened market liquidity. The banking 
system soon faced a severe liquidity crisis (Batunanggar, 2005) and the Indonesian 
government asked for International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance \\ i th an 
agreem~nt encompassing a programme for economic and financial restructuring. 
complemented by monetary and fiscal programs. The programs gradually showed 
changes hut Indonesia sti 11 needed a further recovery action plan. The inlmediate 
policy response may have reduced the impact of the crisis but the country was still in 
political and social turmoil. Chronologies of crisis events are outlined in Box's 1 and 
") 
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Table: 2.4 Key Economic Indicators 
Indonesia 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Real GOP growth 0.2 3.4 2.1 4.1 3.0 3.8 2.8 2.8 ~.q 
Inflation 2.0 3.8 11.5 11.8 6.8 6.1 10.5 13. I 6.4 
Current. Account 4.1 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.5 0.6 0.1 3.0 2.5 
Balance
' 
Source: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); 'percentage of gross domestic product (GOP). 
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Box 1: Indonesia 10 
The IMF-Supported Program of Economic Reform 
The shift in financial market sentiment that originated in Thailan~ exposed structural weaknesses in 
Indonesia's economy, notably the large amount of short-term foreign debt owed by the private 
corporate sector. On November 5, 1997 the JMF's Executive Board approved financial support of up to 
SDR 7.3 billion or about US$lO billion, equivalent to 490 percent of Indonesia's quota, over the next 
three years. 
October 8 
November 5 
Mid-January 
January 15 
January 26 
April 10 
May 4 
June 24 
July 15 
July 29 
August 25 
September 1 I 
September 25 
October 19 
November 6 
November 13 
December 15 
Chronological Highlights 
1997 
The IMF announces support for Indonesia's intention to seek support from the fMF 
and other multilateral institutions. 
The Executive Board approves a US$lO billion stand-by credit for Indonesia and 
releases a disbursement of US$3 billion. 
1998 
IMF Management visit Jakarta to consult with President Suharto on an acceleration 
of reforms already agreed under the program, after further depreciation of the rupiah. 
Indonesia issues Memorandum of Economic and Financial policies on additional 
measures. 
The IMF welcomes Indonesia's plans for a comprehensive program of the 
rehabilitation of the banking sector and puts into place a framework for creditors and 
debtors to deal with the external debt problems of corporations on a voluntary and 
case-by-case basis. 
Indonesia issues a Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 
on additional measures. 
The Executive Board completes the first review of the stand-by arrangement and 
disburses US$l billion. 
Indonesia issues a Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial policies 
on additional measures. 
The Executive Board completes the second review of the stand-by arrangement, 
disbursing US$l billion, and approves an increase in the IMF financing under the 
stand-by credit by US$1.3 billion. The Fund also announces that additional 
multilateral and bilateral financing for the program will be made available, in part 
through an informal arrangement among bilateral creditors that involves debt 
rescheduling or the provision of new money, for total additional financing of over 
US$6 billion, including the increase in IMF financing. 
Indonesia issues a Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies on additional measures. 
The Executive Board completes the third review of the stand-by arrangement and 
disburses US$l billion. At the same time, the Board approves an Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) for Indonesia, with the access and duration under the new 
arrangement the same as under the stand-by arrangement it replaces, but with a 
longer repayment period under EFFs, which are intended to support economic 
programs dealing with deep-seated structural problems. 
Indonesia issues a Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies. 
The Executive Board completes the first review under the extended arrangement 
(EFF) and disburses US$940 million. 
Indonesia issues a Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies. 
The Executive Board completes the second review under the extended arrangement 
(EFF) and disburses US$960 million. 
Indonesia issues a Letter of Intent and Supplementary Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies. 
The Executive Board completes the third review under the extended arrangement 
(EFF) and disburses US$957 million. 
10 A Factshect (January 1999): The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis. 
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Box 2: IMF Program of Economic Reform II 
• fmancial sector restructuring, including closing unviable institutions, merging state banks, and 
estabJishing a timetable for deaJing with remaining weak institutions and improving the 
institutiona~ legal, and regulatory framework for the financial system; the establishment of 
the Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (mRA)12; a government guarantee on bank deposits 
and credits; elimination of existing foreign ownership restrictions on banks; and the issuance 
of a new bankruptcy law; 
• structural refonns to enhance economic efficiency and transparency, including liberalization 
of foreign trade and investment, dismantling of domestic monopolies, and expanding the 
privatization program; 
• stabilizing the rupiah via the retention of a tight monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate 
policy; a strong monetary policy to ensure stabilization of the rupiah; 
• The fiscal measures included cutting low priority expenditures, including postponing or 
rescheduling major state enterprise infrastructure projects; removing government subsidies; 
eliminating VAT exemptions; and adjusting administered prices, including the prices of 
electricity and petroleum products; 
• A comprehensive agenda of structural refonns to increase competition and efficiency in the 
economy, reinforcing the commitments made in January and including the further 
privatization of six major state enterprises and the identification of seven new enterprises for 
privatization in 1998/99; 
• Restructuring the banking system through measures to strengthen relatively sound banks 
partly through the infusion of new capital, while moving swiftly to recapitalize, merge, or 
effectively close weak banks, while maintaining the commitment to guarantee all depositors 
and creditors; and 
• Strengthening the monitoring of the economic program. 
2.4 Korea 
In Korea, the financial industry consists of three large groups; (1) a central bank 
(Bank of Korea, BOK); (2) deposit money banks, including commercial and 
specialised banks; and (3) Non-bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs), which include 
development savings, investments, insurance and other institutions13• Banks in Korea 
include commercial and specialised banks (including national banks, regional banks, 
and foreign banks branches). The banking sector has grown rapidly over the last 50 
years and has contributed to the country's economic growth by mobilising financial 
resources for business firms when it dominated the financial market in the 1960s and 
1970s. Korea has experienced a remarkable increase in its economy over the past 
three decades with an annual growth rate of over 9 percent. Figure 2.2 and 2.3 clearly 
shows how the changes have developed the Korea financial institution since the 
1970s, and table 2.5 illustrates changes in the number of banks in the system. 
II Summarized from secondary source: A Factshcct - January 1999:The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis 
12 Accelerated bank restructuring with IBRA to continue its take-over or closure of weak or unviable institutions 
and empowered to issue bonds to finance the restoration of financial viability to qualified institutions; 
Il Ji and Park (1999). The Korea Banking Sector: Current Issues and Future Direction. A Study of Financial 
Markets. 
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Figure 2.2 Financial Institutions in Korea (as in 1978)14 
Central Bank The Bank of Korea 
Commercial Banks ~D_e_~ _ I_'t_M_o_n_e_Y_B_anks ___ ~~~ ________ __ Special Banks 
~N_o_n_-_fi_na_n_c_ia_l_b_anks _____ ~I __ +I __________ __ Development Institutions Saving Institutions Life Insurance Companies 
Investment Companies 
I Quasi-financial Institutions 
Non-financial banks I 
I 'L... ______ Korea Credit Guarantee Fund r Leasing Companies 
Security Advisory Board 
~ Korea Stock Exchange 
L--securities Companies 
Figure 2.3 Financial Institutions in Korea (as in 2008)15 
Central Bank Banks of Korea (BOK) 
Banking Institutions I----------fL L...-_________ ~ 
Non-Bank Depository 
Institutions 
Insurance Companies 
Securities Related 
Companies 
Other Financial 
Institutions 
Financial Auxiliary 
Institutions 
Commercial banks 
Speculative Banks 
Merchants Banking 
Corporations 
Mutual savings Banks 
Credit Institutions; etc. 
Life Insurance Companies 
Non-Life Insurance Companies 
Postal Insurance; etc 
Securities Companies 
Assets Mgt. Companies 
Future Companies 
Securities Finance Companies 
Credit Specialised Financial 
Institutions 
Venture Capital Companies; 
Financial Supervisory Service 
Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Financial Telecommunications 
14 Cole and Park. pp. 40. Financial Development in Korea. 1945-1978. Harvard University Press. ( 1983). 
I~ Bank of Korea. (2008). 
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Table 2.5: Decline in the Number of Financial Institutions 
End of '97 End of '99 Rate of Decline 
(%) 
No. of Financial Inst. 2102 1755 -16.5 
Banks 33 23 -30.3 
Security Companies 36 30 -16.7 
Insurance 50 44 -12.0 
Investment Trust 31 23 -25.8 
. . . . Source: Mmlstry ofFmance and Economy; Lee, Flgure 8, pp. 19, (2000) . 
2.4.1 Korean Financial Sector 
The following section will look at Korean banking reforms from the 1960s to the 
present day. 
1) Korean Financial Institutions before the Crisis: 1960s-1990s 
The Korean financial system has experienced several phases of regulatory 
developments that have shaped the system impacted on economic and financial 
systems developmentl6. The financial system in the early 1960s was basically under 
state control and worked at channelling funds allocated by the government to high 
priority sectors in the economy. A series of policy measures were established in the 
late 1960s to encourage and create a more favourable environment for the expansion 
of capital markets. Despite this development, the economy and the financial system 
were in a state of stagnation after the Korean War (1953-1960), together with 
economic dislocation and social and political turmoil. Tight government controls 
prevented development in the financial sector resulting in inefficient internal 
management. The financial sector had limited authority, and acted only as a channel 
for allocating funds government high priority sectors 17, limiting financial sector 
initiative and innovation. 
16 http://www.asianinfo.orglasiaoinfolkorealcconomy.htm 
I'Most funds are allocated to 'Chaebols' with government given full suppon to which can be defined as the 
business conglomerates! family business or monopoly. 
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Figure 2.4: The Relationship between the Korean Governments, the Banks and 
the Chaebols 1960s - 19708 
Control through 
management and 
policy 
Government 
Source:FUshi(2001) 
Banking 
Economic Growth 
Low Interest Rate to 
Chaebols 
Loans 
Chaebol 
The Korean government needed to strengthen financial sector competitiveness and 
efficiency, and to do so the Ministry of Finance and Economy engaged in a series of 
reforms aimed at; (1) restoring market credibility through financial restructuring; (2) 
developing capital markets by introducing long term financial products and risk 
management skills; (3) rebuilding a stronger finance infrastructure through improving 
the economic system, deregulation, developing a credit bureau and introducing more 
advanced information technology (IT). There was also the goal of creating major 
financial institutions to emphasise the strategic importance of the sector. 
The role of Korean banks as government intermediaries continued throughout the 
1970s. In the 1970s a lot of focus was on the diversification of finance; in other 
words, to develop private sector financial institutions. The Korean government also 
embarked on a plan to eliminate the existing unofficial sector, commonly known as 
the'curb market1S, in the early the 1960s and again in the 1970s. In 1972, the Korean 
government announced a decree to stimulate economic activities and reform the 
financial and investment sectors aimed at improving domestic mobilisation of funds. 
\I Business financing was obtained primarily through bank loans or borrowing on the informal and high-interest 
"curb market" of private lenders. The curb market served individuals who needed cash urgently. less reputable 
businesspeople who engaged in speculation. and the multitudes of smaller companies that needed operating funds 
but could not procure bank financing. The loans they received. often in exchange for weak collateral. had very high 
interest rates. The curb market played a critical role in the I %Os and 1970s in pumping money into the economy 
and in a.c;sisting the growth of smaller corporations. The curb market continued to exist. along with the fonnal 
banking syslcm. through the 19805 (hnp:/lcounttystudies.uslsouth-koreal49.hlJJl; US LibraI) of Congress). 
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2) Korea Pre-Crisis: 1980s-1990s19 
The Korean economy in the 1960s and 1970s experienced significant economIc 
growth. Despite these achievements, the government's role in economic management 
began to adversely affect the economy's efficiency as a whole. In the 1980s, the 
government undertook major action to Iiberalise further and internationalised the 
financial sector. This involved the following actions: 
a) A reduction in government intervention over financial sector 
In 1983 all commercial bank ownership was returned to the private sector. As a 
result this loosened government control over commercial banks, internal operations 
and management. One notable development was the replacement of direct credit 
controls with an indirect system in 1982. 
b) New entry regulations 
In order to promote competition amongst banks, the government lowered regulatory 
entry barriers; this increased the number of banks as well as non-financial 
institutions and enhanced competition in the financial industry. By the end of the 
1980s, the number of new banks and non-financial institutions increased 
significantly and created a healthier competitive environment. 
c) Relaxation of restriction on financial institutions activity 
Without government intervention the banks began to be more innovative in 
expanding their products and activities. They were more able to operate at full 
capacity and expanded to introduce new business products2o• 
d) Deregulating the interest rates 
Banks were given more discretion in setting their own loan rates and terms on other 
financial instruments. 
e) Internationalising the financial market 
More foreign banks were able to operate in the Korean financial sector raising the 
number of banks in the 1980s. The number of foreign bank branches increased 
significantly from only 18 in 1979 to 66 in 1989. The Korean government 
19 Oh and Park ( 1998). 
20 Among new fields ventured by the banks are sales of commercial bills. credit cards. sales of government bonds 
under repurchase agreements (RPs). factoring. mutual installment savings. and trusts. negotiable certificates of 
deposits (CDs). as well as the acceptance. discount and sale of trade bills. Among non-financial institutions. 
investment and finance companies and merchant banking corporations were permitted to offer commercial paper 
(CP) and cash management accounts (CMAs) See Oh and Park (1998). 
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introduced new fmancial instruments involving open and closed-end funds targeting 
foreign investors. Loosening entry allowed the foreign security companies to build 
up their representatives offices in Korea and by the mid 1990s they were permitted 
to establish wholly owned subsidiaries (Sang Koo N~ 1998). 
Korea's economy grew significantly from 1986 to 1989, impacted by a weak dollar, 
low oil prices and global interest rates. However, the transition to democracy in 1987 
adversely affected economic growth and this had an impact on the competitiveness of 
the economy. Despite the downturn, liberalization of the financial sector and capital 
account accelerated rapidly in the 1990s and this further improved the efficiency and 
internationalization of the financial market. The most notable financial reforms 
included four stage interest deregulations that included; (1) deregulating short term 
lending and deposit rates for all banks and non-financial bank institutions (NBFI); (2) 
in 1993 all regulations on lending rates were lifted and rates on long term deposits 
with maturities of two years or more were freed-up; (3) the third stages implemented 
in 1994 and 1995 involved further interest rate deregulation; and (4) all regulations on 
interest rates were abolished. 
The financial crisis in 1997 brought a shock to the Korean economy and forced the 
government to seek financial assistance from the IMF. During the 1990s, Korea's 
economy had grown and shown significant changes through financial deregulation, 
but this abruptly ended due to rising inflation, the appreciation of the Korean Won, 
and recession in the world economy. Despite the liberalisation process, the Korean 
banking sector collapsed prior to the 1997 financial crisis and as a recovery plan, 
Korea launched two restructuring stages as summarised in Park and Weber (pg, 2374, 
2006) as: 'The first stage involved the nationalisation of banks for later sale to 
foreigners, fIVe insolvent banks were closed and then merged with blue-chip banks, 
foreign capital injections were given to seven banks, and public funds were used to 
normalise operations of the remaining surviving banks'; and 'The second stage 
focused on restoring bank profitability. Financial holding companies were created to 
malce merger and acquisition easier and help banks realise scare economies'. Figure 
2.5 lists ten major causes for Korean financial crisis (Lee, 1998). 
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Figure 2.5: Ten Major Causes for Korean Financial Crisis 21 
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November 21 
December 3 
December 4 
December 18 
December 24 
December 30 
January 7 
January 8 
February 7 
February 17 
May 2 
May 29 
July 24 
August 28 
November 13 
December 9 
December 14 
Box 3: Korean Cbronological Higbligbts22 
1997 
The IMF welcomes Korea's request for IMF assistance. 
The IMF notes the successful conclusion of discussions with Korea and the 
pledges of support coming from the World Bank, ADB, and countries in the group 
of potential participants in the supplemental financing support package for Korea. 
The IMF Executive Board approves a US$21 billion stand-by credit for Korea. 
and releases a disbursement ofUS$5.6 billion. 
The IMF Executive Board concludes the first bi-weekly review of the stand-by 
arrangement and disburses US$3.5 billion, activating the IMF's new supplemental 
Reserve Facility. 
Korea issues a Letter of Intent, concerning intensification and acceleration of its 
program. The IMF Managing Director announces his intention to recommend to 
the executive Board a significant acceleration of the resources available to Korea. 
in light of Korea's Letter of Intent and in context with the progress between 
Korean and international banks in dealing with Korea's external debt. and notes 
that the World Bank and ADB would disburse a total of US$5 billion before the 
year's end and the group of potential participants in the supplemental financing 
support package for Korea would be prepared to disburse up to US$8 billion. 
The Executive Board approves the request by Korea for modification of the 
schedule of purchases, bringing forward part of the amounts originally 
scheduled for February and May 1998, but without changing overall access to 
fund resources, and disburses US$2 billion to Korea. 
1998 
Korea issues a Letter of Intent providing additional details on measures described 
in the December 24, 1997 Letter of Intent. 
The IMF Executive Board concludes the second bi-weekly review of the stand-by 
arrangement and disburses US$2 billion. 
Korea issues a Letter of Intent on additional measures. 
The Executive Board completes the first quarterly review of the stand- by 
arrangement and disburses US$2 billion. 
Korea issues a Letter of Intent on additional measures. 
The Executive Board completes the second quarterly review of the 
stand-by arrangement and disburses US$2 billion, and concludes the 
1998 Article IV consultation. 
Korea issues a Letter of Intent on additional measures. 
The Executive Board completes the third quarterly review of the stand- by 
arrangement and disburses a further US$I billion. 
Korea issues a Letter of Intent on additional measures. 
Korea announces it will make Supplemental Reserve Facility 
repurchases ofUS$2.8 billion during December 1998. 
The Executive Board completes the fourth quarterly review of the stand- by 
arrangement and disburses a further US$1 billion. 
22 Summarization from secondary source: A Factsheet ( JUJuary 1999);The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis 
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BoI 4:Tbe IMF-Supported Program of Economic Reform23 
Over the last several decades, Korea transformed itself into an advanced industrial economy. However, 
the financial system had been weakened by government interference in the economy and by close 
linkages between banks and conglomerates. Amid the Asian financial crisis, a loss of market 
confidence brought the country perilously close to depleting its foreign exchange reserves. On 
December 4, 1997 the IMF's Executive Board approved financing of up to SDR24 15.5 billion or about 
US$21 billion, equivalent to 1,939 percent of Korea's quota, over the next three years. 
The initial program of economic reform assumed growtb in 1998 of 1.5 percent and featured: 
• Comprehensive financial sector restructuring that introduced a clear and finn exit policy for 
financial institutions, strong market and supervisory discipline, and independence for the 
central bank. The operations of nine insolvent merchant banks were suspended; two large 
distressed commercial banks received capital injections from the government, and all 
commercial banks with inadequate capital were required to submit plans for recapitalization; 
• Fiscal measures equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP to make room for the costs of financial 
sector restructuring in the budget, while maintaining a prudent fiscal stance. Fiscal measures 
include widening the bases for corporate, income, and V A T taxes; 
• Efforts to dismantle the non-transparent and inefficient ties among the government, banks, and 
businesses, including measures to upgrade accounting, auditing, and disclosure standards. 
require that corporate financial statements be prepared on a consolidated basis and certified by 
external auditors, and phase out the system of cross guarantees within conglomerates; 
• Trade liberalization measures, including setting a timetable in line with WTO commitments to 
eliminate trade related subsidies and the import diversification program, as well as 
streamlining and improving transparency of import certification procedures; 
• Capital account liberalization measures to open up the Korean money. bon~ and equity 
markets to capital inflows, and to liberalize foreign direct investment; 
• Labour market reform to facilitate the redeployment of labour; and 
• The publication and dissemination of key economic and financial data. 
2.5 Malaysia 
It has been over 50 years since Malaysia gained its independence in August 31, 1957. 
The Malaysian economy, referred to as a Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)2S, has 
been driven by high technology, knowledge based and capital intensive industries. 
From a country dependent on agriCUlture and primary commodities in the 1960s, 
Malaysia has today become a manufacturing based export driven economy. 
The Malaysian economy has experienced rapid structural and economic changes since 
independence in 1957. Since 1970 Malaysia's economy has experienced many 
structural changes and these changes were guided through three long term 
2J Summruization from secondary source: A Factsheet - (January 1999);The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis 
24 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are international foreign exchange reserve assets. Allocated to nations by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). a SDR represents a claim to foreign currencies for which it may be exchanged 
in times of need. ~\ Countries with mon: advanced economies than other developing nations. but which have not yet furry 
demonstrated the signs ofa developed country. are grouped under the tenn newly industriaJiZJ:d countries. 
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development programs, namely the New Economic Policy (NEP), 1970 - 1990, The 
National Development Policy (NDP), 1990 - 2000, and the National Vision Policy 
(NVP), 2001-2010. The aims and objectives have remained consistent and interrelated 
with the need for the country to sustain its economic growth whereas fmancial 
restructuring aimed at improving the fmancial system performance and assuring the 
program benefitted all groups and communities. Malaysia has a very diverse economy 
and can be divided into four broad phases; 
1) 1957-1970 - the years after the independence 
Within this period, Malaysia continued its 'open-door' policy by supporting and 
permitting more trade and industry activity, redressing ethnic and regional economic 
imbalances through providing social and physical infrastructure (Snodgrass 1980), 
(Athukorala 2005). Malaysia's fmancial system has changed from a commodity based 
country into an industrialised economy with a strategy directed towards 'promote 
effort, geared to the provision of an investment climate favourable to the private 
enterprise' (Wheelwright 1963, pg 69). The racial riots of May 1969 were a turning 
point that led to the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, the 
publication of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 and the Outline Perspective Plan 
(OPP) 1971-1990. NEP came with objectives to eradicate poverty, restructuring of 
Malaysian society and to continue attracting foreign investors. 
2) 1971-1990 - Post war growth 
The 1970s showed further development in economic and structural changes with a 
strong emphasis on economic growth and enhancing income/wealth distribution. 
Malaysia also faced the international oil crises in 1973-1974, the 1978-1979 global 
economic slowdown and a major reduction in demand for electronics and primary 
commodities by the mid-1980s. The move towards heavy industrialization in the 
1980s brought economic crisis during 1985-1987 which was caused by a large deficit 
due to heavy industrialisation plans and a downward trend in major export product 
prices. In response to the crisis a recovery package was launched putting emphasis on 
the private sector and participation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Corden, 
1996). 
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3) 1991-1999 - the year of crisis and recovery program 
In the mid 1990s, after an impressive economic performance, the country was shaken 
by the Asian Financial Crisis. In 1998 the Malaysian government launched a policy 
package to insulate monetary policy from extemal volatility. Malaysia reacted by 
adopting a strong capital control policy and a fIXed exchange rate system. 
4) 2000-2005 - post crisis period 
In 1999 the Central Bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), proposed a 
merger plan to restructure its 54 domestic fmancial institutions. The merger plans 
were implemented to consolidate the banks into 10 major institutions by 2002. The 
plan ended in 2002 with 9 'anchor banks' as shown in Table 2.8. The proposed 
merger plans by BNM in 1999 were to restore stability in the banking sectors and 
maintaining the integrity of public savings. In order to succeed BNM acquired shares 
in some of the troubled commercial banks and through absorption of the assets and 
liabilities of insolvent institutions. 
Table 2.6: General Policy Package 
Pre-Liberalisation + 
1958-70: launched market-led development 
policy 
1968-85: promotion of export-oriented 
policy 
1965-70: launched First Five-year 
Malaysia Plan 
1971-75: Second Five-year Malaysia Plan 
1976-80: Third Five-year Malaysia Plan 
1970: Establishment of Free Trade Zone 
Post-Liberalisation ++ 
1980-90: heavy industrialisation push 
1983: beginning of Privatisation Policy 
1986-90: adjustment and liberalisation 
1986-95: Industrial Master Plan 
1981-85:F ourth Five-year Malaysia 
Plan 
1986-90: Fifth Five-year Malaysia Plan 
1991-95: Sixth Five-year Malaysia Plan 
1991: Launched Vision 2020 I 
New Development Policy 
1996-2000: Seventh Five-year Malaysia 
Plan 
Source: The Malaysia Economy and Monetary Policy. Mohame<L (2000), pp. 2. 
Note: +Pre-Iiberalisation - from the year Malaysia gained her independence from Britain in 1957 until 
the end of 1978 when domestic interest rates were deregulated; 
++ Post-Iiberalisation period (post-I 978) - era of financial refonns and is designed to enhance 
domestic monetary policy control in achieving economic growth. 
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Table 2.7: Financial Liberalisation and Monetary Policy Reform 
Monetary Policy Exchange Rate & Financial System Reform 
Reform Capital Flow 
1978: deregulation 
domestic interest rates; 
of 1972: adoption of US dollar as 
intervention currency; 
1975: Quantitative control on 
credit was abolished but 
maintained credit to selected 
sectors; 
Since 1987, sales and 
purchases of government and 
central bank securities have 
become increasingly 
important 
1991: removal of the Base 
lending rate that was 
introduced in 1983. 
1973: conversion from fixed 
to a flexible exchange rate 
regime; since 1978 there has 
been no restriction on capital 
inflows. 
1959: establishment of Central 
Bank; 
1960: establishment of Malayan 
Stock Exchange (equity market) 
and the birth of Malaysian 
Government Securities; 
1963: establishment of discount 
houses; 
1973: Malaysia and Singapore 
agreed to tenninate their common 
currencies and at the same time the 
stock market was disjointed; 
1978: the birth of banks NCO 
(Negotiable Certificate of 
Deposits); 
1980s: the development of private 
debt securities market; 
1990: actual splitting of The 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and 
Singapore Stock Exchange; 
1990:establishment of the 
International offshore financial 
centre; 
1997: establishment of future 
options market. 
Source: The Malaysia Economy and Monetary Policy. Moham~ (2000), pp. 2. 
30 
Tabl 28 Ch . Mia· B ki e • an2e8 In a IYStan an ng • • 
Banking Groups Banking institutions in the group 
(Anchor bankt Subsidiaries Acquired institutions 
Alliance Bank Multi-Purpose Bank Bh<L 
Malaysia Berhadc International Bank Malaysia 
Bhd~ Bolton Finance Bh<L 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers 
Bh<L Sabah Bank Bh<L Sabah 
Finance Bhd and Amanah 
Merchant Bank Bhd 
AmBankc Arab Malaysian Finance Berhad MBF Finance Bhd. 
CIMBb Commerce Finance Berhad Commerce International 
Merchant Bankers Berha<L Bank 
Bumiputra; Southern Bank 
EON Bank EON Finance Berhad Oriental Bank; City Finance; 
Perkasa Finance; Malaysia 
International Merchant Bankers 
Hong Leong Bank Hong Leong Finance Berhad Wah Tat Bank· , Credit 
Corporation Malaysia 
Malayan Banking Mayban Finance Berhad PhileoAllied Bank; Pacific Bank; 
Berhad Sime Finance 
Affin Bank Affin Finance Berhad BSN Commercial Bank· , BSN 
Perwira Affin Merchant Bankers Finance; Asia Commercial 
Finance; BSN Merchant Bank 
Public Bank Public Finance Berhad Hock Hua Bank· ~ Advance 
Finance; Sime Merchant Banks 
RHB Bank RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Sime Bank; Bank Utama; Delta 
Finance; Interfinance Berhad 
9 institutions 9 institutions 36 institutions 
Source: Bank Negara MalaYSIa Annual Report (2009). 
Note: -The six original acquirers or 'anchor banks' in the government-led merger programme were 
Maybank, Bumiputra Commerce B~ Public B~ Perwira Affin Bank, Multi-Purpose Bank and 
Southern. tJsumiputra-Commerce was created from the merger between Bank of Commerce and Bank 
Bumiputra, the second largest banking institutions prior to 1997 crisis. The latter suffered from oon-
performing loans and so was rescued by the Bank of Commerce. The mergers between Bank of 
Commerce and Bank Bumiputra as well as RHB Bank and Sime Bank happened in 1999 prior to the 
government merger announcement in October 1999. In 2006 Southern Bank was bought out by 
Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings (BCHB). BCHB planned to delist the bank from public listing as well 
as Bumiputra-Commerce and CIMB (Investment bank division). Therefore these three banks converted 
into one universal bank and was renamed CIMB Bank commencing, on 18th March 2007. cAmBank 
and Alliance Bank were previously known as Arab Malaysia Bank and Multipurpose Bank 
respectively. 
2.S.1 Malaysian Financial Institutions 
The banking system in Malaysia comprises commercial banks, investment banks and 
Islamic banks. These are the main source of funds and the main contributors in 
financing the economy and development activities in the country. By the end of 1959, 
two years after gaining independence and the establishment of BNM, there were 26 
commercial banks with only 8 of them being Malaysian .. whilst the rest were foreign 
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owned (Matthews and Ismail, 2005). At the time the foreign banks dominated the 
system specialising in foreign exchange business and finance of foreign trade (Lin 
1977; Matthews and Ismail, 2005). 
In the 1960s, BNM took drastic measures to develop the banking structure with the 
main concern being to develop a domestically oriented banking system. As a resul~ 
the domestic banking network was extended and foreign banks were asked for 
reorientation of their operations towards meeting and catering for domestic needs. In 
1982 the local banks improved considerably by increasing the number of commercial 
banks to 38 with 21 Malaysian and 16 foreign banks, and by 1993 the number of 
domestic banks had increased to 23. Since 1971, BNM has prohibited any opening of 
new foreign bank branches and the last license to a foreign institution was granted in 
1973 (Detragiache et al. 2005). 
1) Malaysian Banking-1980s 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Malaysian banking experienced a severe banking crisis 
and underwent financial deepening, following the mid 1980s recession and the 
collapse of the stock market. The Government supported by BNM, moved towards 
reforming the policies and to improve banking supervision and regulations. In 1989, 
BNM launched the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) to improve 
supervision and regulation. 
2) Malaysian Banking-1990s 
Malaysia's performance peaked in the early 1990s (before the 1997 crisis) and 
successfully sustained a rapid annual growth averaging almost 8 percent annually. 
During this period, the banking sectors and the economy experienced a significant 
change in its operating environment and structure. 
The Malaysian economy underwent sharp economic deepening in 1997 - 1998 during 
the Asian crisis. In 1998 the economy contracted by more than 7 percent this also 
affected the surrounding countries, including Korea, Indonesi~ Thailand, and the 
Philippines. Large capital outflows, declining in equity values. ringgit depreciating 
and equity and real estate value plunging were among the first signs of the onset of 
the crisis in mid 1997. As the economy continued to deteriorate. the government 
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launched a plan to restore the economy, amongst other things by creating Danaharta 
and Danamodal. Danaharta was responsible for buying non-performing loans (NPL) 
at a discount from banks and Danamodal helped to provide new capital to banks in 
trouble. 
3) Crisis and recovery plan - 1997 - 2005 
There were two important reform processes associated with the restructuring (Zakaria, 
1999). Besides launching Danaharta and Danamodal to recapitalise the financial 
institutions, the reform process included restructuring of the corporate sector, mergers 
and developing a stronger and more secure bond market. In September 1998, the 
Malaysian Government imposed capital controls by imposing restrictions on capital 
repatriation by investors and offshore trading of ringgit denominated assets (Sharma 
D. S., 2003). 
Figure 2.6: Malaysia Recovery Plan 
r 
I 
I Stabilisation I Reform 
I 
Development of the 
Danamodal Danaharta bond market 
Mergers 
Corporate sector 
restructuring 
Malaysia was the only country (under study in this thesis) that did not agree to IMF 
assistance post crisis. Instead they launched a 'capital control' plan as part of the 
recovery process. The control was aimed at stemming the speculative pressure on the 
ringgit, and to provide stabilisation though moderation of domestic interest rates and 
pegged exchange rates. 
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Box 5: Malaysian Controls on Capital and Exchange Controls 
Sept. 1-2, 1998 
I) Malaysia fixed the exchange rate at RM 3.80 per SUS 
2) Prior approval was required for non-residents to be able to buy or sell ringgit forward. 
3) All sales of ringgit assets were required to be transacted through approved domestic 
intennediaries. This effectively shut down the operation of the offshore ringgit market. 
4) Non-residents were required to obtain BNM approval to convert ringgit held in external accounts 
into foreign currency, except for the purchase of ringgit assets in Malaysia or for the purposes of 
conversion and repatriation of sale proceeds of investment made by foreign direct investors. 
5) Settlements of imports and exports were required to be settled in foreign currency. However. free 
exchange was maintained for all current account transactions in addition to supply of trade credit 
to non-resident exporters of Malaysian goods. 
6) Credits to External Accounts were limited to the sale of foreign currency, ringgit instruments, 
securities or other assets in Malaysia; salaries, wages, rentals commissions, interest, profits, or 
dividends. 
7) Debits to External Accounts were restricted to settlement for purchase of ringgit assets and 
placement of deposits; payment of administrative and statutory expenses in Malaysia; payment of 
goods and services for use in Malaysia; and granting of loans and advances to staff in Malaysia. 
8) Domestic nationals were forbidden to export more than RM 10, 000 during any travels abroad. 
Foreign nationals were forbidden to export more than RM I 000 upon leaving Malaysia. 
9) After September 1, 1998, non-resident sellers of Malaysian securities were required to hold on to 
their ringgit proceeds for at least 12 months before repatriation was to be allowed. Ban on the 
provision of domestic credit to non-resident correspondent banks and stock broking companies. 
Changes in Controls -1999 
I) As of February 15, 1999, the year-long moratorium on repatriation of investments was replaced 
with a graduated tax. All capital that had entered Malaysia before February 15, 1999 was subject 
to the following levies on the capital being removed: (a.) 3()oA, if repatriated within the first 7 
months after entering Malaysia, (b.) 20% if repatriated between 7 and 9 months after entry, (c.) 
10% if repatriated between 9 and 12 months of entering, and (d.) no levy if repatriated after one 
year of entry. 
2) For funds entering Malaysia after February 15, 1999, capital was free to enter and leave without 
taxation; however, profits were taxed at the rate of 3()oA, if repatriated within one of entry and 
10% if repatriated after one year of enter. 
Source: Kaplan and Rodrik, Box 1, pp. 36, (200 1) 
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Table 2.9: A Chronology of Key Events 
Malaysia, 
Asian crisis, 
1997-1998 
July 14, 1997 
January 5, 1998 
September 1, 1998 
September 2, 1998 
September 7, 1998 
February 4, 1999 
Source: Remhart and Edison, pp. 23, (2001) 
Interest rates peak. 
Ringgit suffers its largest daily decline (7.5 percent) 
against the dollar. 
Exchange controls introduced 
Exchange rate is fixed. 
The stocks market suffers its largest one-day decline 
(down 22 percent). 
Exchange controls modified. New rule introduced to 
replace one-year holding period rule for portfolio capital. 
Under the new rules, a declining scale of exit levies 
replaced the 12-month holding restriction on repatriation 
of portfolio capital. 
T bl 210 A Ch I fK E t a e • rono ogy 0 ey ven s • . 
Date Policy Objectives Specific Measures 
September To deter speculation on the Controls on transfers of funds from ringgit-denominated 
1998 ringgit and gain monetary accounts for non-residents not physically present in 
policy independence Malaysia, in effect imposing a 12-month holding period 
restriction for repatriation of the proceeds from the sale of 
Malaysian securities, with retroactive effect. Prohibition of 
offshore transactions of ringgit. Ringgit pegged at RM3.8 
per U.S. dollar. 
February 1999 To pre-empt exodus of Easing of some controls, including replacement of the 12-
capital and reengage month holding period restriction for repatriation of 
foreign investors portfolio capital by a two-tier, price-based graduated exit 
levy system. 
September To provide further Removal of the exit levy on repatriation of principals. The 
1999 relaxation two-tier graduated levy system on repatriation of profits 
simplified and replaced by a flat 10 percent exit levy, 
irrespective of when the profits are repatriated. 
February 2001 To provide further easing Removal of the 10 percent exit levy on portfolio capital 
profits repatriated after twelve months. 
May 2001 To eliminate controls on Complete removal of the 10 percent exit levy 
portfolio investment 
. Source: Kawai and Takagi, pp. 10 (2003) 
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2.6 Pbilippines26 
Since independence in 194627 the Philippines economy can be characterised as a 
country under financial repression. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Philippines managed 
to experience modes growth but it began to deteriorate after 1965 due to political and 
social unrest. The deterioration was mainly caused by inefficient allocation of foreign 
debt-financed public investment, the oil shock, world recession and the increasing 
dependence on commercial foreign debt. The problems persisted when the country 
faced severe recession from 1984 through 1985 and perceptions of political instability 
during the Aquino administration further dampened economic activity. Furthermore 
the Philippines Presidency critically faced unrest experiencing major changes: 
• The presidency of Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) 
• The presidency ofCorazon Aquino (1986-1992) 
• The presidency of Fidel Ramos (June 1992-June 1998) 
• The presidency of Joseph Estrada (June 1998-January 2001) 
• The presidency of Gloria Arroyo (January 2001- present) 
IMF assistance has been sought to design economic policies for the Philippines since 
the 1960s. The Philippines entered an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program 
in 1970 to overcome the defects of the economy. The program was also supported by 
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in ensuring adjustment and this 
involved: devaluation of the peso, the promotion of manufactured exports and 
incentive schemes to attract multinationals that were export-oriented (Bautista and 
Lim, 2006). With the IMF assistance the economy slowly recovered towards the end 
of the 1980s. 
26 Lim and Montes (200). 
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Table 2.11 :Decade Highlights 
1950 - 1959 
1960 - 1969 
1970 - 1979 
1980-1989 
1990-2000 
Reconstruction financing based on war reparations dries up; Import substituting 
industrialization strategy implemented to stave off BOP crisis; high growth in 
manufacturing and the economy; BOP crisis towards end of the decade. 
1962 devaluation; Abandonment of import-substituting industrialization strategy; 
Initial IMF help; Infrastructure spending spree in second half of decade; Foreign 
debt crisis towards end of the decade. 
1970 devaluation to solve BOP crisis; Centralized government under Martial Law; 
First oil shock; Foreign debt-driven growth with IMF assistance and support. 
Second oil shock; High interest rate policies by developed countries; Latin-
American foreign debt crisis begins in 1982; 1983 Aquino assassination and BOP 
crisis; Debt default and moratorium; Capital flight; Political instability; Economic 
collapse in 1984-85; End of Martial Law; Trade and Financial Liberalization in 
second half of decade; Recovery with IMF assistance; Series of coups against the 
Aquino government. 
Slowdown in 1990 and recession in 1991 due to another crisis brought about by 
debt overhang, monetarist policies and loss of confidence; Power crisis of 1992-93; 
Tariff reduction and capital account liberalization I locking into AFT A, WTO and 
APEC in the early and mid-nineties; Bullish growth in 1994 - 91; Asian currency 
crisis of 1997 - 99. Weak and uncertain recovery after. 
Source: Lim and Bautista, pp.6 (2006). 
2.6.1 The Philippines Financial Sectors 
The Philippines fmancial system is made up of four types of banks; commercial banks 
which are divided into universal and regular commercial banks, thrift banks, rural 
banks, and cooperative banks. The Philippines banks entered the crisis period in a 
well capitalised and robust condition. The Philippines implemented measures to 
encourage competition and strengthen their supervisory and regulatory system in three 
distinct phases: (i) 1980s financial reforms; (ii) reforms in the mid 1990s; and (iii) 
reforms in 2000 through IMF recommendations28• In 1990s, Philippines promoted 
openness to foreign banks29 operations with an aim to create a more competitive 
environment. In doing so the Government projected economic growth through 
attracting more foreign investment by creating more variety in financial system 
services. With these reforms the Philippines emerged as one of the more resilient SEA 
economies and were less impacted than others from the 1997 crisis (Reyes, 200 1 ). 
]I The refonn plan recommended by IMF had three purposes; (I) to strengthen the savings mobilization to 
financial intennediaries. (2) to devise provision of medium and long tenn industries funds. and (3) to enhance the 
productivity of the financial sector by expanding its scale. This plan. followed by a n~mber of m.casures 
implemented; (I) liberalizing interest rnleS. (2) selccted banks were penmtted to operate uDlversaJ bankmg. (3) 
reducing reserve requirements. and (3) revising the tax system on institutions income. 
~e foreign banks operations are still und~ strict regulations when: they are not to operate as universal banks; 
not to eng88e in trust operations and not allowed to open new branches. 
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Table 2.12:The Philippines Financial System 
Type of Institutions 
Banking Institutions 
Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries 
Non-Bank Thrift Institution 
Source: Gochoco-Bautista, pp. 35 (1999). 
Components 
Universal banks 
Commercial banks 
Thrift banks 
Rural and cooperative banks 
Specialised government banks 
Investment houses 
Financing companies 
Securities dealers 
Investment companies 
Fund managers 
Lending investors 
Pawnshops 
Government NBFIs 
Venture capital corporations 
Mutual building and loan associations 
Institutional associations 
Non stock savings and loans 
associations 
1) Financial Restructuring in the 1980s 
In 1980 the Philippines experienced a serious economic and financial crisis that 
forced the government to restructure the banking system in order to add stability and 
to promote competition. The banks were given the responsibility to allocate funding to 
various economic activities. To achieve these objectives, numerous types of banks 
were pared down to five main types, namely; universal banks or banks with expanded 
commercial banking functions; ordinary commercial banks; thrift banks; rural banks; 
and specialized government banks. Minimum capital requirements varied across these 
different institutions (Lamberte, 1993; Manlagftit and Lamberte, 2004). In light of 
several bank failures in the 1980s the reforms continued to be implemented in several 
other important areas such as: removal of interest rate ceilings, restricting bank entry 
(lifted in 1991) and the tightening of prudential regulations. 
2) Financial Reforms - mid 1990s 
In the early 1990s, the government aimed to encourage foreign participation 10 
economic activities, contribute towards foreign investment and increases variety in 
banking services (Manlagftit and Lam berte, 2004). The reforms continued with 
greater changes and emphasis was given to developing foreign that involved; 
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• Deregulating the foreign exchange market to enhance efficiency consistent with 
economic development; 
• Redefining prudential limits on foreign exchange activities of banks; 
• Introducing legislation, the New Central Bank Act in 1993, to ensure 
independence from political interference in the conduct of monetary policy; 
• In 1991, bank entry restrictions were lifted, 10 new foreign banks were allowed 
licences by 1993. 
Reforms in early 1990's significantly improved econormc and financial sector 
development. These changes however, also brought some weaknesses and 
vulnerability (Alburo, 1999), namely; 
• a surge in short-term capital mostly in the form of portfolio investments relative 
to the flows of foreign direct investmeneo; 
• emergence of a stock market bubble and real estate and non-tradable good 
inflation; 
• a rapid expansion of domestic credit extended by the commercial banking system, 
• widening current account deficits; and 
• an overvaluation of the local currency (similar symptoms to the Mexican crisis in 
1994). 
In 1997, the economy was again in turmoil, when the Asian financial crisis (which 
started in Thailand) struck the region. The crisis left significant macroeconomic 
effects such as; 
• A downward shift in economic growth and credit availability; 
• Higher interest rates; 
• Policy action designed to reduce credit rationing seemed to have the opposite; 
effect and credit availability increasingly tightened; 
• Large depreciation of the Peso resulting from a large outflow of foreign capital; 
30 Portfolio investment inflows in the Philippines have found their way into the property sectors., into the stock 
markets. or into financial institutions. among others. Driven by continued privatization of public enterprises. initial 
public offerings by corporations. and overall "irrational exuberance," these investments drove up asset prices and 
created large paper gains in the stock market. The flotation of the First Philippine Fund (FPF) in the New York 
Stock Exchange helped this along especially after 1992. Evidence of the property bubble can be readily observed 
in the rapid decline in property prices around the prime areas of the country. the shelving of planned property 
construction. and the sharp drop in prices of club and golf course shan.'S in the immediate aftennath of the crisis 
(Alburo, 1999. pp. 443) 
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• Rise in inflation: and 
• A fall in government revenue due to a shortfall in income tax and import tax 
collections. 
'Ibe Philippines recovery plan involved extending the IMF supported progran1 which 
was already in place (since late 1980s and early 1990s) to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis. The IMF supported programs successfully implemented macroeconomic 
adjustment and structural reform. This enabled the Philippines to weather the crisis at 
a relatively lower cost in terms of output loss. employment and social distortion 
compared to other SEA economies (IMF, 2000). 
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T bl 213 C titi P P Ii . dD I . a e . ompe on- romotin2 o Cles an eregul ation • . 
Early Introduction of universal banking; Lifting of interest rate ceilings 
1980s 
1989 Measures to promote competition among banks. Abolition of opening new 
branches in preferentially treated agricultural areas. Unification of legal reserve 
ratios 
1990 Abolition of moratorium on new entry by domestic banks. Raising the minimum 
paid-in capital of savings banks. Approved off-site A TMs. Raised minimum 
paid-in capital of savings banks. 
1991 Raised minimum paid-in capital of expanded commercial banks and ordinary 
commercial banks. Measure to promote bank mergers and consolidation. 
Liberalization of regulation on opening bank branches. Approval of opening 
branches across the country was given to agricultural bank. Measure to promote 
bank mergers/consolidation. The Central Bank's approval was no longer 
required for installing A TM in areas where bank branch does not exist. Foreign 
exchange liberalization 
1992 Measures to promote the opening of branches. The ceiling was raised on the 
ratio of foreign exchange holding to receipts from exports to 40%. Abolition of 
foreign exchange regulation as a principle 
1993 Creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Deregulation of ATM installation 
criteria. Further relaxation of branching policies. Lifting of prior CB Approval 
in the establishment of A TMs. Gradual reduction of reserve requirements. 
Capital ratio, liquidity and profitability and sound management became criteria 
for approving the opening of bank branches. The New Central Bank Act was 
enacted. Legal reserves were introduced to common trust funds 
1994 Liberalization of market entry by foreign banks. Reduction of required 
equivalent capital for opening branches for savings banks. Revision of 
minimum paid-in capital for savings banks; Rationalization of the rediscount 
rate. 
1995 Liberalization of entry-exit rules for rural banks. Increase in the minimum paid-
in capital for banks. Passage of Thrift Bank Act of 1995. Easier rules on 
investment in banks. 
1996 Guidelines on the issuance of expanded commercial banking authority to local 
branches of foreign banks operating in the country. Further increase in the 
capital requirement of banks. 
1999 Further encouraged mergers and consolidation. Increased disclosure 
requirements of banks. 
2000 Passage of the General Banking Law of 2000; Electronic Commerce Act. 
Greater transparency in granting OOSRI loans. Issued rules and regulations to 
combat money laundering. Issued guidelines on operations of foreign exchange 
subsidiaries of banks. 
2001 Issued regulations to implement the General Banking Law of 2000. 
Amendments to the New Central Bank Act. 
2002 Maintenance of strength and stability. Improvement of banking services and 
corporate governance. Promote microfinance. 
2003 Approved the increase in the liquidity reserve requirement against peso deman<L 
savings, time deposits and deposit substitute liabilities of Universal Banks 
(UBs) and Commercial Banks (KBs) Issued guidelines in the establishment of a 
foreign subsidiary by a bank subsidiary 
2004 Increase of the liquidity reserve requirement against peso demand, savings, time 
deposits and deposit substitute liabilities for UBs and KBs and Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions with Quasi-Banking Functions (NBQBs). 
.. 
. Source: Money &. Bankmg m the Phlllppmes (BSP 2(03); Okuda and Saito (200 I). Manlagfht and 
Lamberte. (2004) 
41 
2.7 Thailand 
Thailand is considered as a middle-income country in the SEA. In the early years. 
1960s to mid 1980s, Thailand was the fastest growing country with GNP growth 
averaging 4.7 percent over the entire period. The economy was mainly dependent on 
production and export of primary commodities and continued to grow substantially 
between 1986 and 1990 (Warr and Bhanupong, 1996; Hicken, 2004). 
Thailand's economy can be characterised by three sub-periods31 of development: 
• 1980-1985 period of macroeconomic adjustment, economic uncertainty 
and hardship 
• 1986-1996 a period of extraordinary high economic growth, economic 
surge, speculation and 'bubbles' 
• 1997-2003 economic distress and emerging recovery 
Table 2.14: Thailand: Economic Background 
GOP FOI InDation Rate Current Account Budget Year Growth (0/0) (Mill of USS) (GOP deDator) Balance Surplus (°10 of GOP) (01. of GOP) 
1980 5.2 190 12.7 -6.4 -4.9 
1981 5.9 291 8.4 -7.3 -3.4 
1982 5.4 J91 5.1 -2.7 -6.4 
1983 5.6 350 3.7 -7.2 -3.4 
1984 5.8 401 1.4 -5.0 -4.0 
1985 4.6 ]63 2.2 -4.0 -5.2 
1986 5.5 263 1.7 0.6 -4.2 
1987 9.5 352 4.7 -0.7 -2.2 
1988 13.3 1,105 5.9 -2.7 0.6 
1989 12.2 1,776 6.1 -3.5 2.9 
1990 11.2 2,444 5.8 -8.5 4.5 
1991 8.6 2,014 5.7 -7.7 4.7 
1992 8.1 2,113 4.5 -5.7 2.8 
1993 8.4 1,804 3.3 -5.1 2.1 
1994 8.9 ],366 5.1 -5.6 1.8 
1995 8.8 2,065 6.0 -8.1 2.9 
1996 5.5 2,336 4.0 -8.1 2.4 
1997 -0.4 3,745 5.4 -1.9 -0.9 
Source: Hicken (2004). 
Thailand's economy has experienced a remarkably rapid and consistent growth of 
economy since the early 1960s until the mid 1980s. The growth in GDP amounted to 
8.2 percent between 1960 to 1969, 7.2 percent over 1970 to 1979 and 5.4 percent over 
1980-85 (Dixon, 200 1). The Thai economy developed in the late 1970s until early 
31 Pholphirul ( 2005) 
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1980s mainly due to growth of agricultural production and an import substituting 
manufacturing sector. In the 1970s the economy was adversely impacted by the global 
oil crisis (and again in the mid 1980s). Thailand's government encouraged 
(subsidised) expansion of the economy in key areas namely: international 
manufactured exports, utilising revenues gained from tourism sectors and remittances 
from foreign workers to help fmance this activity. In terms of trade, Thailand is 
considered the most closed of the Asian economies, as its development was 
characterized by comparatively low levels of foreign investment and ownership, a low 
level of trade dependence and from the late 1970s it was the most highly protected 
(Dixon, 2001). 
Table 2.15: Thailand (in 1978) 
Openness ratio 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Source: Dixon, 2001, pp.48 
(%) 
44.2 
86.9 
48.2 
41.7 
Trade Weighted Tariff 
Protection (0/0) 
20.0 
6.6 
23.0 
30.4 
The level of effective protection increased in 1970 which ranked Thailand as being 
one of the most protected economies (World Bank, 1980). By the beginning of the 
mid 1980s, Thailand experienced a sharp and continuous growth and in 1996 the 
government embarked on an internationalisation programme aimed at integrating into 
the global economy (Dixon, 2001). The high growth and stable macroeconomic 
environment from the late 1980s provided enough confidence for Thailand to open-up 
to the international fmancial market. Thailand became an international investment hub 
and attracted funds from new industrial economy countries (NIEs) along with Japan. 
The country successfully became a key element in the emergent Pacific Asian 
regional division of labouf32 (Dixon, 2001, pp. 48). After 1990, Thailand experienced 
an increasing level of foreign direct and short term investment to the private sector. 
The foreign direct investment in Thailand became an important element towards the 
development of the country's continuous economic growth in the 1990s and the 
increase in import and shift towards manufacturing. 
)2 Thailand became the main labor relocation spot cspc:cially for the manufacturing sectors in the mid 1980s. 
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Besides experiencing rapid growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, the country has also 
been affected by strong external and internal economic and political shocks; 
• perceived military threat from Vietnam in 1960 
• 1972-1973 international commodity crisis 
• Oil crisis 1973 - 1974 and 1979 - 1980 
• High interest rate of the early 1980s 
• World recession in the 1980s 
• Overload of foreign investment in late 1980s. 
• Severe economic and financial tunnoil in 1997 
Before being affected by the 1997 financial crisis Thailand's banking sector was 
viewed as the main element of growth in the economy. The country was considered as 
one of the "East Asian Miracle' countries for posting record growth and 
improvements in total factor productivity (World Bank 1993). All this changed by the 
mid-1990s when an overheated economy and overvalued currency led to the collapse 
of a highly leveraged and fragile banking system. (Sawanapom and Menkhoff, 2003, 
pp.3). 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis began in Thailand and spread to the neighbouring 
countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The 1997 crisis left the 
country in severe economic failure resulting in large sectors of the financial sector 
(banks and finance companies) and the real sector (property companies) becoming 
insolvent. 
Table 2.16: Thailand Financial Crisis: Key Elements33 
1988-1995 Thailand's economy's booming periods with large current account deficit, 
weak financiaJ system and overvaJuation of Thai baht. 
May 1997 Foreign speculators attack the baht. Thailand spends 90010 of foreign 
reserves to defend the baht against speculative attack. 
July 1997 Thailand changed its exchanged rate system from fixed exchange rates to 
manage floated. Thailand accepted financial assistance from IMF. 
August 1997 Thailand receives US 17 billion loans from the IMF and agrees to adopt 
tough economic measures to overcome the situation. 
December 1997 Financial sectors collapse when 56 solvency financial companies and one 
commercial bank are closed. Thailand economy slips into recession . 
. 1:1 Willman. (2004). 
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The main causes of Thailand's fmancial crisis include: 
• Weakness in domestic macro-economic fundamentals - a deficit in the current 
account due to appreciation of Thai baht and large increase in the real wages; 
• Weaknesses in the financial system, namely; excessive lending to high risk 
investors without prudent procedure of lending and monitoring; 
• Adverse effects of financialliberalisation and the massive influx of capital; 
• Speculative attacks and the floatation of the currency (baht); 
• Mis-timed political intervention, delays in policy implementations and an 
unstable political regime. 
To restore the economic and fmancial sectors from crisis, the Thai government agreed 
IMF fmancial assistance conditions of which the most important are listed as 
follows34: 
• Restoring fiscal, monetary and economic stability immediately; 
• Retaining reserves equal to 3.5 months' import value, or at least US$25 
billion; 
• Restoring confidence and trust in the finance and banking industry to counter 
any run on funds; 
• Restructuring the Financial Institutions Development Fund to ease the burden 
on government; 
• Restructuring policies, amend economic reforms, and tighten financial 
institution operating systems and macroeconomic steps; 
• Cut the current deficit from 8% of GDP in 1996 to 5% in 1997 and 3% in 
1998; 
• To maintain annual economic growth at 3- 4 % in 1997 and the year after; 
• Cap inflation at 8-9% in 1997; 
• Maintain fiscal stability balancing income and expenditure; and finally to 
• Tackle economic problems and build international credibility through fmancial 
and technical assistance from the IMF, foreign governments and foreign 
financial institutions. 
)4 Ye Myint. pp. 8-9 
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Thailand undertook other actiOns35: 
• Raised value-added tax from 7% to 1 ()01o; 
• Restricted spending on essentials such as educatio~ public hea1~ 
infrastructure and social welfare; 
• Retained the managed float of the Baht; and 
• Followed austere monetary policies. The Bank of Thailand and the Financial 
Institutions Development Fund provided liquidity to support the operations of 
the 33 fmancial institutions whose operations were not suspended. 
2.7.1 Thailand's Financial Sector 
The Thai banking system is bank-oriented with limited financial intermediation 
through mutual funds and other types of institutional investor (Alba et al., 1999; 
Chantapong, 2005). Thailand's fmancial institutions can be divided into four types: 
(1) commercial banks; (2) capital market firms36; (3) government-owned specialised 
financial institutions (SFIs) and non-bank financial intermediaries (finance 
companies, credit foncier companies, life insurance companies, and various co-
operatives). 
Before the 1997 financial cnSlS, Thailand's financial sector was dominated by 
commercial banks, which remained the oldest type of financial institution operating in 
the country. The environment experienced massive landscape changes following the 
1997 crisis due to closures and mergers of many of the finance companies. 
Table 2.17 Pre and post Crisis in Thailand Experience 
~--~--------------------------, 
Pre-financial Crisis 
Jan 31,1997 
- Commercial Banks (31) 
- Thai (15) 
- Foreign Bank Branches (16) 
International Banking facilities 
(IBFs) attached to commercial banks 
(25) 
- Stand alone lBFs (17) 
Finance and Security Companies (91) 
Credit Fonder () 2) 
- Total Financial Institutions (1761 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
l5 Ye Myint • pp. 8-9 
Post-financial Crisis 
December 31,2003 
- Commercial Banks (31) 
- Thai (13) 
- Foreign Bank Branches ( 18) 
International Banking facilities (IBFs) 
attached to commercial banks (24) 
Stand alone lBFs (5) 
Finance and Security Companies ( 18) 
Credit Fonder (5) 
Total Financial Institutions (83) 
)6 Thailand's capital market can be divided into stock and bond markets. 
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2.7.2 Weaknesses in the Thai Financial Sector 
Although the aforementioned reforms helped stabilise the country's banking and 
fmancial system., there remain some underlying issues: 
i) Too many regulatory authorities 
Financial institutions in Thailand are subject to different laws and are regulated by 
several different agencies. 
Figure 2.7 Thailand Financial Institutions 
Ministry of Finance 
Bank of Thailand 
Securities and 
Exchange 
I-- Securities 
-- Commercial banks companies 
f-- Stock market 
---Finance companies 
_ Derivative 
-Credit foncier market 
companies L-
Fiscal Policy Office 
~Specialised 
financial 
institutions 
Future market ~---------------- ----------------~ 
-V-
Thailand Financial System 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperative 
Office of Insurance 
Commissions 
I- Life 
msurance 
business 
Non life 
'-- insurance 
\.... business 
Cooperative Auditing 
Department 
'-r--
LAgricu,tura, 
Co-operative 
-----~ 
'V" 
Regulatory Authorities Structure 
The structure has left the financial sector less efficient, costly and has created 
inconsistencies in supervising and regulating the various monetary regulators. 
Thailand's system needs a convergence of regulatory practices. 
ii) Thailand's commercial banks became less efficient 
According to Chamsan (2005), Thailand's commercial bank efficiency diminished 
over the post-crisis period from 1998 - 2004. The banking sector experienced a sharp 
fall during the period 1998-1999 and gained a slight increase during 1999-2004. The 
finding also indicates no changes in the level of efficiency for domestic and foreign 
commercial banks. Compared to foreign banks activities, Thailand's commercial 
banks operated the least efficiently. Williams and Intarachote (2002) indicate that 
foreign entry was allowed into Thailand's financial sectors due to diligence and 
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monitoring, evaluating and disclosing of credit risks. Thai banks are still not able to 
compete with foreign counterparts as the foreign branch banks have skill advantages 
in sales and marketing, product innovation, and risk management as well as access to 
a cheaper source of funds. 
iii) Small Capital Market 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SEn is still developing with a limited number of listed 
firms and small a trading volume. Operating for more than 30 years, SET still has lack 
of good governance and transparency. 
2.7.3 Reform in Thailand's Banking Sector 
The liberalisation process in Thailand took place during the 1980s and early 1990s 
under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand. This process included deregulation of 
international capital flows and movement towards a more flexible exchange rate 
system. The government took steps in turning Bangkok into a regional financial sector 
with the establishment of Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBFs) in 1993. 
Thailand financial liberalisation between 1990 to 1997 can be subdivided into three 
phases (Williams and Intrachote, 2002, Chantapong, 2005): (1) 1990-1992 - increased 
competition and efficiency in the banking system; (2) 1993-1995 - enhanced savings 
mobilisation, expanded financial services to rural areas and developed Bangkok as a 
regional financial centre: and (3) 1996-1998 - deregulation of foreign exchange 
controls and relaxation of entry barriers into the domestic financial sector. 
During the early stage of liberalisation in the early 1980s, Thailand's financial sector 
was segmented between domestic banks, and other domestic and foreign bank 
institutions. The situation limited the ability to compete with domestic banks with 
both foreign banks and domestic financial institutions. The environment also made it 
difficult to compete between banking sectors and undeveloped domestic financial 
markets. Financial liberalisation policy in Thailand can be divided into four 
components (Williams and Intarachote, 2003: Okuda and Mieno, 1999): (1) 
deregulate the financial system; (2) developing financial instruments; (3) improve the 
payment system; and (4) improve supervision and examination. The objective for 
implementing financial liberalisation can be categorised into three: (1) to increase 
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competition in the domestic fmancial sector in the expectations of raising the 
efficiency of savings mobilisation and resource allocation; (2) expand the financial 
sector to support economic growth; and (3) establish Bangkok as the leading offshore 
fmancial centre in the region. 
The main mistakes made were the pursuit of fmancial liberalization without an 
adequate supervisory framework as well as the lack of appropriate monetary and 
exchange rate policies. These mistakes substantially increased the risk of economic 
stability, resulting eventually in the 1997 crisis. The financialliberalisation measures 
built up vulnerability towards economic and financial shocks. This impact can be 
observed through; (1) liberalization of foreign capital flows while keeping the 
exchange rate rigid; (2) premature liberalization of financial institutions; and (3) 
failure to prudently supervise financial institutions. 
2.8 Evaluation of the Asian Financial Crisis 1997: Crisis and Action 
Plan 
Banks in the SEA economy were somewhat prone to crisis due to the structural 
weaknesses in their respective economies and the major financial and ecOonomic 
changes that took place over the period. As noted by Rade1et and Sachs (1998, pp. 1): 
"The East Asian Financial crisis is remarkable in several ways. The crisis had hit 
the most rapidly growing economies in the world It has prompted the largest 
financial bailouts in history. It is the sharpest financial crisis to hit the developing 
world since the 1982 debt crisis. It is the least anticipatedjinancial crisis in years ". 
The Asian financial crisis of 199737 is now seen as one of the most significant 
economic events in recent world history. At the time, one common interpretation was 
that the crisis debunked the "Asian miracle". Capitalism and globalization were 
17 The 1997 Asian economic crisis was initially a financial one as speculation caused funds to drain out of Thailand 
and Korea currencies and stock markets. Due to this event.. the crisis eventually caused ","Conomic growth rates to 
collapse in several Southeast Asian countries. There have been d~stinct .phases to the Asian. crisis: the .first from 
mid-July 1997. when it first struck Thailand then followed by nClghbonng country. MalaYS1~ Indoncsl~ and ~c 
Philippines. and the second since mid-) ?98. when the turbulence has sp~ beyond the region as R.ussl&' China 
and Brazil have shown signs of contagion. Measures had to be taken to Improve overall economic system as 
depression became uncontrollably serious and prolonged. 
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repudiated and blamed for the bursting of currency and property bubbles and the 
resultant difficulties (Kim, 2007). 
There were various participants that supported SEA countries post-crisis. These 
included Asian and Western governments, the private sector, and the International 
Monetary Fund. Support sought to provide temporary financial assistance to help 
countries ease balance of payments problems (Muchhala, 2007). In particular, the 
IMF played a major role in changing the SEA economies mainly by emphasizing the 
need to restructure their banking systems. Asian crisis hit countries also agreed to 
proposals which introduced global standards for banking regulation, enhancing the 
quality of economic statistics and improving the levels of information available to 
investors in emerging market economies. However, Malaysia refused to be liberalized 
and open its capital and fmancial markets and instead took capital control measures as 
the country believed it is the movement of short term money that caused the crisis 
(Y oon, 2005). 
Several factors, both domestic and external, have contributed towards the crisis and 
these are summarised in Table 2.18: 
Table 2.18: Causes Contributed towards Asian Crisis 
Domestic factors 
• A large external deficit and inflated property 
and stock market values; 
• Lack of enforcement of prudential rules and 
inadequate supervision of financial systems, 
coupled with government directed lending 
practices that led to a sharp deterioration in the 
quality of banks' loan portfolios; 
• Problems resulting from the limited 
availability of data and a lack of transparency, 
both of which were hinder by economic 
fundamentals; and 
• Problems of government and political 
uncertainties, which worsened the crisis of 
confidence, fuelling the reluctance of foreign 
creditors to roll over short -term loans, and led 
to downward pressures on currencies and the 
stock market. 
External Factors 
• International investors had underestimated the 
risks as they searched for higher yields at a time 
when investment opportunity appeared less 
profitable in Europe and Japan, owing to their 
sluggish economic growth and low interest 
rates; 
• Since several exchange rates in East Asia were 
pegged to the US dollar, wide swings in the 
dollar/yen exchange rate contributed to the 
building in the crisis through shifts m 
international competitiveness that proved to be 
unsustainab Ie; 
• International investors, who were mainly 
commercial and investment banks, contributed 
(along with domestic investors and residents 
seeking to hedge their foreign currency 
exposures) to the downward pressure on 
currenCies, 
Source: "The ASian Crisis: Causes and Cures", Fmance and Development (Quarterly magaZIne of the 
IMF). (June 1998. Volume 35, Number 2). 
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Figure 2.8 Chronology of Financial Crisis 
Thailand 
1996 and early 1997 The 
Thai Baht IS under 
speculative attack during 
1996 and early 1997. Thai 
stock markets fall 
throughout 1996 and early 
1997 . 
Korea 
Early 1997 There are seven 
high-profile bankruptcies 
of Korean conglomerates, 
such as Hanbo Steel and 
Kia Motors . Korea The 
economy is very dependent 
on manufacturing-based 
enterprises, especially large 
industrial conglomerates 
known as Chaebol , which 
dominate the economy. 
AS I A:\ 
C RI SIS 
The Philippines 
July 1997 The Philippines 
abandons its dollar-peg 
and Imposes certa in 
forei gn exchange controls. 
Malays ia al so abandons 
its pegged exchange rate. 
Overnight interest rates 
are raised in the 
Philippines to 32% at one 
point. 
Malaysia 
Started in July 1997 with 
a plunge in its currency. 
the ringgit deprec iated 
by 35 percent from J u I y 
1997 to December 1997 
against the dollar. This 
lunge not onl y severely 
affected the Malays ian 
stock market but a lso 
destroyed 
confidence. 
introduces 
controls. 
mvestor 
Malaysia 
capita l 
Indonesia 
14 Augu t 1997 
Indones ia ra ises 
interest rates but 
lowers them fro m late 
August as it deva lues 
the Rupiah on 14 
August. 
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The nature of this crisis, and the need to restore confidence as soon as possible, also 
drove each country to take several measures towards recovery. The financial crisis of 
SEA countries (initiated in Thailand in June 1997) was generally met treated with two 
countermeasures; 
Accepting 
IMF 
Table 2.19: Countermeasures of countries and IMF supports 
IMF SupPOrt and Policy Intervention 
Support Refusal to support 
Positive Korea Malaysia (Capital Control) 
Passive Thailand 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Source: Y oon~ (2005). 
Measures shown in Table 2.19 can be classified as follows: 
• Accepting IMF assistance: Korea and Thailand received IMF help and propelled 
finance and corporate structural reshuffles as requested by IMF. 
• Accepting IMF with complications: Indonesia received IMF help but didn't 
accomplish the IMF program because of their political situation. The Philippines 
adopted its own policies from its successful IMF supported program of 
macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms in the late 1980's and early 
1990's, enabling the country to confront the crisis at a relatively lower cost in 
terms of output loss, unemployment and social dislocation . 
• Without the IMF: Malaysia refused IMF help and undertook its own policies which 
refused the opening-up and liberalizing the financial market. 
International Monetary Fund (lMFJ intervention. Three of the most affected 
countries accepted IMF financial support packages and these can be briefly explained 
as follows: 
(1) Financing: Indonesia, Korea and Thailand were given IMF financial support 
worth US$35 billion as assistance for adjustment and reform programs. Some US$85 
billion of financing was committed from other multilateral and bilateral sources. 
Besides financing, additional action was taken at various stages in different countries 
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after the start of IMF programs, to stem private capital outflows through making the 
return on domestic assets more attractive. 
(2) Macroeconomic Policy: Monetary policy was tightened according to each 
countries background, in order to stop the exchange rate from falling further and to 
prevent the currency from depreciating and leading to inflation and continuing 
depreciation38• 
(3) Structural Reform: The main structural reforms were in the financial and corporate 
sectors. First of all to clear up the fallout from the crisis, unviable insolvent 
institutions that needed intervention were closed and the potentially viable were 
strengthened. In addition, actions had to be taken to limit the risks of bank runs and 
uncontrolled liquidity expansion. Secondly, financial supervision and regulation was 
improved to help minimize the likelihood of problems recurring39 (Lane, 1999). 
As for the Philippines, they embarked on a successful IMF supported program of 
macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Crisis management after mid-1997 was sound, and the Philippines adopted its policies 
including floating of the Peso (tightening of monetary policy) and strengthening the 
banking system (lMF Quarterly Magazine, 2000) . 
. '1 In the IMF Asian program. interest rates were raised to halt inflation. However. this was only a temporary 
measure as confidence began to recover and markel conditions stabilized. interest rates were lowered. . 
19 Other areas covered arc ( I) enhancing governance and competition; (2) increasinll the transparency of economiC 
and financial data; (3) international trade refonn: and (4) social sector refonn. 
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Table 2.20: IMF Programmes: Objectives and Strategies 
Indonesia Korea 
Macro-targets for 1998 
Economic Growth: -5% 
Inflation: 50010 
Fiscal policy 
Reduction/removal of subsidies, 
tight budget (no cuts in social 
sector expenditures), revoking 
fiscal concessions to special 
national projects, and divestiture 
of state owned enterprises, and 
cancellation of some of the 
public sector infrastructure 
projects. 
Monetary policy 
Promotion of central bank 
independence, tight monetary 
policy and flexible exchange 
rates 
Financial Sector Reform 
Bank closures, financial sector 
restructuring including 
enforcement of capital adequacy 
standards and strengthening the 
regulatory framework, deposit 
guarantee for small depositors 
and no government guarantee 
for private non-financial 
companies. 
Debt Repayment Funds 
IMF bailout to be used for full 
payment of foreign debt 
obligations. 
Trade, Tariff and Competition 
Policy Removal of state 
sponsored monopolies and 
cartels, abolition of restrictions 
on marketing arrangements and 
reduction of tariffs. 
Macro-targets for 1998 
Economic Growth: 2.5% 
Inflation: 52% 
Fiscal policy 
Fiscal consolidation comprising 
reduction of government 
expenditure, broadening VAT 
base, and selective increases in 
income and corporate taxes 
Monetary Policy 
Policy Promotion of central 
bank independence, tight 
monetary policy and flexible 
exchange rates. 
Financial Sector Reform 
Financial sector restructuring 
including enforcement of capital 
adequacy standards and 
strengthening the regulatory 
framework, and improving 
accounting and disclosure 
practices in line with 
international standards. 
Debt Repayment Funds 
IMF bailout to be used for full 
payment of foreign debt 
obligations. 
Trade, Tariff and Competition 
Competition Policy Elimination 
of trade related subsidies, 
removal of restrictive import 
licensing, promoting labour 
market flexibility, and reduction 
of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment. 
Source: Based on Radelat and Sachs (1998) 
Thailand 
Macro-targets for 1998 
Economic Growth: 3.5% 
Inflation: 5% 
Fiscal policy 
Fiscal consolidation comprising 
reduction of government 
expenditure, (except for health 
and education), raising of VAT 
rates, and divestiture of state 
owned enterprises, and 
reduction/removal of subsidies. 
Monetary Policy 
Policy Promotion of central 
bank independence, tight 
monetary policy and flexible 
exchange rates 
Financial Sector Reform 
Bank closures, financial sector 
restructuring including 
enforcement of capital adequacy 
standards and strengthening the 
regulatory framework, and 
improving accounting and 
disclosure practices in line with 
international standards. 
Debt Repayment Funds 
IMF bailout to be used for full 
payment of foreign debt 
obligations. 
Trade, Tariff and Competition 
Policy promoting competition 
through education and training. 
Capital Controls. Despite obtaining financial assistance from the IMF (and other 
multilateral and bilateral assistance), Malaysia took further steps by implementing its 
own recovery solution through imposing controls on capital account transactions., 
fixing the exchange rate at RM3.80 per US dollar, cutting interest rates and embarking 
on a policy of re-flatiron40 (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002). Malaysia's policies aimed to 
40 Under IMF financial assistance. countries like Thailand. Korea. and Indonesia committed to float their exchange 
rates. raise interest rates. tighten fiscal policy, open up their financial markets to foreigners. close troubled hanks 
and financial institutionS. and undertake a range of other structural refonns. 
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resolve external imbalances, alleviating pressures on the ringgit and to restore market 
confidence (Table 2.21). 
T bl 221 B . fS fM· E h de c a e . ne ummaryo aJor xc ange an apltal ontrols • . 
Date Policy Objectives Specific Measures 
September To deter speculation on the Controls on transfers of funds from ringgit-denominated 
1998 ringgit and gam monetary accounts for nonresidents not physically present m 
policy independence Malaysia, in effect imposing a 12-month holding period 
restriction for repatriation of the proceeds from the sale of 
Malaysian securities, with retroactive effect. Prohibition 
of offshore transactions of ringgit Ringgit pegged at 
RMJ.8 per U.S. dollar. 
February To pre-empt exodus of capital Easing of some controls, including replacement of the 12 
1999 and re-engage foreign investors month holding period restriction for repatriation of 
portfolio capital by a two-tier, price-based graduated exit 
Jevy system. 
September To provide further relaxation Removal of the exit levy on repatriation of principals The 
1999 two-tier graduated levy system on repatriation of profits 
simplified and replaced by a flat 10 percent exit levy, 
irrespective of when the profits are repatriated. 
February To provide further easing Removal of the 10 percent exit levy on portfolio capital 
2001 profits repatriated after twelve months. 
May 2001 To eliminate controls on Complete removal of the 10 percent exit levy. 
portfolio investment 
Source: Meesok et at, (200]), pp. 14-15; Kawai and Takagi, (2003), pp. 12. 
Additional policies were taken into account between March and August 1998 in 
reaction to an output slow down, rebalancing macroeconomic policy, when fiscal 
policy was relaxed and tightening the credit facility. In order to safeguard the stability 
of the financial system, several measures were taken including upgrading of capital 
adequacy, prudential guidelines and disclosure standards for banking institutions and 
implementing merger plans for finance companies. These actions were followed by 
comprehensive financial corporate restructuring through the establishment of Asset 
Management Company, Oanaharta, Oanamodal and Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Committee (CORC). The government also introduced a new liquidity framework for 
banking institutions which entitled banks to manage assets and liabilities prudently 
and efficiently. 
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Ten years after the crisis. Ten years have passed since the financial crisis and 
abruptly ended fmancial liberalization in the Asian economic regio~ it was also been 
ten years since the beginning of bank restructuring programs41 and aU the measures 
that were implemented with several changes to accommodate each country's 
economy, type of leaders and various social conditions at the time. The recent turmoil 
that struck South East Asian countries has had a significant impact on the financial 
sector of these economies and this makes it interesting to study the impact of such 
factors42 on banking sector efficiency. 
A study of bank performance during post-crisis restructuring is significant for a 
number of reasons43• First, during the 1990s the East Asian economies were 
recognized as the most successful in terms of financial integration, attracting capital 
flows and providing the (preferred) model of development for other emerging 
countries (World Bank, 1993). However, the disruption in fmancial systems in 1997 
caused repercussions in many other financial markets (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). This 
implies that stability of East Asian economies and banking system performance has 
implications way beyond the region. 
Second, bank inefficiency has often been claimed as a major cause of banking crises 
in developing countries. After the East Asian crisis in 1997, most of the bank 
regulators in crisis-affected countries adopted several measures to enhance their 
banking systems, including encouraging or even forcing distressed banks to merge as 
a way to reduce failure risk and remove inefficiency. However, the effectiveness of 
different policies at the individual bank level following a crisis has rarely been 
explored for these countries (an exception is Williams and N guyeD, 2005) 
41 The programs contained a mixture of stock and flow solutions to financial distress; flow solution aimed to 
protect banks from making losses whilst stock solutions intended to resolve accumulated losses (Williams and 
Nguyen. 200S and Gochoco-Bautista et aI., 2(00). As a reaction to financial distress. governments may nationalize 
banks; closing unviable banks; carrying out compulsory purchases and assumptions and transferring assets to 
healthier banks; creating larger core banks; removing bad assets to state-owned and managed asset management 
companies; and providing capital injections to recapitalized banks. Adopting internationaJ standards in bank 
supervision and regulation (capital adequacy. loan classification. and loan loss provisioning) and improving the 
institutional environment are also steps taken by some countries (Williams and Nguyen. 200S and Lindgren et al .. 
2(00). 
42 For this paper we define environmental variable into microeconomic variable (consisting of gross nalional 
income and population densiry), bank structure variable (cquiryltotal assets and loans Itotal deposits). ~Jarory 
variable (a dummy for capital control). risk control (loan loss provision). 
41 Nakhun and Avkiran. 2009; pp 240-241. 
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Third, the current study sheds light on the relationship among bank mergers. foreign 
bank entry, state intervention, and bank efficiency in developing markets. Finally, this 
thesis seeks to investigate environmental influences on bank efficiency measures, and 
how bank efficiency impacts on competition and concentration in the industry. In the 
cross-country bank efficiency literature, research that accounts for the influence of 
environmental factors is limited to studies based on Europe (e.g., Lozano-Vivas et al., 
2002; Weil, 2004). Our results highlight the importance of country-specific conditions 
that play a significant role in bank efficiency, competition and concentration 
measurement in developing countries. 
A number of studies have also attempted to provide empirical evidence of economic 
and financial fragility in the affected Asian countries prior to the 1997 crisis. Some 
studies have compared indicators of fragility in the affected countries at the onset of 
the crisis with those in non-affected or less-affected emerging economies, using cross-
sectional regression approaches (for example Corsetti et al., 2000). Results from these 
studies, in general, show that the affected countries were on average more fragile than 
others, although a few non-affected countries were also found to be vulnerable 
according to the indicators used. These types of study, however, cannot discriminate 
between the two factors described above. To do this requires testing not only whether 
there was fragility in the affected countries, but also whether such fragility had 
reached some "crisis triggering level." Researchers have attempted to show whether 
early warning system (EWS) models could have predicted the 1997 Asian crisis. The 
most notable examples are Kaminsky (2000); Berg and Patillo ( 1999a, b); Goldstein, 
Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000); and Edison (2000). Two approaches have been 
widely used in constructing EWS models in this literature and the most widely used is 
the so-called signaling approach pioneered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (Kaminsky, 
Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998)44. 
44 This involves monitoring a set of high-frequency leading indicators that tend to behave differently prior to a 
crisis and examining whether they individually or collectively have reached ''threshold'' values that are historically 
associated with the onset of a financial crisis. An allernative approach uses probitllogit models (see for example 
Berg and Patillo 1999b). Probitllogit EWS models arc multivariate and allow testing of statistical significance of 
explanatory variables. But these models usually ~uire large samples to estimate. and can only accommodate a 
limited number of explanatory variables to avoid multicolinearity. In contrast the signalling approach-based EWS 
models are univariate. and do not allow testing of statistical significance. as they arc nonparametric. But such 
models can work with small samples and impose no restriction on the number of explanatory variables. 
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Overall, much progress has been made in terms of reform during the past ten years. 
With the exception of Indonesia (mostly due to complicated political instability), all 
Asian countries including Korea have recovered from the financial crisis of 1999 and 
2000. Malaysia and Korea recovered mostly due to reflationary macroeconomic 
policies and the pre-Y2K electronics boom. However, international economic crises 
will probably continue to occur in the future as they have for centuries. It has been 
suggested that emerging market countries which intend to avoid the shocking effects 
of such crises should create efficient early warning systems, associated with standard 
country surveillance, reduce the vulnerability of their economies by getting 
macroeconomic policies right, and creating sound banking, increasing international 
liquidity and shifting from risk-based incentives to supervision regulations (Feldstein, 
1999 and 2000). 
T bl 222 A h I I f As" C"" 45 a e " c rODO oglca summary 0 laD rulS • " 
Date Event Follow-up Commentary 
1996 and The Thai Baht is under speculative Thai stock markets fall throughout 1996 
early 1997 attack during 1996 and early 1997 and early 1997. 
Early 1997 There are seven high-profile Korea Economy is very dependent on 
bankruptcies of Korean conglomerates, manufacturing-based enterprises, 
such as Hanbo Steel and Kia Motors. especially large industrial conglomerates 
known as chaebol, which dominate the 
economy. 
May 1997 Thailand is forced to impose certain On 27 June, The largest non-bank 
exchange controls financial institution in Thailand becomes 
bankrupt By the end of the year, fifty-six 
such finance houses are closed down. 
2 July 1997 The Baht's peg against the dollar IS Hedge funds play a major role in this 
officially abandoned. first devaluation of an Asian cnsls 
current 
July 1997 The Philippines abandons its dollar-peg Overnight interest rates are raised in the 
and imposes certain foreign exchange Philippines to 32% at one point, whereas 
controls. Malaysia also abandons its Malaysia introduces capital controls. 
pegged exchange rate. 
14 August Indonesia raises interest rates but lowers 
1997 them from late August, as it devalues 
the Rupiah on 14 August 
20 August The IMF puts together a $17.2 billion The letters of agreement with the IMF 
1997 Thai rescue. have since been re-negotiated five times. 
August 1997 The Hong Kong dollar comes under 
speculative attack. 
Mid-October Devaluations vis-A-vis the dollar Stock markets in the western economies 
1997 average 20010 to 30% in Thailand, are still setting new highs. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
---
4S Karunalilekka (1999). 
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Cont'd 
17 October 
1997 
27 October 
1997 
November 
1997 
5 November 
1997 
4 December 
1997 
December 
1997 
12 January 
1998 
June 1998 
17 June 1998 
June 1998 
12 July 1998 
The new Taiwan dollar is forced to 
devalue, the Hong Kong dollar IS 
attacked again. 
The Dow Jones index on Wall Street 
falls by 7% in one day. 
President Clinton calls the developing 
crisis "a few small glitches in the road". 
Indonesia finalized a deal with the IMF 
for funding that could total up to $42.3 
billion. 
The IMF organizes a $58.2 billion 
rescue for Korea. 
Talks led by the US Federal Reserve 
lead to $422 billion of Korea's private 
sector debts being re-negotiated. 
The largest investment bank in Hong 
Kong, Peregrine Securities, goes 
bankrupt. 
The second phase of the crisis "Asia II" 
begins with another speculative attack 
on the Hong Kong donar. 
The United States begins to intervene in 
the foreign exchange markets, 
attempting to support the Japanese Yen 
for the first time since 1987 
The Hong Kong dollar peg is defended 
by the authorities with market 
intervention. 
Poor results in the upper house elections 
cause Japanese Prime Minister 
Hashimoto to lose Power. 
Hong Kong overnight interest rate rise to 
280%, the Hang Seng index falls 23% in 
three days. The crisis worsens when 
Korea's sovereign credit rating IS 
downgraded. 
Latin American stock markets fall in 
tandem with the Dow Jones index and 
Brazil doubles overnight interest rates to 
43%. 
For most of late 1997, Western stock 
markets fall, before recovering to new 
all-time highs in 1998. However, the 
fourth largest investment bank in Japan, 
Y amichi Securities, goes bankrupt on 24 
November. 
Although the Indonesian authorities close 
16 insolvent banks on 1 November, the 
IMF deal is renegotiated three times as 
the government is unwilling to meet all 
the conditions it imposes. 
The Korean Won is eventually allowed 
to float on 16 December. 
In April 1998, Korea manages to re-
negotiate $24 billion of sovereign short-
term debt as well. 
Prompted by the Japanese economy 
contracting in the first half of 1998, the 
Bank of Japan cuts short term interest 
rates to 0.25% from 0.50%. 
The weakness of the Yen causes 
additional pressure on Asian Crisis 
currencies because of the linkages 
between these economies. 
Concurrently, Hong Kong authorities 
instigate a plan to intervene in the stock 
market with public funds to stop it 
falling. In Singapore, the government 
introduces measures to curb property 
transactions to stop price falling. 
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June and July Latin America Countries are forced into Brazil attempts to prevent a devaluation 
]998 a senes of knock-on currency by pre-emptively imposing economic 
devaluations. stringency; the authorities intervene the 
foreign exchange markets to defend the 
real and raise short-tenn interest rates in 
two stages, from 19010 to almost 50%. 
July 1998 Sharp Falls in western stock markets of The cause is emergence of problems in 
approximately a quarter of their value. Russia, a recipient of investment inflows 
from Western Europe. 
20 July 1998 The IMF agrees to a $5.6 billion The Russian monetary authorities raise 
Russian rescue deal. overnight interest rates to over I ()()01o. 
August 1998 The Hong Kong dollar is attacked again In Taiwan, slowing growth leads the 
and $8.8 billion is spent defending it. government to enact a two-year. $5.7 
billion, and economic stimulus package. 
17 August There is a de facto devaluation of the Western markets fall as Russian 
1998 Russian ruble; exchange controls are authorities declare a ninety-day 
imposed. moratorium on the payment of private 
sector foreign currency debt. 
1 September Malaysia imposes more capital controls; 
1998 the ringgit is fixed at RM3.80 to a 
dollar. 
2 September The Russian Central Banks stop Russian government defaults on its 
1998 defending the currency. sovereign obligations later in September. 
September As real economic activity contracts, 
1998 Korea lowers short tenn interest rate. 
15 January Brazil is forced to allow its currency to 
1999 float freely. 
2.9 Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and Impact on Southeast 
Asia 
The region was hit again by further financial tunnoil in late 2008. The shoc~ which 
started as a housing sector crisis in the United States (US) resulted in major failures 
and institutions in the US and Europe, followed by aggressive co-ordinated actions by 
the affected authorities to inject funds into money markets and to gain confidence in 
their financial systems. 
There is much debate about the causes of the 2008 global cnSlS, factors cited as 
important in creating the crisis are as follows: (i) a prolonged period of abundant 
liquidity: (ii) excessive imprudent lending in the subprime and other parts of the real 
estate sector; (iii) lack of adequate prudential regulations over financial institutions; 
and (iv) the bursting of the housing price bubble. 
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The global fmancial crisis has placed developing Asia in a more difficult economic 
position than the financial crisis of 1997-1998 with expectations of lower growth and 
credit availability although there is some evidence that these economies are 'bouncing 
back' much quicker than their developed counterparts. 
Box 6 
Then and now: Comparing the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crises and the Current Crisis 
World output • rose robustly 
• is contracting sharply 
Global trade • slowed only modestly in 1998. • set to contract in 2009 by the largest 
volumes amount since 1982. 
The crisis • started in the region • started in the U.S. and developed 
• affected some countries developing economies. 
• affected East Asia severely, and • has affected virtually all countries 
others more modestly. in the world. 
GDP growth in • bounced back quickly, thanks to • is projected to recover slowly as 
the region robust world markets and export global recovery takes time. 
growth. 
Contraction • drop in domestic demand despite a • contraction in exports, weaker 
reflects large positive contribution from net investment, despite government 
exports. stimulus. 
Export volumes • expanded strongly in most EAP • are set to contract with almost no 
countries exception 
Commodity • benefitted because of robust global • are suffering because of a drop in 
exporters demand' prices and global demand 
Current accounts • adjusted sharply during the crisis • except in China and Malaysia, 
where they worsened modestly in 
2008 due to oil prices and the 
contraction in exports. 
Capital flows • fell sharply in Indonesia, Korea, and • have weakened sharply in all 
Thailand. countries. 
Currencies • weakened in several countries, led • have weakened by 10 percent since 
by a depreciation of III percent the end of 2007 in Thailand, 23 
from the end of 1996 to the weakest percent in Indonesia, and 48 percent 
point in Korea, 86 percent 10 in Korea. 
Indonesia and 56 percent 10 
Thailand. 
Foreign exchange • were depleted in many countries • remain strong, with very modest 
reserves reductions thus far in some 
countries. 
Source: Battling the Process of Global RecesSion, Chapter 1. (2009). pp.lO. 
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Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand have all taken immediate action 
to strengthen economy and implement fiscal stimulus packages. These countries also 
took sharp action in maintaining financial and monetary stability. 
Table 2.23: Financial, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Responses 
Components/Country Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Fiscal Policy ./././././ 
Deposit Guarantee 0./ 0 0 0 
Government Stakes in ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
banks 
Regulatory Forbearance ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Stock Market ./././ 0 ./ 
interventions 
Monetary Policy 
Policy Rate 
Reserve Ratio 
Liquidity Injection 
Exchange Rate 
Arrangement 
Expenditure 
Infrastructure 
Investments 
Support to SMEs and/or 
farmers 
Safety Nets 
Housing Construction 
Support 
Strategise Industries 
Support 
Increase/subsidy in 
wage 
Employment 
Generation 
Other 
Revenue 
Corporate Income Tax 
Incentives 
Personal Income Tax 
Incentives 
Indirect Tax 
Exemptions 
Other 
./ = with policy response 
./ 
./ 
o 
./ 
./ 
./ 
o 
o 
0 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
o 
o 
./ 
./ 
./ 
o = no policy response or data not available 
Source: ADS 2008 Asia Economic Monitor. December 2008. pp. 9 
./ 
./ 
o 
./ 
./ 
o 
o 
o 
0 
0 
./ 
./ 
o 
o 
./ 
./ 
o 
0 
62 
Table 2.24: Fiscal Stimulus Plans46 of Selected Asian 
Developm£ Member Countries 
Indonesia 
Fiscal expenditure and 
tax cuts (IDR 73.3 
trillion USD 6.1 billion 
1.20/00fGDP) 
Republic of Korea 
Fiscal expenditure and 
tax cuts under "2009 
Budget and Public Fund 
Operations Plan to 
Overcome Economic 
Difficulties" (KRW 35.6 
trillion, USD 26 billion, 
4% ofGDP) 
Fiscal expenditure under 
"Green New Deal Job 
Creation Plan" 
- measure expected to 
generate 950,000 jobs 
over 4 years 
(consolidation of 
previous plans) 
(KRW 50 trillion, USD 
37 billion) 
Fiscal expenditure 
(supplementary budget 
bill) KRW 29 trillion 
- Tax breaks for individuals and companies (43 trillion) 
- Waived import duties and taxes (13.3 trillion) 
- Infrastructure spending ( 12.2 trillion) 
- Diesel subsidy (2.8 trillion) 
- Rural development (0.6 trillion) 
- Creation of more jobs by providing better job training 
through expansion of the internship system, vitalizing 
venture enterprises, increased job positions for the 
underprivileged 
- Increased welfare support to stabilize livelihoods of 
low income classes and provide aggressive support in 
reducing childcare costs 
- Increased social overhead capital investment with focus 
on investments in construction projects including leading 
projects for advancement of the metropolitan economy 
and provincial traffic network expansion 
- Support stabilization of SMEs and the financial markets 
by increasing SME guarantees 
- Support regional finances to offset reduced real estate 
tax 
- Energy conservation, recycling and clean energy 
development to build an energy-saving economy 
- Green transportation networks and clean water supplies 
to upgrade the quality of life and environment - Carbon 
reduction and stable supply of water resources to protect 
the earth and future generations 
- Building of industrial and information infrastructure and 
technology development to use energy efficient in the 
future 
Jan 
2009 
13 
Dec 
2008 
Jan 
2009 
_ Maintaining job security and revitalizing provinciaJ 23 
economies & supporting industries with future growth Mar 
2009 potential (17 trillion Won) 
- Remaining amounts to plug tax revenue shortfalls 
46 Fiscal stimulus plans were put into action to stimulate firs. consumer and public investment in the fonn of 
economic and social infrastructure. 
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Cont'd 
Malaysia 
Fiscal expenditure (MYR 
7 billio~ USD ].9 billion 
1% ofGDP) 
Fiscal expenditure (MYR 
7 billion, USD 1.9 billion 
10/0 of GOP) 
Philippines 
- Investment funds to promote strategic industries and 
high-speed broadband (1.9 billion) 
- Small-scale infrastructure projects (1.6 billion) 
- Education and skills training programmes (l billion) 
- Public transport and military facilities (I billion) 
- Fiscal injection (15 billion) 
- Equity investment (] 0 billion) 
- Tax incentives (3 billion) 
- Guarantee funds (25 billion) 
- Private finance initiatives and off-budget projects (7 
billion) 
Nov 
2008 
Mar 
2009 
Fiscal expenditure and - Job creation programme expected to provide 824,000 Jan 
tax cuts (PHP 330 temporary jobs in government departments by July 2009 
billion, usn 6.5 billion, 2009 
4.6% of GOP) - Tax reduction in corporate income tax and waiver of 
personal income tax for minimum wage earners 
Thailand 
Supplementary budget 
(THB 116.7 billion, usn 
3.3 billion, 1.2% of 
GOP) 
- Infrastructure projects 
- Waiver of penalties on loans from social security 
Institutions 
- One time living cost allowance of THB 2000 for those 
earning < THB 15,000 per month 
- Extension of 5 public service subsidies programme for 6 
months 
- Support given to unemployed workers 
- Free education for students 
- "Sufficient Economy Fund for Improvement in Quality 
of Life" fund for rural villages 
- Old-age support payment of THB 500 per month 
- Infrastructure projects 
- Tax measures to boost real estate sector, SMEs and the 
tourism industry 
Source: Official government web-sites, EIU Country Reports, various news sources 
Jan 
2009 
With the experience of the 1997 financial crisis and refonns program, emerging Asia 
has improved economic policies and institutional frameworks. Their economies are 
now more resilient towards crisis with more stable prices and reduced output 
volatility. Overall, the economies are better prepared against any adjustment in 
international financial markets. Asia's banking and financial systems are now 
relatively robust, highlighting progress after years of restructuring. Bank asset quality, 
profitability, and capital adequacy have all improved remarkably over the past decade. 
After all , Asian banks had limited direct exposure to sub-prime and related securitized 
products. This factor, together with healthier balance sheets, has helped the region's 
financial systems weather the current financial stonn. Better supervisory oversight 
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and risk management practices have also played a part. Loan-to-deposit ratios remain 
relatively low and the limited use of off-balance sheet financing implies that the 
region's banks will likely avoid the severe liquidity and funding stress suffered by 
their western counterparts (Lohani, 2009) 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter briefly discusses the unique background to each SEA country while 
facing financial crisis in mid 1997. The changes discussed earlier in this chapter 
reflect each affected country's authorities concerns in bringing back stability and 
growth to the region. We discuss the different policy focus and corresponding policy 
measures put into action by each country. Even though more than ten years have 
passed since the crisis much still needs to be done. The global financial crisis in mid 
2008 provided a reminder of the need for a better understanding of contagious 
banking shocks and interlinkages in the global financial marketplace. It also raised 
major policy questions about the efficacy of current supervisory and prudential 
regulatory practices in the financial sector. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the crisis literature by investigating the impact of 
policy changes on banking sector efficiency, concentration and competition in SE 
Asia over the 1997-8 crisis period. We attempt to answer the question as to whether 
external factors which include macroeconomic and regulatory factors have any impact 
on bank efficiency. In particular, this thesis uses a non-parametric approach to 
analyze the efficiency of banks in the selected countries using an additive model of 
DEA, namely, a slacks based measure of DE A combined with Tobit regression. 
In addition, we examine banking sector concentration and competitiveness as some 
literature indicates that lower market concentration exposes banks to crisis. Another 
important issue is whether concentration in regional banking systems has increased as 
a result of the post-crisis restructurings and whether this adversely influences 
competition. While the closing down and/or merger of troubled banks with stronger 
institutions would be expected to increase concentration, the size of the effect will 
depend importantly on whether closures and mergers are mainly among small or 
medium- to large-sized banks, and on the structure of the new banking groups that 
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emerge. Economic theory and practice do not provide a clear guide as to the 
implications of any increase in banking-system concentration. On the one hand~ 
concentration might lower unit costs and improve efficiency to the extent to which 
there are economies of scale and scope and this can feed through into greater 
competition. On the other, international experience suggests that highly concentrated 
banking systems tend to be riskier and less competitive than concentrated markets47• 
The remaining focus of the thesis is to investigate these questions for the SEA 
countries under study. 
47 Adam. 2008.PP. 8 
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CHAPTER 3 
BANKING CRISIS AND EFFICIENCY: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction 
The Asian fmancial crisis started in mid July 1997 with devaluation of the Thai baht. 
This caused local currencies and bourses to plunge, burst real estate bubbles and led to 
serious recession, thus leading many banking institutions around the region to 
collapse as well as severely weakening others48• The crisis revealed weaknesses in the 
financial sectors49 and ended by contributing greatly to the impetus for change. Much 
has been written on the causes of the crisis as well as the reforms and development of 
the region even a decade after the crisis. 
Prior to the 2008 credit crises, the global financial system had witnessed three major 
crises, all of which occurred during the 1990s50: the European Monetary System 
(EMS) crisis of 1992-1993; Mexico 1994-1995 and Asian financial crisis 199751 • All 
of these seem to share important similarities, specifically, they were all preceded by: 
1) A process of rapid fmancial deregulation and capital account opening without 
adequate regulation and supervision of the domestic financial system; 
2) All countries exchange rates were pegged aiming to contain inflation and attract 
foreign capital; 
3) Large interest rate differentials led to significant increases in capital flows; and an 
4) Upsurge in net private capital inflows contributed to real currency appreciation 
and/or an over extension in bank lending . 
... See chapter 2 for further details on each affected country's weaknesses that led to crisis. 
49 Further discussion can be found in chapter 2. 
so Since the late 19705, 117 systemic banking crises have occurred in 93 countries: more than two-thirds wen: in 
developing countries (Caprio and Klingebiel. 2(03). A banking crisis is considered as "systemic" if it involves 
widespread banking failures that affect more than 20 percent ofa banking system's deposits (Sheng. 1996). 
SI EMS was hit by speculative attack which forced five countries: Finland. the United Kingdom., Italy. Sweden and 
Norway 10 floar their currencies. Spain. PortU8aJ and JreJand remain in the EMS by devaJualin8 their currencies. In 
1994 Mexico's government announced their decision to devalue their peso against the dollar. These steps caused 
specUlative attacks against other Latin American currencies. which are also known as the tequila effect. 
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There is a wide range of literature on the causes and effects of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis (such as Goldstein, 1998; Hunter et al., 1999 and Jao, 2001). There is 
also a long debate between two interpretations on the occurrence of the crisis: ~ 
one set of literature focuses on fundamental weaknesses and policy inconsistencies 
(Corsetti, 1998; Corsetti et al., 1999a, b, c; and Lane et al., 1999) and a second school 
of thought emphasises the role of self-fulfilling expectations and financial 'panics' 
(Chang and Belasco, 1998; Sachs and Radelet, 1998; and Corsetti, 1998)52. There 
have also been a growing number of studies on cross-country banking crisis, for 
example Breuer (2004) provides a review of currency and banking crises, and Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) and Demirgii~-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) extensively survey 
systemic banking crises. Most of the existing studies aim to describe the causes, 
consequences, lessons, speed and shape of general recovery (for example, Demirgii~­
Kunt and Detagiache, 1998 and Dell' Ariccia et al., 2005). 
The Asian financial crisis seriously damaged the respective banking systems and 
revealed large amounts of non-performing loans which were caused by poor 
management, and excessive lending in various parts of the real sector. A large number 
of financial institutions became insolvent and subsequently had to be financially 
supported, merged or liquidated by the affected governments (Laeven, 1999). Some 
banks were recapitalised and stronger banks were forced to merge with distressed 
banks in order to avoid banks closures3 (Hawkins and Turner, 1999; Hawkins and 
Mihaljek, 2001; Gelos and Rold6s, 2004). There was still uncertainty as to whether 
the merging and consolidation process would help to sustain the banks weakness or 
make them stronger (Hawkins and Turner, 1999). The crisis also raised various issues 
regarding the efficiency and safety of local banking industries. This forced bank 
regulators to implement several measures to reform the banking system, with the aim 
of providing efficient banking services to the economy on a sustainable basis (Garcia, 
52 The first attributes the initial financial turmoil in some Asian countries in 1997 and its propagation over time. 
mainly to sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence followed by regional contagion (Radelet and Sachs.. 
1998; Marshall. 1998; Chang and Velasco. 1999). While admitting the worsening of the macroeconomic 
perfonnance of some affected countries in the mid-l990s.. this view suggests that the extent and depth of the crisis 
should not be attributed to deterioration in fundamentals. but rather to panic on the part of domestic and 
international investors. The second argues that the crisis occurred primarily as a result of structural and policy 
distortions (Corsetti et al.. 1999&; Dooley. 1999). According to this view. fundamental imbalances triggered the 
currency and financial crisis in 1997 even as after the crisis started. market overreaction and herding caused the 
plunge in exchange rales. a.';sets prices. and economic activity to be more severe than warranted by the initial weak 
economic and financial conditions (Zhuang J. and Dowling M .. 200~ pp.l). 
~l Further discussion on die cause and ctfed can be referred 10 in chapter 2. 
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1997). It was then prudent for the Asian governments to implement international 
standards in the governance of banks, and to allow foreign investors to bring in 
international best practice in regulation and general oversight as well as to adopt new 
technologies (Choi and Clovutivat, 2004). 
Changes in the regulatory framework, liberalization and restructuring - including new 
applications in computer and communications technology, together with the 
introduction of new fmancial instruments, altered the way banking is conducted. Such 
changes significantly modified the technology of bank production. Previous studies 
that have investigated those countries that were involved in the crisis, have primarily 
considered how banking systems operated throughout the turbulent period (Drake et 
aI., 2008). To date only a few studies have investigated bank efficiency during and 
post banking crises in Asian countries. 
There has been a great deal of concern about the resilience of the Asian countries 
during the 2008 crisis and the influence of the prevailing economic conditions. Many 
economists have argued that the crisis would have a limited impact on the region, as 
Asian countries have gone through many changes after being hit by the 1997 financial 
crisis. The Asians countries are said to be; (I) still far from incorporating highly 
complex financial innovations into their current banking models; (ii) more aware and 
cautious about decision making, especially involving investment decisions in high risk 
areas; and (iii) the banking institutions are now more prudent after past reforms and 
implement better risk management practices. 
However as the 2008 global crisis prolongs, the situation is becoming more acute and 
its impact on the real sector in emerging and developing countries will have a 
substantial effect on the economy's growth (Fidrmuc and Kornohen, 2009). The IMF 
argues that the recent global crisis may have a greater impact on Asia's economy than 
the earlier financial crisis, because of more extensive trade and financial integrations 
between Asia and the US. A study by Hong et al., (2009) shows that historical 
analysis implies that worldwide crisis has always had an overwhelming impact on 
Asia' s economic growth. He also suggested the existence of a close relationship 
between Asian economies via more integrated trade and financial channels. Severe 
financial downturns or recessions in advanced economies are often associated with 
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financial crisis or recession in Asia (Hong et al. (2009, pp.15). Similar conclusions are 
found in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) where they argue that economic downturns in 
emerging markets are more severe when many countries simultaneously face 
domestic banking crises. 
Several other studies have discussed the current global crisis and compared it with 
other past crises including the 1997 fmancial crisis. For example Claessens et al. 
(2008) made an extensive cross country empirical analysis of past recessions that 
coincided with a credit crunch, a house prices burst and equity price bubbler. They 
conclude by suggesting that globalisation factors will make the results of the 2008 
crisis more costly than the recession created in the past. However the study also 
argues that each recession is different depending on the authorities' skills in managing 
the country's financial health, banks and households. Similar results can be found in 
the study by Lall et al. (2008). Their paper is based on historical data and investigates 
the impact of financial stress by focusing on banking, securities and foreign exchange 
activity. 
Having said all this, however, there remains no systematic empirical research focusing 
on the stylized facts of economic and financial crises in developing Asian economies, 
and the links of these crises with global financial crises and recessions. There is also 
no empirical analysis that looks into whether the restructuring in the previous crisis in 
Asia has helped these countries to face-up to the current global crisis. The closest 
study is by the IMF (2008), an analysis of the impact of US spillovers on Asia - both a 
descriptive and quantitative analysis. The research found that the impact on Asia is 
increasing over time and this is due mainly to higher trade exposures, which also 
tends to have high financial exposure and historically large spillovers as well. 
This discussion has brought us back to the question of how the changes and 
experiences following the 1997 financial crisis leave the Asian region better equipped 
to face the impact of the 2008 global crisis. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
forecast that Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are among the Asian countries that 
will experience a further downturn of exports as global trade will remain weak. 
Developing Asia's recovery will be further affected by the perfonnance of the global 
economy as the region relies heavily on external demand. ADB have proposed that 
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Asian countries should broaden their scope and extend their openness in order to 
reduce the risk of a more severe impact on their economy. Domestic deman<L labour 
mobility and promoting more intra regional trade are vital for improving Asia's 
economies. The fmancial market needs to play its part by supporting the development 
and sustaining regional capital markets for the effective use of regional saving. 
Building on this, the aim of this chapter is to review the theoretical and empirical 
evidence of these interrelated features and the impact of financial crisis on the 
efficiency of the banking sector. It also seeks to investigate the role of environmental 
variables on bank efficiency after the crisis period54• This chapter will start by 
offering a brief review of the main literature on bank efficiency, with a particular 
focus on studies examining the performance of banks in Asian countries. Further. it 
will review the issue of bank concentration and competition, and its relations to bank 
efficiency. It is important to highlight that most of the policies followed by the 
authorities post 1997 crisis brought about an increase in concentration, particularly via 
mergers and acquisitions. Also, in most Asian countries, policies have been enacted to 
foster competition in the banking and financial sector. It is important to understand 
how the crisis has shaped these responses and whether this had the expected positive 
impact on bank efficiency. Finally, we summarize and highlight the major caveats in 
the existing literature, which underpin our empirical design. 
3.2 Bank Efficiency 
The efficiency of financial institutions has long been the focus of banking research. 
Bank efficiency research has covered several aspects of bank performance. 
Inefficiency and poor overall banking sector performance have been claimed to be 
major causes of crisis in developing countries (Arif and Luc Can, 2009; Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999; Bongini et al., 2001). While there have been several cross-
country studies on the effects of bank restructuring, deregulation, consolidation and 
S4 The study will look into the post-crisis .~riod (1999-~OO~) si?cc, this is considered as the recovery ~od ~ a 
study of bank efficiency during post-cnSIS restructunng IS slgmficant, fm: a n~bcr .of ~ns. FIrst. AsI~ 
countries play an imponant role in the world economy; and second. banking mcfficlency IS cJamlCd to be the maIO 
caused for the Asian banking crisis. 
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privatization on bank perfonnance, these studies have mainly been conducted on 
European systems and much less is known about such features in emerging marketsSs• 
Banks roles as fmancial intermediaries are vital towards the growth and development 
of economic activity in a number of ways. Over the last two decades the banking 
sector has experienced major transformations worldwide in its operating environment 
(Delis et aI., 2008). These changes have affected both external and internal (domestic) 
factors and have also had an impact on the structure, efficiency and performance of 
the economy. An efficient banking sector is better able to withstand negative shocks 
and contribute to the stability of the financial system (Delis et a1., 2008). 
3.2.1 The Measurement of Bank EfficiencyS6 
The idea of efficiency in a production unit was frrst introduced by Farrell (1957), 
under the concept of "input oriented measures". According to Farrell, a technical 
efficiency measure is defined as one minus the maximum equi-proportionate 
reduction in all inputs that still allows continuous production of given outputs. 
Technical efficiency is linked to the possibility of avoiding waste by producing as 
much output as the use of input allows (output oriented measure), or by using less 
input than the production objective plans to (input oriented measure). This efficiency 
is measured by comparing observed and optimal values of production costs, revenue, 
profit or all that the production system can follow as an objective and which is under 
appropriate quantities and price constraints. Therefore, we can analyse technical 
efficiency in tenns of deviations from an idealistic production frontier isoquant. 
The literature proposes two approaches for measunng frontier production: the 
mathematical (non-parametric) programming approach and the (parametric) 
econometric approach (Kablan, 2007, pp.8). The concepts of both non-parametric and 
parametric techniques for measuring efficiency in banking have been considered 
widely in the literature (Drake et a1., 2006 and Hall, 2001). The empirical research has 
advanced greatly over the past three decades. Berger and Humphrey (1991) surveyed 
SS Berger and Humphrey (1997) for. an extensive review of bank e~~iency lit~re: Berger et at (1999) and 
Amel et aI. (2004) for literature revIews of bank mergers and acqUISitiOns, Meggmson (2005) and Clarke et aI. 
(2005) of bank privatization, and Detragiache et at (2006) and Cull and Maninez-Peris (2007) of foreign bank 
~n~~ methodological approach used in this study will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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financial institution efficiency. Their fmdings found that vanous methodss7 in 
measuring efficiency do not always yield consistent results and suggested some ways 
on how to improve the use of these methods to bring about conclusions that are more 
consistent, accurate, and useful. The methodological approached will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. Below, we will give an intuitive introduction to the mam 
parametric and non-parametric methods before reviewing the relevant literature. 
a) The Non-Parametric Approach 
The most commonly used non-parametric approach is a mathematical programming 
method known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The frontier is estimated using 
non-parametric mathematical linear programming. It offers an analysis based on the 
relative evaluation of the efficiency in an input/output of multiple situations, by taking 
into account each bank and measuring its relative efficiency to an envelopment 
surface made up of the best practice banks (Kablan, 2007, pp.8). Considering the 
immediate compatibility with multiple inputs and multiple outputs, DEA features 
major advantages especially in environmental applications58• 
The simplest method is based on the assumption of constant return to scale (CRS). 
However, in recent applications variable return to scale (VRS) assumptions are used 
as this hypothesis is more relevant in the environment of imperfect competition in 
which banks operate59• Many studies have attempted to analyse efficiency issues by 
using non-parametric techniques. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is 
commonly used to evaluate bank efficiency, as it allows researchers to avoid 
specification of an ad hoc functional form or error structure. Many researchers have 
focused on estimating the cost efficiency, allocative efficiency. and technical 
efficiency of banks by utilizing this method, such as Aly et al. (1990), Grabowski et 
al. (1993), Favero and Papi (1995), Zaim (1995), Schaffnit et al. (1997), and 
Fukuyama et al. (1999). 
57 The five major different econometric techniques for estimating efficiency frontiers are non- parametric which 
include (I) data envelopment analysis (DEA). (2) free disposal hull (FDH), and parametric frontiers which 
comprise three main approaches; (3) stochastic frontier approach (SFA). (4) distribution-free approach. and (S) 
thick frontier approach (TFA). 
SI www.nomepre.netlrevicM..hlm. 
59 Chamcs Cooper and Rhods (1978) proposed a model that had an input orientation and assumed constant return 
to scale (eRS). while FAre el aI. (1983) and Banker. Chames and Cooper (1984) proposed a model thalassumcd 
variable return to scale (VRS). 
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Recent studies of research using this method include Shennan and Gold (1985). 
Parkan (1987), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Charnes et ala (1990), Oral and Yolalan 
(1990), Berg et ala (1991), Berg et ale (1993), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992), 
Fukuyama (1993), Grabowski et ale (1994), Zaim (1995), Grifell-Tatje and Lovell 
(1996); Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997) and Jackson et ale (1998). 
b) The Parametric Approach 
The parametric approach consists of an econometric estimation of the best practice 
frontier by its specification in a Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) or translogarithmic (cost or production) functional form. The econometric 
method can be deterministic. In this case, every deviation from the frontier is 
attributed to inefficiency. It can also be stochastic; it is then possible to separate 
random errors from the production unit inefficiency. The stochastic frontier method 
has two principal advantages compared to the non-parametric DEA method. First, it 
allows random error to be separated from the production unit inefficiency and takes 
into account the existence of exogenous shocks. For this purpose, the error term is 
divided into two components: an inefficiency component and a random one (which is 
composed of the error measurement and the exogenous shocks) and second, the 
stochastic frontier analysis which is less sensitive to extreme values (Kablan, 2007, 
pp.9). Examples of these types of studies include Battese and Coelli (1995), Berger 
and Humphrey (1997), Bhattacharyya et ala (1997) and Coelli (1995). 
3.3 Bank Efficiency: a summary of the literature 
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to the measurement of the 
performance of financial institutions. Since the structure of financial service industries 
evolved very quickly. it is interesting to measure the efficiency changes surrounding 
these institutions, and to explain variation in the (in) efficiency measures (Jackson and 
Fethi, 2000). Berger and Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies of financial 
institution efficiency in 21 countries, covering various types of depository institutions 
including commercial banks, savings and loans, and credit unions including insurance 
finns. The study aimed at summarizing and critically reviewing empirical estimation 
of financial institutions efficiency by analyzing five different estimation approaches. 
The aforementioned study mainly concentrated on frontier efficiency, in other words. 
74 
how close fInancial institutions are to a 'best-practice' frontier. Frontier analysis is a 
way to benchmark the relative performance of production units. Generally speaking, 
studies of frontier efficiency are based on accounting measures (of costs, outputs, 
inputs, revenues, profits, etc) to calculate efficiency relative to the best practice within 
the available sample since information on the technology of financiaI institutions is 
hard to obtain. The five main approaches for estimating efficiency frontiers include; 
non parametric approaches (1) data envelopment analysis (DEA) and (2) free disposal 
hull (FDH), and parametric approaches that comprise the; (3) stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA), (4) distribution-free approach (DFA) and (5) thick frontier approach 
(TFA) 60. Berger and Humphrey (1997) found that the various efficiency methods do 
not always yield consistent results. 
Ferrier and Lovell, (1990), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Resti (1997), Chen and Yeh 
(2000), and Huang and Wang (2000) examined bank efficiency comparing both 
parametric and nonparametric approaches. In terms of the strength of DEA and SF A 
(parametric approach), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Eisenbeis et aI. (1997), Resti (1997) 
found that there is a close average efficiency generated by both approaches while 
Huang and Wang (2002) reported that the congruency between the results of two 
methodologies is rather limited. In a more recent study, Casu et aI. (2004) compare 
parametric and non-parametric approaches by estimating the productivity change in 
European banking between 1994 and 2000. Productivity change has been decomposed 
into technological change, or change in best practice, and efficiency change. Their 
results show competing methodologies, sometimes identify conflicting findings for 
the sources of productivity for individual years, yet the two approaches do not yield 
different results in terms of identifying the components of productivity growth 
especially in European banking during the 1990s. Weill (2004) investigates the 
60 SF A specifies a functional fonn for the cost. profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and 
environmental factors. and allows for random error. SF A suggests a composed error model where inefficiencies are 
assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, nonnally the half-nonnal, whereas random errors follow a 
symmetric distribution. usually the standard nonnal. The inefficiencies must have a truncated distribution because 
inefficiencies cannot be negative. OF A specifies a functional fonn for the frontier but separates the inefficiencies 
from random in a di fferent way. OF A assumes that the efficiency of each finn is stable over time whereas random 
error tends to average oul to zero over time. Unlike SF A. DF A has no strong assumptions relating to the specific 
distributions of the inefficiencies or random errors. Based on OF A. inefficiencies can be of almost any form of 
distribution. even one that is relatively close to symmetric as long as the inefficiencies are nonnegative. The last 
approach is TFA TFA specifies fonn and a.-.sumes that deviations from predicted perfonnam.-e values within the 
highest and lowest pcrfonnance quartilcs of observations classified by size class represent random error. At the 
same time. deviations in predicted perfonnance between the highest and lowest quaniles represent inefficiencies 
and random error exists within these quartiles (Berger and Humph~. 1997. pp. 7). 
75 
consistency of efficiency estimates by measuring the cost efficiency of selected 
European banks using three frontier techniques; (1) stochastic frontier approach 
(SF A), (2) distribution-free approach (DFA), and (3) data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). The efficiency scores computed by all three techniques are quite consistent 
with standard measures of performance. The results suggest a lack of robustness in 
fmdings between approaches, even if there are some similarities between parametric 
approaches. The results also show some correlation between all frontier approaches 
and standard measures of performance. 
Changes in the economic environment and advances in technology are generally 
expected to improve bank efficiency but these factors can also lead to banks taking-on 
greater risk (Chiu and Chen, 2009). Altunbas et al. (2000) look into the impact of risk 
and quality factors on banks' costs by using the stochastic cost frontier in order to 
evaluate scale and X-efficiencies for commercial banks in Japan between 1993 and 
1996. They use loan loss provisions to control for bank output quality, with financial 
capital and liquidity measures included to control for risk. This paper follows the 
approach suggested by Mester (1996) where risk and quality factors need to be taken 
into account in order to avoid optimal size banks to be overstated. Altunbas et al. 
(2000) find that the level of financial capital has a significant influence on scale 
efficiency, and appears less sensitive to risk and quality factors. Mester (1996), 
Hughes (1999), Hughes et al. (2000), Altunbas et al. (2000), Hughes et al. (2001) and 
Girardone et aI. (2004) all emphasise the importance of incorporating internal risk into 
analysis of production and measure of bank efficiency61. Altunbas et al. (2000) and 
Drake and Hall (2003) also suggest that failure to adequately account for risk can 
have a significant impact on relative efficiency scores. 
61 Most studies of internal risk in the existing literature use credit risk indicators. including non-perfonning loans. 
allowance for loan losses. and risky assets. to explain bank efficiency scores., but do not consider market and 
opernling risks associated with bank efficiency. However. I~ing ~ds to the dc:mand sid~ is .not the main 
business of banks anymore. In January 2001 the Basle Committee diVided calculatmg bank nslt mto 3 parts -
credit. market. and operating. These new types of complicated business mean that banks are exposed to cnonnous 
operating and market risks. ThUs. the non-perfonning ratio is no longer a good index to evaluate the risks of banks 
(Chill and Chen. 2009. pp. 4S6) 
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3.3.1 The Importance of the Environmental Variables in Evaluating 
Banking Efficiency and Performance 
Bank efficiency scores have been shown to differ markedly across systems (and 
studies) (Berger et aI., 1997 and Berger and Humphrey, 1997). According to Mester 
(1993), Mester (1997) and Berger and Humphrey (1997), the failure to account for 
differences in cross-country differences in banking efficiency estimates is likely to 
induce instability in efficiency findings. It is important to consider geographical and 
economic conditions while comparing banking efficiency cross countries. Differences 
between banks may not be the only reason for banking efficiency scores to differ 
among studies (Shen et al., 2008). The same recommendations can also be found in 
Bos et al. (2008), indicating that controlling for cross-country heterogeneity may 
result in efficiency scores that more accurately reflect management's ability to 
minimize costs and maximize profits. 
Cross-country comparisons of bank efficiency levels can be considered somewhat 
paradoxical since banks were often compared to common efficiency frontiers, 
assuming that banks operating in different countries had access to the same 
technology (Radic and Fiordelisi, 2009, pp.9). In the 1990s, most literature on 
international comparisons of banking efficiency had been perfonned primarily on US 
and European systems. These studies involved measuring banking efficiency without 
considering environmental variables. They assumed that any differences in efficiency 
could be explained by country-specific banking technology without making any 
adjustment for country specific condition or norms (Chafai et al., 2001, pp.147). Berg 
et ale (1993) relied on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in order to capture the 
differences in banking efficiency among Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Berg et ale 
(1995) did a follow up study by adding Denmark to the previous sample. The same 
four countries were then again investigated in Bergendahl (1995). Fecher and Pestieau 
(1993) and Pastor et ale (1997) applied the distribution free approach (OF A) and DEA 
analysis to 11 OECD countries and 8 developed countries, respectively. Allen and Rai 
(1996) used DF A and the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SF A) in order to undertake a 
systematic comparison of efficiency measures across 15 developed countries under 
different regulatory environments. Finally, Maudos et ale (2002) used DFA to 
compare efficiency measures across 11 European countries and showed that nation-
wide efficiency frontiers understate cost and profit efficiency in comparison to 
77 
specific frontiers for each specialization. The above studies share two common 
limitations. First, differences between countries are measured without controlling for 
variations in technology and second, none of these studies account for differences in 
environmental conditions among countries. 
Due to the introduction of new products such as derivatives in the financial markets 
and the rapid fluctuations/changes in the financial and economic environment, more 
researchers are now attempting to incorporate the impact of environmental, economic 
and regulatory factors on bank efficiencies, in both parametric and non-parametric 
approaches62• Among the researchers that have incorporated economic, environmental 
and regulatory effects to efficiency studies based on parametric approach are: 
Akhigbe and McNutty (2003), Berger and Mester (2003), Chaffai et ale (2001) and 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000); whereas those applying a non-parametric approach 
include: Lozano-Vivas et ale (2002). Fried et ale (1999) introduced a four stage 
procedure which can be viewed as an extension of the two stage and frontier 
separation approach. They introduced a non-parametric, linear programming, frontier 
procedure for obtaining a measure of managerial efficiency that controls exogenous 
features of the operating environment. Using an example of a nursing home, this 
paper illustrates statistical tests of the effects of external conditions on the efficient 
use of each individual input/output. The results show that by controlling for the 
external environment, the average efficiency score increased. 
The same interpretation also can be found in Dietch and Lozano-Vivas (2000). They 
investigate the influence of environmental conditions on the cost efficiency of French 
and Spanish banking. This paper is produced by following recommendation by Berger 
and Humphrey (1991) to address the condition of environmental variables and its 
impact in the international banking efficiency literature. Dietch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000) suggest that in a cross country comparison it is essential to include any 
differences arising from some country specific aspects of bank technology. 
environmental and regulatory conditions. The differences are more likely to exist in 
the economic environmental conditions across countries and these differences may 
62 Parametric studies treated external variables as conb'Ol variables to the functional fonn by assuming to have a 
direct effcct on the production or cost structure. therefore.. each bank would face a different frontier or cost frontier. 
Whereas non-parametric studies. external variable are used as non-discrctionary inputs and/or outputs. and had a 
direct effect on the efficient production frontier (Drake ct al .• 20(6). 
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induce differences in bank efficiency. Using cost frontier estimations for cross 
country comparisons of efficiency, their results demonstrate that environmental 
variables contribute significantly to differences in efficiency scores between the two 
countries and neglecting these variables could induce an important misspecification of 
the cost frontier and an overestimation of the bank cost inefficiency63. 
However, the literature addressing cross-country comparison of bank efficiency in 
developing countries is scarce and as far as we are aware there has not been any 
comprehensive work done on cross-country efficiency comparisons for banks in the 
developing countries. Therefore this study aims to extend the existing literature by 
controlling for environmental variables when investigating the efficiency of the 
banking sectors in Asian countries. 
3.4 Efficiency in Asian Banking 
The Asian financial crisis has spawned a large amount of literature although little 
work has been done investigating banking sector efficiency issues. As noted earlier, 
most of the past literature on banking efficiency was largely conducted on the u.s. 
and to a lesser extent on Europe and relatively little on Asian financial institutions 
(Chantapong, 2005; Kwan, 2003; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Kwan (2003) uses multiple regression analysis to look into the banking industry's 
per unit operating costs in seven East Asian economies, namely, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand, from 1992 to 
1999. Prior to the 1997 crisis period, the author finds that bank operating costs among 
these Asian countries were declining from 1992 to 1997, indicating that banks, on 
average, were improving their operating performance over time. Laeven (1999)64 used 
DEA and introduced risk taking measurements to assess the overall performance of 
five Asian crisis countries (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines). 
Laeven suggested that both efficiency and risk factors are essentials in investigating 
overall bank efficiency performance. The findings argue that any rise on average 
6J Evanoff and Israilevich (1991). Berger and Humphrey (1991). Berger and Mester (1997). Mester (1997). and Oc 
Young (1998) also provide analysis by including environmental variables in their research with parametric 
:pproach. Results show significant effects of these environmental variables in their results. 
The only cross-country study found on Asian bank efficiency using DEA. 
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efficiency scores before the crisis were due to excessive risk-taking and do not reflect 
the true increase in efficiency. Looking at the different ownership structure~ the 
author also indicates that foreign-owned banks only took a smaller risk compared to 
other banks in the regio~ and family-owned banks were among the highest risk 
takers. Karim (2001) used Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to analyse the 
efficiency of banking industries in Asia's most affected countries. The findings 
indicate different results from the above mentioned studies where efficiencies in 
Asian banks tend to decline over the year preceding the crisis and suggested that bank 
failure may be related to inefficiency. 
Williams and Nguyen (2005) investigated the impact of changes in bank governance 
on bank perfonnance. Similar to Laeven (1999), this paper also indentifies bank 
governance in tenns of bank ownership. Their results tend to support bank 
privatization and the repeal of state ownership on economic grounds. Like Laeven 
(1999), Williams and Nguyen (2005) found that family-owned or company owned 
banks are the most risky - many of these banks ceased operations as a result of the 
crisis. Even though they use control for some country specific factors~ these are only 
to control for limited cross-border differences as recommended in previous literature 
(Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Chaffai et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001; 
Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002 and Weill, 2003). 
3.4.1 Impact of Environment and Regulatory Variables on Asian Banks 
Efficiency 
From the existing literature, each country is substantially different according to its 
own geographical and macroeconomic conditions. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2002) 
suggested that in order to predict the effects of an expected increase in cross-border 
competition, knowledge of the differences or similarities in current banking costs and 
productive efficiencies between countries is essential. More recent studies such as 
Beccalli (2004) emphasises the importance of environmental variables in their cross-
country study by comparing the cost efficiency of UK and Italian investment finns. 
Considering environmental variables together with banking variables whilst 
measuring banking efficiency differences, are vital and will influence the behaviour of 
a country~s banking industry (Lozano-Vivas et al., 2(02). Based on previous 
80 
discussion (in 3.4), no studies have incorporated both banking and environmental 
variables (with the exception of William and Nguyen) and they do not consider the 
effects of measurement/changes taking place during and after the crisis period. 
Shen (2008) filled this gap in the literature by investigating cost efficiency in ten 
Asian countries through setting up a common frontier as a benchmark and including 
cross-country heterogeneous factors to measure relative efficiency scores. The 
fmdings show that when cross-country heterogeneity is considered, bank efficiency 
scores are higher than when they are not included. The results suggest that 
heterogeneity can explain part of the inefficiency and thus neglecting heterogeneity in 
cross-country studies will generate underestimated efficiency scores. Nakhun and 
Avkiran (2009) looked into the relationship between post-crisis bank restructuring, 
country-specific conditions and bank efficiencies in Asian from 1997 - 2001. The 
authors indicate that, although domestic mergers produce more efficient banks, 
overall, restructuring does not lead to more efficient baking systems. Banking system 
inefficiencies are mostly attributed to country-specific conditions, particularly. high 
interest rates, concentrated markets and economic development (Nakhun and Avkiran, 
2009, pp.240). They also suggest that the region needs to focus more on introducing 
stabilizing macroeconomic policies, as this may help the local and international 
regulators in facing other potential crises in the near future. Among other recent 
literature, Amir and Luc Can (2008), Gurcharan et al. (2008), Amadou et al. (2008) 
and Chiu and Chen (2009) discuss and include country specific variables to account 
for their effects on bank efficiency. 
3.5 Competition and Concentration on Banking Efficiency 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the 1997 financial crisis has led to regulatory 
improvements that helped to develop competitiveness in the Asian banking markets. 
The most definite changes in this regime are: increased consolidation through mergers 
and acquisition, nationalization of banks; closure of unviable banks; compulsory 
purchases and assumptions; transfer of assets to healthier banks, creating larger core 
banks, and providing capital injection to recapitalize banks (Williams and Nguyen 
2005). International standards were introduced in managing banks for better 
supervision and more effort was taken in implementing stringent regulations on 
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capital adequacy, loan classification and loan loss provisions (Lindgren et al.~ 2(00). 
This regulatory change is believed to have contributed to the improvement in the 
stability of the fmancial sector, as well as to improvements in the cost efficiency of 
the banking industry. It has also fostered an increase in concentration. On the one 
hand, increased concentration is expected to intensify market power and therefore 
hinder both competition and efficiency. Then ag~ it might be argued that if bank 
mergers and acquisitions are driven by economies of scale, then increased 
concentration may foster efficiency improvements and can enhance competition - as 
bank can post lower prices if they benefit from scale and other efficiency advantages 
(Casu and Girardone, 2005, pp.2). 
Following the Asian crisis, substantial changes in the regulation of financial markets 
were anticipated in order to lessen any barriers to the development of competition 
among financial institutions. Affected countries have started to adopt international 
standards in providing better financial services and to enhance management. These 
changes were made with the intention of liberalizing the provision of services and to 
increase domestic market competition. Financial restructuring (in respect of Asian 
financial crisis countries) has improved bank services by lessening restrictions on 
reserve requirement and other restrictions which indirectly have reduced the cost of 
production. Banks are more motivated to implement new ideas, improve their services 
and are able to develop new opportunities and technological innovation (Zhao et al., 
2010; Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005; Aghion and Howitt, 1996; Avkiran~ 
2000; and Berger and Mester~ 2003). At the same time, bank efficiency may have 
increased and this could allow for the opening up of the market place to new entrants~ 
bringing along technology transfer and skills advantages (Glass and Saggi~ 1998). 
Although there is overwhelming empirical literature on the 1997 Asian crisis. the 
existing literature does not address the cross-country relationships linking bank 
competition, concentration, and efficiency. Most literature is country specific and the 
empirical work on bank competition and concentration also typically focuses on the 
US and European banking sectors: such as Shaffer (1989); Berger et ale (2004); Casu 
et al. (2004); Casu et ale (2005); Jansen and De Haan (2003): Bikker and Groeneveld 
(2000); Weill (2004); Bikker (2004); De Bandt et ale (2000); and Molyneux et ale 
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(1994). Even though this literature is useful it may not be directly applicable to 
developing countries (Demirgfi~-Kunt and Levine, 2(00). 
3.S.1 The Role of Competition and Concentration in Banking 
Competition is argued to have a positive impact on industry efficiency, quality of 
provision and innovation (Casu and Girardone, 2001). The financial sector plays a 
vital role in economic development, especially in a developing economy where a 
competitive and efficient fmancial sector is needed to help with economic growth. 
The progress of developing countries in economic policy reforms and financial 
institutions liberalization has enhanced competition in the fmancial sector; increased 
savings mobilization and allocative efficiency for achieving better economic growth. 
According to Claessens and Laeven (2004, pp. 563), the degree of competition in the 
financial sector can be significant in the efficiency of the production of financial 
services, the quality of financial products, and the degree of innovation in the sector. 
While some relationships between competition and banking system performance and 
stability have been analyzed in the theoretical literature, empirical research on the 
issue of competition, particularly cross-country research, is still at an early stage 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004, pp.564). However, a number of papers have 
investigated competitive conditions in banking systems and the relationship between 
competition and efficiency (most of them regressing cost efficiency on a set of 
variables for market structure) for example Berger (1995) and Berger and Hannan 
(1997; 1989) on US banks, Lang and We1ze1 (1996) on Western German banks, and 
Goldberg and Rai (1996) and Punt and Van Rooij (2003) on European banks find 
some positive link. Bilcker and Haaf (2002) examine competitive conditions and 
market structure in 23 banking systems over the 1990s and find evidence of 
monopolistic competition in all countries as do Yanelle (1997); Gilbert (1994); and 
Padoa-Schoppa (2001) in other related literature. 
Recent research on the impact of competition and banking efficiency has been 
conducted by Casu and Girardone (2009): using panel data on EU countries they 
found positive causality between market power and efficiency, whereas a weak 
relationship between competition and efficiency has been revealed. Casu and 
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Girardone (2007) looked into the relationships in European countries and suggest a 
negative causation between efficiency and competitio~ whereas the causality from 
competition to efficiency is positive and relatively weak. Weill et al. (2008) and 
Weill (2004) also found negative relationships between competition and efficiency in 
the Czech Republic and again in EU countries. Despite the abundance of literature 
existing on banking competition, there is a scarcity of studies analysing specific cases 
of cross-country studies for developing countries and the impact of environmental 
variables. 
Competition and concentration are an important element in measuring the welfare-
related public policy towards market structure and conduct in the banking industry. 
Recent literature shows scarcity in the analysis of competition and concentration and 
most of the existing literature too date appears to focus on the European Union 
banking market. Berger et a1. (2003) suggested that more research is needed on the 
topic of bank. concentration and competition. 
The inclusion of developing nations is highly encouraged as it will provide additional 
evidence on the effect of concentration and competition. For the past ten years, the 
Asian crisis has given impetus towards the regional economic development, 
regulatory reform, large-scale consolidation and the improvement in infonnation 
technology. The restructuring has changed the banking environment, with potentially 
offsetting effects on the overall degree of competitiveness. A recent wave of 
consolidation through mergers in most of the affected country (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines) is expected to have substantial implications on 
competition and concentration. 
Recent studies on competition and concentration do not explicitly incorporate the 
effect of regulation and other environmental changes in their analysis. Gilbert (1984) 
mentioned that regulation is one of the important determinant elements in banking 
competitive performance. However many studies appear to neglect this point. The 
same argument found in Canoy et al. (200 1, pp.27) suggests that there is no hard 
evidence yet on how regulatory changes in the late 1990s have affected structure. 
conduct and performance relationships in the financial sector. 
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3.5.2 Measurement of Competition and Concentration 
The research on bank competition has evolved mainly in two directions: structural and 
non-structural approaches. The structural approach to the measurement of competition 
includes the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) and the efficiency 
hypothesis. The former states that the higher the concentration in a marke~ the lower 
the competition and the higher the profits that the finns receive. The latter takes 
efficiency into account and states that firms with superior efficiency improve their 
market shares and become more profitable65 • The SCP paradigm is used to investigate 
whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among the larger 
banks, resulting in superior performance, whereas the Efficient Structure (Efficiency) 
Hypothesis (ES) investigates whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that enhances 
their performance and results in a more concentrated market (Clark, 1988; Berger, 
1995; and Casu and Girardone, 2005). The SCP approach has been the most 
commonly used assessment of competition in banking since the early 1950s (such as 
BaiD, 1951 and Bain, 1954) up to the late 1990s. The approach infers competition 
from observable market structure and links banks' market power with market 
structure. Market structure is reflected by concentration ratios (CR ratios) for the 
largest firms and the Hirschman Herfindahl Index (HHI) (Casu and Girardone, 2005). 
Under the SCP approach, higher concentration is said to encourage firms to collude 
with the assumption that the degree of the market concentration is inversely related to 
the degree of concentration. 
The efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis emerges from the criticism of SCP 
hypothesis (Demsetz, 1974; Peltzman, 1977; AI-Muharrami and Mathews, 2009). 
Under ES hypothesis, the efficiency of the firm will determine the link between 
market structure and performance of any firm. The most efficient companies will 
reduce costs, leading to a higher profi~ thus increasing in the market share and leading 
higher market concentration. Firms may be exploiting greater x-efficiency (the so-
called "efficiency hypothesis") or greater scale efficiency (the so-called "scale 
efficiency hypothesis"). If higher market concentration lowers competition. according 
to the efficiency hypothesis there should be an inverse relationship between 
M Both approaches will be further discus.-.ed in Chapter S methodology. 
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competition and efficiency, thus reversing the causality running from efficiency to 
competition in the SCP paradigm (Casu and Girardone, 2007, pp.16). 
Another alternative assessment is put forward by the New Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (NEIO) literature. This approach indicates that several other factors may 
also determine competition, other than market structure and concentration~ such as 
conte stability in the banking market and exit/entry barriers (Casu and Girardone. 
2005, Bawnol et ai., 1982; Bresnahan, 1989; Rosse and Panzar, 1977: Rosse and 
Panzar, 1987). These latter approaches were developed under the new Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. NEIO came after several studies elaborated 
on the limitations of using market concentration as a proxy for competition66• The 
theory of a contestable market argued that, perfect competition can be found even in a 
highly concentrated market and that collusive agreement can still be achieved in a 
market with large numbers of firms (Maudos and Guevara, 2006). This indicates that 
the degree of competition should not only be related to the number of competitors 
or/and concentration of the market, but also related to the conditions of entry/exit in 
the sector (Maudos and Guevara, 2006). 
3.5.3 Literature on Banking Competition and Concentration 
The existing literature on the relationship between competition and concentration in 
banking markets is rather large and focuses on the EU and the US banking markets 
(Molyneux et al., 1994; Hempell, 2002; Bikker and Groeneveld, 2000). Most studies 
in this strand of the literature utilize either the Bresnahan or the panzar Rosse (P-R) 
non-structural methodology to evaluate competition in the financial sector. More 
recently, a number of studies have employed these methodologies to quantitatively 
assess the degree of competition and market structure of the banking industry in 
developing and transition countries. Generally, none of the studies have investigated 
the competitive behaviour and concentration issues in the Asian banking sector in a 
cross country setting and in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis (Sufian and Abdul Majid., 
2007. pp.l 0-11 ). 
(16 Recent studies have aJso shown the inadequacy of using market concentration as an indicator of competition 
(such as Berger et al .• 2004; Guevara et at, 2005; Claesscns and Laevco. 20(4). pointing to the necessity of using 
aJtemalive indicators and introducing NEIO. 
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Work by Abbasoglu et a1. (2007) found that no relations existed between 
concentration and competitio~ and no robust relationship was present between 
efficiency and profitability. Similar to Jansen and De Haan (2003), no evidence was 
found to show that concentration indicators are linked to profitability and they added 
that concentration and competition are not related. Smirlock (1985) and Yeyati and 
Micco (2007) also state that there is no discemable positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability. Using Granger-causality tests, Casu and Girardone 
(2007) suggest that concentration is negatively associated with competition and that 
there is a weak positive causality between efficiency and competition. Weill (2004) 
investigates the relationship between competition and X-efficiency using Stochastic 
Frontier Approach and non-structural panzar and Rosse (P-R) model and found a 
negative relationship between competition and efficiency. Bikker and Bos (2005) 
looked into the nature and degree of competition in the European Union (EU) banking 
market and the level of efficiency of the banks, they also found that the effectiveness 
in European banking had improved significantly, which gained through an increase in 
the competition level and profitability. Their findings also suggest that deregulation 
and monetary integration does give a positive impact on competitive improvements 
and efficiency gains. 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) associate competitiveness measurements with indicators 
of countries banking system structural and regulatory regimes. The study found that 
banking systems are more competitive if there are fewer regulations on foreign entry 
and activity restrictions. These findings can be related to fragility, Beck et ale (2003), 
found that more competitive banking systems with fewer entry regulations and 
activity restrictions tend to be more stable. Laeven (2005) study's the effect of 
competition, ownership, diversity of activities, and government policy on the 
performance of banks in East Asia. His findings suggest that banks that operated in 
more concentrated banking systems generated greater income, resulting in less 
intervention by the government. Consolidation does positively affect the performance 
and stability of the selected countries bank operations. Using the panzar and Rosse (P-
R) approach~ the results suggest that existing banks could grow by improving the 
quality of their services rather than concentrating on further consolidation. The entry 
of foreign banks was suggested as one way of applying pressure on the country to 
increase competition in local banking markets, together with improvements in the 
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areas of fiscal and monetary policy. Sufian and Abdul Majid (2001) used data from 
Malaysia and found that the competitive behaviour of banks is not necessarily related 
to the number of banks in a market or to concentratio~ because other factors are also 
at work. However the authors argue that the results need to be treated with caution 
since the process of liberalisation (referring to Malaysia) was still not fully completed. 
Recent research has also highlighted that the relationships between competition and 
banking system performance are complex (Vives, 200 1). It is important to have a well 
developed financial system because there is always the possibility that banks can face 
competition from different financial firms and imposing few restrictions on bank 
activity will encourage contestable behaviour (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Sufian and 
Abdul Majid, 2007). 
T bl 31 C ff dC t ti . E M kt a e . omj!e I Ion an oncen ra on In mergm~ ar es • • 
Author Period Countries Method Findings 
B ikker and Haaf 1988- 23 EU and non- P-R MC (all countries~ 
(2002) 98 EU countries competition weaker in small 
markets and stronger In 
international market) 
Gelos and Rold6s 1994- 8 European and P-R MC (all countries except for 
(2002) 99 Latin American Argentina and Hungary near 
countries PC) 
Yildrim and 1992- 14 Central and P-R MC (Lithuana, Macedonia); 
Philappatos (2002) 99 Southeast PC (Latvia); Neither MC 
European and the nor PC (other countries) 
Russian 
Federation 
Murjan and Ruza 1993- Middle Eastern P-R MC (oil-producing countries 
(2002) 97 countries are less competitive than 
non-oil ~roducing countries) 
Claessens and 1994- 50 Industrialised P-R MC (largest countries tend 
Laeven (2004) 2001 and developing to have lower competition) 
countries 
Mamatzakis et al. 1998- 7 Southern P-R MC 
(2005) 2002 Eastern 
European 
countries 
Drakos and 1992- Central Eastern P-R MC 
Konstantinou 2000 European and 
(2005) former Soviet 
Union Countries 
Mkrtchyan (2005) 1998- Armenia P-R MC 
2002 
---~--~ 
-
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Cont'd 
AI-Muharrami et 1995- Gulf Cooperation P-R MC (Bahrain~ Qatar)~ 
al. (2006) 2003 Council's Countries PC (Kuwa~ Saudi Arabia, 
UAE); Neither MC nor PC 
(Oman) 
Perera et al. (2006) 1995- 4 South Asian P-R MC 
2003 Countries 
Gunalp and Celik 1990- Turkey P-R MC 
(2006) 2000 
Yuan (2006) 1996- China P-R PC (nearly perfect 
2000 competition) 
Belaisch (2003) 1993- Brazil P-R MC (except large banks: 
2000 PC) 
Levy-Y eyati and 1993- Argentina, Brazil, P-R MC 
M icco (2003) 2002 Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, EI 
Salvador and Peru 
Abbasoglu et al. 2001- Turkey P-R MC 
(2007) 2005 
Source: CompIled by the author from referred studies; P-R is Panzar and Rosse; MC is 
Monopolistic Competition; MO is Monopolistic Market; PC is Perfect Competition. 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the recent literature on the issue of concentration and 
competition in the banking sectors of emerging markets. All studies reviewed employ 
the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic67 as a measure of competition and find that banking 
markets are mostly operating under monopolistic competition. This thesis aims to add 
to the existing literature by analysing the evolution of concentration and competition 
in the banking markets of South East Asian countries in the aftermath of the 1997 
cnsts. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Asian countries experienced a severe financial crisis which erupted in the mid-1990s 
and culminated in a 1997 crisis. The crisis was followed by deep economic downturns 
that lead to changes in economic policies and most importantly the restructuring of 
their financial institutions. Despite the severity and deep influence on both the real 
and financial sectors, studies on the impact of the crisis on banking sector efficiency 
and competitive behaviour remains rather rather limited, particularly in a cross 
country setting. 
67 Methodological details will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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This Chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence of two interrelated 
aspects of banking efficiency in the Asian countries most affected by the crisis, 
namely (l) how the environmental variables affect the degree of efficiency across 
countries and (2) the relationship between competition, concentration and efficiency 
when taking into account country specific variables. 
One important point that has not been adequately recognised in the literature also 
relates to the impact of regulatory changes and the role of external variables on the 
degree of banking sector efficiency over the crisis period. To understand the process 
of financial refonn and convergence in Asian fmancial institutions it is important to 
investigate the degree of competitiveness and the efficiency of banks across-country 
taking into account environmental and regulatory factors. To date regulatory changes 
have encouraged consolidation and as a result, most Asian countries have experienced 
widespread mergers and acquisition leading to a more concentrated system. From a 
policy perspective it is important to gauge whether the crisis has resulted in a more 
efficient and competitive system post crisis and this is what the empirical evidence 
provided in the following chapters seeks to address. 
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Appendix 3.1: Cross Country Study 
Authors Period Data Source 
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE 
Cetorelli & 1989 to Bankscope, 
Gambera, 1996 Demirgtlc-Kunt 
2001 & Huizinga 
(1998) 
DemirgOc-
Kunt& 
Levine, 2000 
1990 to 
1997 
Beck, Demirgtlc-
Kunt & Levine 
(1999) 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Bikker& 
Haaf,2002 
Buch& 
Golder, 2001 
Cerasi, 
Chizzolini & 
Ivaldi, 2002 
Corvoisier & 
Gropp, 2002 
De Bandt & 
Davis, 2000 
Gischer & 
Juttner. 200 I 
1988 to 
1998 
1986 to 
1999 
1990 to 
1996 
1993 to 
1999 
1992 to 
1996 
1993 to 
1997 
Bankscope 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank & 
Federal Reserve 
Board (200 1 ) 
Bankscope, 
Bankers 
Almanac, Bank 
Base,OECD, 
IFS, ERE 
Bankscope, 
OECD, ECB, 
Central Banks 
Bankscope 
OECD Bank 
Profitability 
Countries 
41 countries 
99 countries 
Method 
Conc. ratios, 
int. margins 
& OH costs 
CR3 
23 countries - panzar 
European and Rosse 
non-European 
Germany, US Cournot 
model & 
Stackel-berg 
9 EEC Cerasi 
countries (1995);2-
stage game 
10 European Cournot 
countries model; 
Herfindahl 
Index 
France, panzar and 
Germany, Italy Rosse 
25 OECD Lerner. 
monopoly 
index/reg. 
Competition Results 
No optimal market structure re 
competition In banking. 
Concentration positive effect on 
financing young finns - hence 
can impact technological 
progress. 
Bank concentration not closely 
associated with bank efficiency. 
financial development, industrial 
competition or stability banking 
system. 
All countries: monopolistic 
competition 
Small banks in local markets: 
weaker competition 
Large banks In int. markets: 
stronger competition 
Europe compo stronger than US, 
Canada & Japan 
Domestic banks tend to dominate 
the market segment of domestic 
customers. 
New York & California have s 
much higher level of foreign 
banks than other US states. 
High competition: Belgium. 
Netherlands, Spain & Denmark. 
Similar level: Gennany, France, 
Portugal & Italy. Low level: 
Greece. Scope for new branches: 
Spain, Portugal, Italy & Greece 
Banks' margins/demand deposits: 
increasing concentration 
increases banks margin by 100-
200 basis points. Tests 
competition wave mergers Euro. 
Savings/time deposits: higher 
concentration results in margins 
100-200 basis points lower in 
more concentrated market. Reject 
SCPo 
Large banks: monopolistic 
competition In all countries. 
Small banks: monopolistic 
competition in Italy. monopoly in 
France 
Generally. 1% incr. Lerner index 
leads to > 3% incr. interest rate 
margin & 1°10 increase in ROA. 
On average. every 1% incr. fee-
to-interest-income decreases NIM 
by approx. I .25e;. 
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Cont'd 
Authors 
Gual, 1999 
Molyneux, 
L1oyd-
Williams & 
Thomto~ 
1994 
Shaffer, 2001 
Staikouras & 
Wood,2000 
Period 
1985 to 
1995 
1986 to 
1989 
1979 to 
1991 
1975 to 
1985 
Data Source 
European 
Commission and 
B~Nolle& 
Rice (1997) 
Bankscope and 
Central Banks 
OECD, Shaffer 
(1993), FDIC 
OECD& 
Bankscope 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Gelos & 
Rold6s, 2002 
Yildirim & 
Philappatos, 
2002a 
1994 to Bankscope, 
1999 OECD, Central 
Banks 
1992 to 
1999 
Bankscope & 
IMF 
Countries 
15 European 
Countries 
12 European 
countries 
Method 
Klein-
Monti 
variation 
panzar 
and Rosse 
15 industrialized Bresnahan-
!countries in Lau 
1N0rth America, 
IAsia, Europe 
Greece, Spain 
4 Asian, 5 Latin 
American & 4 
Cent. East 
European 
panzar 
and Rosse 
CRJ, 
CRIO, H 
index, 
panzar and 
Rosse 
14 countries CRJ, 
Central Europe, panzar and 
South Eastern Rosse 
Europe, Russian 
Federation 
Competition Results 
3.4% decline In concentration 
ratio over period 5-firm 
concentration ratio UlCrea5e 
0.86% points 
Germany, U~ France & Spain: 
monopolistic competition; 
Italy: monopoly or conjecturaJ 
variations short-run oligopoly 
All: markets imperfectly 
integrated. Belgium. Denmark. 
France, Japan & US: market 
power. Finland: slight excess 
capacity. Most markets 
contestable or Cournot oligopoly, 
5 countries significantly 
competitive. 
Spain: profitability higher and 
less variable. Deregulation 
promoted competition in efficient 
system. Greece: larger role of 
state - deregulation promoted 
efficiency 
Consolidation In emerging 
markets not resUlting in less 
competitive pressure. Turkey: 
competition less. Argentina: 
competition increased in later 
years. 
Large banks in transition 
countries: more competitive 
environment than small local 
banks Lithuania, Macedonia: 
monopolistic competition Latvia: 
perfect competition Other 
countries: neither monopolistic 
nor perfect 
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dO 32 C °t ° Ii C t B ks . h· h R edG Appen IX • nena or al~onzln2 an Wit m t e estructur roup • • 
Sub-group 
Criteria 
Merger Merger of two or more domestic banks~ while maintaining 
majority domestic ownership during the period of 1998-200 1. 
either voluntary or mandatory. 
Foreign takeover A bank which was taken over by foreign banks or holding 
companies during the period of 1998-200 1 ~ either voluntary 
or mandatory. Contains majority foreign ownership after the 
event. 
State intervention A state or government agency intervention during the period 
of 1998-2001 including nationalization~ temporary control~ 
and recapitalization by using public funds. 
Source: Nakhun Avkiran, (2009), pp. 243. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BANK EFFICIENCY IN SELECTED SOUTH EAST ASIAN 
COUNTRIES: A NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
4.1 Introduction 
Studies on the efficiency of fmancial institutions have significantly increased 10 
number since the 1990s (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Efficiency indicators produce 
information on the success of the management of both individual banks and the 
industry as a whole. Improving the efficiency levels may create a chain reaction 
leading to a better operating environment, improvement in the ability to utilise inputs, 
upgrading financial products and services, higher shareholder value, a higher volume 
of funds intermediated and, ultimately, foster economic growth by channelling funds 
into productive investments (Molyneux et al., 1996). Berger and Humphrey (1997, 
pp.175) noted that the information obtained from efficiency studies would be useful 
in: (1) informing the regulators/government on their policy through evaluations made 
on the effects of deregulations, mergers or market structure on efficiency; (2) 
addressing research issues by describing the efficiency of an industry, ranking firms, 
or even checking efficiency, it may help to employ different efficiency techniques; 
and (3) improving managerial performance through identifying 'best practices' and 
'worst practices'. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the conceptual framework that underpins the 
analysis of bank efficiency as well as to carry out an empirical analysis of the 
efficiency of South East Asian (SEA) banking sector in the post-crisis and recovery 
period (1999 - 2005). The methodology involved focuses on non-parametric 
techniques (DEA) for the measurement of efficiency and the measurement. Section 
4.1, discusses the concept and the measurement of efficiency. Section 4.2 explains the 
mathematical approaches to measure efficiency; Section 4.3 discusses the 
development of Data Envelopment Analysis. This section also explains the concept of 
radial and non-radial slacks, as we followed this approach to measure the impact of 
environmental variables on efficiency and the multistage analysis involved. Section 
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4.4 presents the empirical application of the methodological approached discussed. 
Specifically, we measure bank efficiency in selected South East Asian Section 4.5 
discusses the results of the empirical analysis whereas section 4.6 draws some 
conclusions. 
4.2 Efficiency: Concept and Measurement 
The main objective of financial restructuring and refonns is to improve the efficiency 
of the banking industry (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). When Asia was struck by the 
financial crisis, each affected country started implementing new policies in order to 
set the economy towards recovery. The flexibility of more liberal regulations, together 
with the competitive environment was expected to give more freedom over the 
utilisation of resources. Bank performance studies have become of great interest in 
many different fields. 
Efficiency for a firm is defined as producing the maximum output from a given set of 
inputs. Efficiency can be seen as part of a firm's performance, either as a measure of 
the maximisation of output, maximisation of profit or minimisation of costs. 
Efficiency measurement began with a study by Farrell (1957) who drew upon the 
work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951). Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) 
highlighted the frontier nature of production functions in economics. Debreu (1951) 
proposed the first measure of technical efficiency using 'coefficient of resource 
utilisation' which uses the smallest amount of input resources needed in order to 
produce a certain output. Koopmans (1951, pp. 60) defines a producer as technical 
efficient when an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one other 
output or an increase in at least one input, and if a reduction in any input requires an 
increase in at least other input or a reduction in at least one output. 
Farrell's (1957) work was the first to define efficiency measures at micro level. His 
work brought forward two issues that needed to be highlighted; (1) how to define 
efficiency and (2) how to benchmark technology and efficiency measures. Farrell's 
study also brought about the proposition of empirical treatment of production 
functions as 'frontier' and proposed that efficiency consists of two components: 
technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). TE reflects the ability of a 
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finn to minimize input (maximize output) used to produce (to gain) for a given set of 
output (inputs). AE represents the aptitude of a firm to use the inputs in optimal 
proportions at a given price and its production technology. Together, these two 
measures represent total efficiency68 (OE) measurement (Coelli et al .. 2005). 
Efficiency ratios take on a value between zero and one, where one indicates that the 
finn is fully efficient. 
Figure: 4.1: Overall, Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
A 
---s 
o A' 
Sources: Coelli et al.( 2005, pp.52) 
The concept of efficiency is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Assuming a finn is using two 
inputs, Xl and X2 to produce a single output (y) at point P. SS· (isoquant) slope shows 
the possible combinations of input and output that the finn can produce if it is 
perfectly efficient. The slope AA' (isocost) represents the input price ratio and it 
shows the various combination of inputs that require the same level of expenditure. If 
the firm's production is efficient it will occur at Q', the cost minimisation poin~ and 
when SS· and AA' slopes intersect and at this intersection point the combination of 
input output at Q' is considered achieving TE and AE or OE. In both technical and 
allocative efficiency, a value less than unity represent inefficiency. 
fII Some of Farrell's lenninology differs. He used price efficiency instead of a1loca1ive efficiency. and overall 
efficiency (OE) instead of economic efficiency (EE). 
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Technical efficiency ofP is measured byOQ/OP orl-QP/OP69. which indicates the 
proportion of inputs that could be reduced without any reduction in outputs. The more 
the frrm moves away from the frontier, the more the performance of the firm 
deteriorates and consequently the TE ratio declines towards zero. Furthermore moving 
closer to the frontier indicates the improvement of firm's efficiency where the 
efficiency ratio IS now closer to unity. In general the TE ratio 
is [0 ~ TechnicalEfficiency < I]. 
Allocative efficiency is defined by the ratio ofOR/OQ. Producing at point P shows 
that the firm made an incorrect choice as to the combination of inputs at the given 
prices, therefore incurring more cost than if it had produced at point Q'. Point Q' 
implies that the firm achieved full efficiency where technical and allocative efficiency 
were attained simultaneously. According to Farrell's seminal work OE is equal to TE 
multiplied by AE orOR/OP = OQ/OP x OR/OQ . 
Farrell's work was originally under the assumption of constant return to scale (CRS) 
and strong disposability of inputs. The latter implies that any increased utilisation of 
input cannot reduce output, keeping the others constant. Constant return to scale 
(CRS) only holds if the production frontier, as showed in Figure 4.1, is characterised 
by the unit isoquant; or explained byl = f(x l /y,X2 /Y). Farrell's work was also 
illustrated in input-oriented measures under the CRS assumption. The input oriented 
measure referred to a question of "by how much can input quantities be proportionally 
reduced without changing the output quantities produced?" The question can also be 
asked, "by how much can output quantities be proportionally expanded without 
altering the input quantities used?" This gives an output oriented measurement as 
opposed to an input oriented measure discussed by Farrell (Coelli et al., 2005). The 
output and input oriented measures are equivalent measures of technical efficiency 
only when constant return to scale exists (Fare and Lovell, 1978; Coelli et al., 2005). 
Farrell is generally acknowledged for his influential work that has been motivation for 
the development of two methodological approaches to the construction of production 
frontiers: parametric and non-parametric or linear programming approaches. These 
69 It is technically inefficient. since by I1l(wing to point Q. it could produce the same output with fewer inputs. 
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approaches differ in terms of assumptions made on the shape of the efficiency frontier 
and the existence of random error. The random term defines the uncontrollable events 
that occur outside the firm's authority. Parametric techniques estimate the frontier 
from statistical methods and impose an explicit functional form for both the frontier 
and its deviation from it, which is inefficiency. A non-parametric approach is defined 
by Farrell as a piece-wise-linear convex isoquant constructed as such that no observed 
point lies to the left or below. Under non-parametric approaches, no assumptions are 
made about the functional form of the frontier or any distributional assumptions about 
efficiency. 
Inspired by Farrell's work, Charnes Cooper and Rhodes 1978 (CCR) extended the 
approach and introduced the linear programming technique known as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). An alternative method in measuring efficiency is the 
parametric approach Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SF A). Figure 4.2 below illustrates 
the different approaches to frontier measurement. 
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Figure 4.270 : Conceptual Efficiency Framework 
Step 1 Type of 
Efficiency 
,~ ~ 
Technical Allocative Efficiency 
Step 2 Efficiency (Farrell, 1957; Leibenstein, 1966) (Farrell, ~ 1957) 
Cost Efficiency I I Profit Efficiency I 
~~ (Berger and Mester, 1997) 
Estimation 
Technique 
,~ 
Step 3 Parametric Non-parametric 
Technique Technique 
1 
,~ , , 
SFA* (ALS, DFA TF A (Berger & 
1977; MVB, (Berger Humphrey 1991 & 1992) 
1977) 1993) 
1~ 
~ 
DEA (Chames, Cooper FDH 
and Rhodes, 1987) (Deprins et al. 1984) 
11r 
Step 4 
Definition of ~ ~ Input Output 
Variables Production Intennediation 
I Approach (Cobb & Approach (Sealey & 
I Douglas, 1928) Lindley, 1977) 
I 
.. 
Environmental ~ ~ Variables 
Regulatory-specific Bank-specific 
Variables Variables 
70 Adapted ftom Ahmad Mokhtar H.S.Cl aI .• Figure 3 (2006. pp.S) 
• ALS: Aigner. Lovell. and Schmidt (19TI); MVB: Meuscn and Van Den Broeck (19TI). 
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4.3 Mathematical Approaches to Measure Efficiency 
Several methods have been used in recent years to measure the performance of 
financial institutions with frontier methods having become the preferred approach. 
Bauer et al. (1997) noted that the main advantage of frontier efficiency over other 
performance indicators is that it is an objectively determined quantitative measure that 
removes the effects of market prices and other exogenous factors that influence 
observed performance. However, after many years of research surrounding the 
frontier method, there is still no consensus on the best method or set of methods for 
measuring frontier efficiency. 
After more than 20 years, researchers have recognized several frontier approaches 
developed to assess firm performance and two of the most commonly used are: the 
nonparametric linear programming approach, often referred as Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), and the parametric econometric approach - the Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SF A). These approaches differ in the assumptions they make regarding the 
shape of the efficient frontier, the existence of random error, and (if random error is 
allowed) the distributional assumptions imposed on the inefficiencies and random 
error in order to disentangle one from the other (Bauer et al.,1998). Below we briefly 
review the main characteristics of Stochastic Frontier Analysis. We will provide more 
detail on Data Envelopment Analysis as it is the methodology employed in the 
empirical analysis. 
4.3.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SF A) 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SF A) is widely used by many researchers in search of 
bank efficiencies. SF A is based on the pioneering work of Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meusen and Vande Broeck (1977), while Kwnbhakar and Lovell (2003) provide a 
comprehensive overview on SF A. The advantages of using SF A is that it allows for 
random error that may reduce any misidentified measurement errors, transitory 
differences in cost, or specification errors in inefficiency. SF A employs a composed 
error model in which inefficiencies are assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, 
usually the half-normal, while random errors are assumed to follow a symmetric 
distribution. usually the standard nonnal (Aigner et al .• 1977). That is. the error tenn 
from the cost function is given by &= J.1 + v. where J.1 represents inefficiency and 
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follows a half-nonnal distribution. The reasoning is that inefficiencies cannot subtract 
from costs, and so must be drawn from a truncated distributio~ whereas random error 
can both add and subtract costs, and so may be drawn from a symmetric distribution. 
Both the inefficiencies Il and the random errors are assumed to be orthogonal to the 
input prices, output quantities, and any other cost function regressors specified. The 
efficiency of each firm is based on the conditional mean (or mode) of inefficiency 
term Il, given the residual which is an estimate of the composed error (Bauer et al., 
1998, pp.93-94). SFA is bound to the requirement of a specific functional form for the 
technology and of distributional assumptions for the efficiency terms in order to be 
able to deal with statistical random errors. This may lead to a rnisspecification for a 
production function and a wrong assumption for distributional of efficiency. 
4.3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
As mentioned previously, DEA is a non-parametric approach to efficiency 
measurement which is based upon the work originally developed by Farrell (1957) 
and referred to as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) by Chames, Cooper and 
Rhoades, CCR (1978). It was originally intended as a tool of performance 
measurement for non-profit and government organizations. Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhoades, CCR (1978) proposed a model that had an input orientation and assumed 
constant return to scale (CRS). Later studies considered alternative sets of 
assumptions, such as variable return to scale (VRS) as introduced by Banker, Charnes 
and Cooper, BCC (1984). 
DEA offers three possible orientations in efficiency analysis (Charnes et al 1994): 
• Input-oriented models: are models where DMUS71 are deemed to produce a 
given amount of outputs with the smallest possible amount of inputs (inputs are 
controllable ); 
• Output-oriented models: are models where DMUs are deemed to produce with 
given amounts of inputs the highest possible of outputs (outputs are 
controllable ); 
71 DMUs were introduced to enclose each entity to be evaluated (i.e. business finn. government ~ non-profit 
agencies. schools. hospitals. military units. policc forces. countries. region ctc- these arc among a Wide range of 
different entities that use DEA) that use similar inputs to produce similar outputs. 
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• Base-oriented models are models where DMUs are deemed to produce the 
optimal mix of inputs and outputs (both inputs and outputs are controllable). 
DEA has a number of advantages compared to parametric techniques, as summarised 
by Charnes et al. (1994): 
• DEA has the ability to handle multiple inputs and outputs; 
• DEA does not require a functional form that relates inputs to outputs; 
• DEA optimizes each individual observation and compares them against the 
"best-practice" observations; 
• DEA can handle inputs and outputs without the need for price information; 
• DEA produces a single measure for every DMU, so they can be easily 
compared. 
There are also several disadvantages to be considered, as summarised by 
Athanasspoulis (1991): 
• Limitations in aggregating different aspects of efficiency, especially in cases 
where DMUs perform multiple activities; 
• Insensitivity to intangible and categorical components (for instance, the service 
quality in a bank branch setting), 
In a DEA analysis, DMUs are assumed to be homogeneous and repeatedly perform 
the same function by utilising similar inputs in order to produce similar outputs. 
Assuming there are N firms (DMU s) using a vector of inputs (k ) to produce a vector 
of outputs (m ), based on the input oriented CCR model, the measure of efficiency of 
a particular firm is calculated as: 
min 0, 
fJ.A 
N 
s1. Ly'",rA,'r ~y'"" 
r-I 
N LX' tT.t T ~ o,x' tl 
A' r ~ 0 
(4.1 ) 
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Where, 
(} = is a scalar, 
A = N*I vector of constant, 
y = the amount of output m for DMU r at time t , and 
x = the vector output k of DMU r which ranges in r = I ... n, at time t . 
Equation (4.1) evaluates the efficiency score for each production unit in sample «(}) 
and search for the weights used by the identified efficient production units to construct 
the same output level as the ith production unit (A). The calculation is repeated for n 
times, once for each unit in the sample. The value obtained from (}. will be the 
efficiency score for the r DMU where 0 ~ (} < 1. In case of (} I has the value equal to 1 
the DMU lies on the frontier and is fully efficient. If (}, < 1, the finn is inefficient and 
needs a (1- 0,) reduction in the input levels to reach the frontier. 
The CRS assumption in the prevIous model (CCR) suggests that all finns are 
operating at an optimal scale. Such an assumption is likely to be invalid if the finns 
under scrutiny operate in an imperfect competition environment, in a regulated 
industry, or are subject to financial constraints. These factors independently or 
collectively might force the finns not to operate at its optimal scale. Hire and 
Grosskopf (1983) suggest the importance of adjusting the CRS and DEA models to 
count for variable return to scale (VRS). Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) argue 
that not all finns are operating at optimal scale. Hence, the use of the CRS model in 
such a situation would result in biased measures of technical efficiencies that are 
confounded by scale efficiency. Banker, Chames and Cooper, BCC (1984) developed 
the VRS model by considering the existence of variable returns to scale in the 
production and measures the pure technical efficiency. BCC (1984) imposed the VRS 
N 
on the fonnulation in equation (1) by adding an extra constrain~ LA r = I. This is 
r .. 1 
N N N 
achieved ifLAr= 1, alternatively if LAr;t; I then if LAr< 1 implies an increasing 
,.1 r-I ,.1 
N 
return to scale and if L A,> I Implies a decreasing return to seale. 
r-I 
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Running equation (4.1) with VRS, the BCC efficiency scores are obtained (with 
similar interpretation of its value as in the CCR mode). These scores are called 44pure 
technical efficiency scores" since they are obtained from the model that allows VRS 
and hence eliminate the "scale part" of the efficiency from the analysis. Overall. for 
each unit of CCR, efficiency scores will not exceed the BCC efficiency scores. 
The BCC model is used in this thesis to comply with the imperfect competition and 
regulatory requirements that may cause a unit not to operate at its optimal scale. In 
this Chapter, we accommodate the BCC-efficiency measure of technical efficiency 
plus additional non-radial input savings (slacks) and output expansion (surpluses) to 
accommodate VRS situations. We chose to accommodate slacks in order to gain 
"strong efficiency" estimations also known as 4'Pareto-Koopmans" efficiency. 
Farrell's radial measure of technical efficiency is referred to as '~eak efficiency" or 
"Farrell Efficiency" because of non-zero slack 
DEA was also chosen based on its ability to account for small sample size (as the 
number of banks in selected countries is decreasing due to the impact from the Asian 
crisis. Input minimisation orientation was applied to accommodate the regulatory 
changes, the increasing competitiveness among firmslbank, and the focus to reduce 
costs in the selected countries, which has change the input utilisation, as it is closely 
associated with the changes in the market structure. The DEA application in this 
thesis was extended using four stage procedures (Fried et al., 1999, pp.252) which 
include radial and non radial input slack (explained in 4.3.2.2). 
The estimation carried out in this chapter also incorporates environmental variables 
into a measure of technical efficiency (TE)72. Following work by Fried et al. (1999), 
we employ empirical technique to separate an external factor that influences the 
performance of a bank using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and utilizes the input 
slacks or output surpluses and re-calculates a measure of technical efficiency which 
adjusts for differences in the operating environment (the specific four-stages 
methodology employed in the empirical analysis is detailed in Section 4.4.4). 
12 TcchnicaJ Efficiency measures the ability of a bank lO produce a given set of outpul with minimal inputs under 
Ihe assumption of variable return 10 scale. 
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4.3.2.1 Multistage Analysis D EA 
According to Fried et al (2002) the characteristics of the environment that surrounds 
the producer's activities are among the main phenomena that influence the evaluation 
of the producer performance. Several alternative models can be found to have 
incorporated the impact of environmental variables. The unique features of multi-
stage DEA make it very practical in measuring efficiency. Coelli (1998~ pp.198) noted 
that the multi-stage DEA method is able to avoid the problems inherent in the two-
stage method. The method is able to identify efficient projected points. which have 
inputs and outputs mixes as similar as possible to those of the inefficient points~ and 
that it is invariant to units of measurement. Dietch (2000) categorised the 
environmental variable into three main points: (1) Main Conditions which describes 
the operational conditions such as, population density, per capita income and density 
of demand deposits; (2) Bank Structure and Regulations which consist of the degree 
of concentration, regulatory conditions and density of demand~ and finally (3) 
accessibility of banking services for customers measured by branch density. 
There are a number of other ways in which environmental variables can be 
accommodated in a DEA analysis. One-Stage Model, for example: Banker and Morey 
(1986); Pastor et ale (1997); Ray (1988); Golany and Roll (1993); Cooper and Pastor 
(1996), Two-Stage Model, is the most common method used in evaluating efficiency 
and performance. It consists of regressed indices of efficiency obtained in the first 
stage, against the environmental variable in the second stage. There are several 
different two-stage models in terms of how it is applied with DEA 73 and among the 
first to apply it in this manner was Timmer (1971) followed by other research, for 
example; McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993); Pastor (1995); Chen and Zhu (2004); 
Wang et ale (1997); Jackson and Fehti (2009); Daley and Mathews (2009). Three-
Slage Model uses DEA in the first stage and includes slacks (obtained from the first 
stage) and the environmental variable in the second stage. In the third stage, they run 
DEA with the adjusted inputs (and/or outputs) to obtain the definitive indices of 
13 Some studies usc ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the second stage equation. others usc 8 Tobit model. 
An advantage of the two-stage approach is that the influence of the external ~ables on the production ~ 
can be tested in tcnns of both sign and significance. However. a disadvantage IS thal the second stage regression 
ignores the infonnation contained in the slacks and surpluses. This may bias the parumctCf estimates and give 
misleading conclusions regarding the impact of each external variable on efficiency. The two-stage procedure docs 
not provide 8 separate measure of managerial efficiency (Fried et aI. 1999. pp.2S I). 
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efficiency filtered for the environmental variables. Studies based on this model are 
getting more attention from researchers including Fried and Lovell (1996); Rouse 
(1996); Fried (2001); Estelle et al. (2010); Garcia-Sanchez (2007); Pastor (2002); 
Blank and Valdmanis (2005). 
4.3.2.2 Radial and Non-radial input slacks 
DEA calculates efficiency scores of DMUs by measuring the maxImum radiaJ 
(proportional) reduction in all inputs (increment in all outputs) which would lead to 
the highest efficiency level that a DMU may achieve within the study set (Taluri, 
2000). However, increase (reduction) in efficiency still leaves some slack in inputs 
and outputs, which illustrates that some DMUs still remain inefficient. The vast 
majority of DEA studies on banking however do not explicitly account for slacks in 
the relative efficiency analysis. Recently researchers have developed a set of non-
radial models where together with a DEA approach they account for the existing 
slacks (for example Fried. et al., 1999; Tone, 2001; and Fare et al., 1994). The radial 
approach is presented by CCR and BBC. Both of these approaches appear to have 
limitations, where both neglect the non-radial input slacks and output surplUses. 
Therefore, if these slacks have an important role in evaluating managerial efficiency, 
the radial approaches may mislead the decision as to when we utilize the efficiency 
score () as the only index for evaluating performance of DMUs (Avkiran et al., 2008, 
pp.130). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the concept of radial and non-radial input slacks (Fried et al., 
1999, pp.253). Assuming there are four units: A, B, C and D, with each unit using two 
inputs, XI and X2 to produce the same amount of output y. Point A and B is the 
efficient frontier which is created by linear combination input vectors A and B. It 
represents the trade off between inputs XI and X2 that is feasible to produce output y. 
The vertical extension AA' is the result of free disposability of input X2 (inequality on 
the constraint of X2). The same situations exist for the horizontal extension BB'. This 
range reflects the free disposability between x I and X2 with X2 being held constant at 
X2R. Farrell radial Technical Efficiency (TE) was achieved at isoquant point AA'BB·. 
TE were attained at A and B, but not at C and D. 
106 
~ 
A 
Figure 4.3: Radial and Non-radial Input Slacks 
D 
B' 
XI 
The radial technical efficiency for C (TEC) is OC*/OC whereas OD*/OD is radial 
technical efficiency for D. By reducing the production to C* to its current level of X I 
and X2 to produce output y~ unit C may have operated at an efficient level. The amount 
(1-TEC)xC is radial input slack, which is the same proportion for all inputs by 
definition. Once reduced to C* no further reduction is possible without losing more 
output. Unit D can reduce its production by (1-TE~ to x I D* ~ but to be radially 
efficient unit D needs further reduction of input XI to XIB. This is referred to as non-
radial slack in input X I. The amount of non-radial input slack is varied across inputs. 
4.4 Bank Efficiency in selected Southeast Asian Countries: An 
Empirical Application 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the relative technical efficiency of 
institutions in a market that has been significantly affected by a severe fmancial crisis, 
in the period between 1999 and 2005, by taking into account the impact of 
environmental variables. We constructed a dataset of commercial banks from five 
South East Asian (SEA) countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysi~ the Philippines and 
Thailand. This chapter explores the relative impact of country specific factors and 
environmental variables on bank efficiency measures. Different policy measures may 
have diverse impacts on a country and often opposite effects on operational efficiency 
and technology improvements of banking operations (Grigorian and Manole. 2006). 
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Following work by Fried et al. (1999), this paper extends on these findings to explore 
the reasons for efficiency differences across countries by relating measures of 
inefficiency to features of the external variables (environmental variables). 
Identifying the nature of inefficiency will assist policy makers to identify policy 
instruments that are effective in bringing about changes in efficiency and generate the 
best policy response (Grigorian and Manole, 2006). This is particularly important for 
the SEA economy which has gone through financial restructuring after experiencing 
the Asian crisis. 
4.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistic 
The dataset used in this study contains observations relative to commercial banks 
operating in the five SEA countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand), worse hit by the 1997 financial crisis. To ensure sample homogeneity and 
comparability with previous studies, we have excluded savings bank, development 
banks, investment banks, regional rural banks, joint- venture banks and any wholly-
owned and subsidiaries banks. The primary source of data is the Bankscope database 
provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd). This dataset was 
however integrated while several additional sources including: individual banks annual 
reports, World Bank data, International Monetary Fund data, Asian Development 
Bank. Using cross sectional time series data, the final sample consists of 976 bank-
year observations over the period of 1999 to 2005 (Table 4.1). 
As shown in Table 4.1, the number of banks for each country have changed 
dramatically due to government intervention in response to the 1997 crisis, including 
nationalizing banks; closing unviable banks; carrying out compulsory purchases and 
assumptions and transferring assets to healthier banks; creating larger core banks; and 
providing capital injection to recapitalize banks (Williams and Nguyen, 2005). 
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T bl 41 N b fB ks b C a e • . um en 0 an ty ountry and Year: 1999 - 2005 . 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Pbilippine Tbailand Total 
1999 67 16 32 32 16 163 
2000 56 17 27 28 17 145 
2001 50 16 26 24 17 133 
2002 48 16 27 31 17 139 
2003 49 17 27 32 17 142 
2004 49 17 26 27 16 135 
2005 44 13 26 21 15 119 
Total 363 112 191 196 115 976 
Source: Yearly banks annual reports. 
4.4.2 Input and Output Variables 
In banking literature there have been considerable disagreements regarding the 
appropriate definition of inputs and outputs. We have adopted the intermediation 
approach proposed by Sea1ey and Lindley (1977) assuming that banks collect 
deposits, to transform them, using loans and capital, into loans as opposed to 
production approach, which views banks as using labour and capital to produce 
deposits and loans74• Following the intermediation approach, we specify two inputs: 
XI = interest expense, X2 = non-interest expense (personnel expenses and other 
administration expenses) and two outputs, Yl = interest income, Y2 = non-interest 
income (non-interest income + net fee/income). Interest expenses serve as the proxy 
for deposits, non-interest expense for expenses incurred in conducting the fmancial 
intermediation process and, in addition, interest income for loans and non-interest 
income for fees revenues generated from the non-traditional and off balance sheet 
activities (Avkiran 1999a and 1999b). Presented in Table 4.2 are each country's 
average values of bank outputs and inputs over the period of 1999-2005 
74 This approach is also applied to other similar banking efficiency studies (for exampl~ Casu and Molyneux. 2003 
and Ca'\u et al .• 20(4). 
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Table 4.2: Mean Descriptive Statistics of Inputs and Outputs, 1999-200575 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines ThailaDd 
Outputs 
Yl = interest income 245.16 2947.37 362.48 109.083 469.618 
(596.07) (2817.96) (480.93) (146.138) (485.735) 
Y2 = non-interest income 20.22 1005.94 68.06 12.925 31.430 
(44.98) (1535.54) (104.15) (22.783) (55.086) 
Inputs 
XI = interest expense 170.24 1828.58 179.39 113.438 472.202 
(458.66) (1631.31) (243.22) (145.409) (480.334) 
X2 = non-interest expense 56.36 547.92 74.36 14.347 172.862 
(121.40) (548.58) (97.90) (27.412) (374.668) 
Source: Bankscope; Standard deviation is in brackets. 
4.4.3 Environmental Variables 
The environmental variables used in this chapter are variables that take into account 
external environmental variables' ability to influence the capability of management in 
transforming inputs into outputs. These features include macroeconomic and 
regulatory variables, which are measured on a country-by-country basis. Theory 
offers few guidelines as to which detenninants are important for explaining the 
particular features of each country's banking industry and for the selection of 
variables where theoretical studies do not exist, it is therefore prudent to rely on 
previous empirical findings. 
The variables used were grouped accordingly into two main76 categories (following 
Dietch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000) and presented in the descriptive analysis in Table 
4.3. The first group is called "main conditions" this includes a measure of per-capita 
income, Gross Domestic Product (GOP per inhabitant). Per-capita income affects 
numerous factors related to the demand and supply of banking services especially 
deposits and loans. Countries with higher per capita income have a banking system 
that operates in a mature environment, resulting in more competitive interest rates and 
profit margins. 
n All variables arc in US$ million and inflation adjusted. We applied broad variable definitions as presented by 
IBCA Bankscope. in order to minimise any possible bias arising from different accounting practices. Similar 
~roaches were also employed by previous literature (for example. Casu et aI .• 2004 and Pastor et aI.: 1997)., , 
Dielch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) categOril.ed their environmental variables in three categories; maIO conditions.. 
bank structure and regulations and finally. accessibility of banking services. 
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The second category is named "bank structure and regulations" which consists of 
Loans over Total Deposits (LTD) and Equity over Total Assets (ETA) of banking in 
each country. The intermediation ratio presented by Loans over Total Deposits (LTD). 
captures differences between the selected banking industries in term of their ability to 
convert deposits into loans. This relates to bank holdings of government securities and 
crowding out of private borrowing by public sector or inadequate institutions to 
support lending to the private sector77 (Fried et al., 2004). A higher intennediation 
ratio may lower the banking industry cost (Casu and Molyneux, 2003: Dietch et al .• 
2000; Pastor, 2002; Fried et aI., 2004). This may reflect developments in the legal and 
regulatory framework that support both the financial intennediation process and lower 
costs to banks. This includes the development of effective secured transaction laws 
and bankruptcy procedures that had taken place in the process of crisis recovery in the 
selected countries. 
The average capital ratio is measured as Equity over Total Assets (ETA) this provides 
a proxy to regulatory conditions. It also accommodates bank management and risk 
preferences. There is a theoretical argument to support the signs of both negative and 
positive influences on the relationship existing between capital ratio and efficiency. 
Berger and De Young (1997) assert that the higher the solvency and prudence (capital 
ratio) of the banks, the lower the bad loans are, meaning less cost incurred to recover 
these loans, and therefore appear more efficient, i.e., banks with higher capital ratio 
will show higher efficiency levels. Pastor (2002) asserts that lower capital ratios may 
cause moral hazard behaviour and banks close to regulatory minimums may take-on 
excessive risk - gambling for resurrection.. Based on the above argument we will not 
make any prior assumptions about the sign of influence of the capital ratio. 
To further account for risk and to act as a proxy for output quality we employ Loan 
Loss Provision nonnalized to total Loans (LLPL). The inclusion of LLPL is also to 
act as a control variable in order to correct any possible discrimination by regulators 
of banks in imposing provisioning rules (Laeven, 1999). Studies by Altunbas et ale 
(2000) and Drake and Hall (2003) found that bank efficiency scores might be biased 
n O'bis explains the situation in Indonesia. Thailand and the Philippines with outdated bankrupt~ ~ws c~m~ 
to Korea and Malaysia. Another structural weakness thal may be reflected by using intermediation ratiO IS the 
failure in transaction law with ma., .. ive misallocation of funding. 
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as failure to incorporate risk in their results may have a significant impact on relative 
efficiency scores. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003, pp.181) suggest that risk should be incorporated into 
efficiency studies via the inclusion of loan loss provisions (as a risk proxy)78; 
following the general consensus among risk agent analysis and practitioners, that 
economic capital should be tailored to cope with unexpected losses, and loan loss 
reserves should instead buffer the expected component of the loss distribution. 
Coherently with this interpretation, loan loss provisions required to build up loan loss 
reserves should be considered and treated as a cost; a cost that will be faced with 
certainty over time, but with uncertainty as to when it will materialize. 
Table 4.3: Mean Environmental Variables, 1999-2005. 
INDONESIA KOREA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES THAILAND 
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 
GDP 745.79 1280 9549.54 15840 3984 4970 1018.88 1320 1984.94 2490 
ETA 5.899 13.06 4.64 6.05 9.58 10.82 19.00 12.35 8.07 13.41 29.75 10.20 1.72 1.24 4.48 8.49 9.42 4.25 7.91 9.96 
LTD 58.82 72.92 64.07 84.64 69.92 61.55 67.53 60.58 83.73 
90.19 
50.21 40.90 11.43 11.78 18.87 26.72 16.93 18.31 28.33 26.68 
LLPL 
22.179 4.10 6.39 1.51 6.24 4.58 6.21 10.04 15.49 7.44 
15.92 3.20 3.02 0.23 4.58 1.75 2.86 6./3 12.60 4.95 
Source: Bankscope, Asian Development Report PeriodicaV Annual Report in Smill. 
GDP = gross domestic product, ETA = equity over total assets; L TD= loans over total deposits; LLPL 
=Ioan loss provision over total loans. Italic shows the standard deviation. 
Interestingly every country has improved their per capita income over the period. 
Despite differences in action taken by each country along with several disruptions 
along the recovery process79, SEA counties continue to grow stronger. Furthermore, 
during the period studied, the solvency, restructuring and liberalization constraints 
imposed by banking authorities' each countries banks are obliged to maintain a higher 
capital ratio and intermediation ratio. 
71 In contrast. Akhigbe and McNulty (2003. pp.312) utilised a profit function approach. which included equity 
capital "to control. in a very rough fashion. for the potential increased cost of funds due to financial risk. - . 
79 Such as terrorism threats. for example the 9/11 attack in Ameri~ bombing in Bali. lndonesi~ SARS pandemiC 
and earthquakes. 
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4.4.4 The Four-Stage Methodology 
Our approach is based on the four-stage methodology proposed by Fried et ale (1999). 
whereby we account for the impact of environmental variables in a DEA- based study. 
The aim is to incorporate the influences of the external variables on South East Asian 
banking efficiency measurements. In doing so, we allowed slack or surpluses due to 
the environment variables and used it to calculate adjusted values for the primary 
inputs. In other words, the new radial efficiency measures incorporate the 
environmental variables. 
The following section explains the four-stage formal procedure for intermediation 
DEA approach with input oriented models. 
First StaKe 
In the first stage, we calculated a DEA frontier using the traditional inputs and 
outputs according to standard production theory. Specifically, we followed the non-
parametric DEA approach to measure inefficiency with an input minimization 
orientation. The choice of a DEA can be based on several considerations; first, DEA 
works well with a small sample. The sample chosen in this study involved five SE 
Asian crisis-affected countries and those experiencing retrieval from the 1997 
financial crisis. The restructuring process has caused the numbers of these countries 
commercial banks to decrease significantly due to consolidation and closing down of 
some insolvent banks8o• Second, DEA does not require any assumption about the 
functional form of the frontier or of the inefficiency component. The recovery period, 
which involved regulatory changes have increased the market competition, therefore 
cutting costs becomes the firm's main focus (Casu and Girardone, 2006). Based on 
changes that were expected on input levels, the input oriented is chosen to reflect the 
differences in the market structures. 
We employed the intermediation approach as we view banks as intermediaries with 
loans and other earning assets as output, and capital, labour and deposits as inputs 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977). The same approach is also applied in similar banking 
efficiency studies such as Altunbas et al. (2001), Casu et al. (2004), and Drake et al. 
(2006). 
10 Table 4.1 shows the number of banks for each of the selected years that have dc:creascd sin\.~ I qqq. 
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In this stage, we exclude the extemaI variables81 , while computing for Farrell 
Technical Efficiency (TE) score, as well as input slacks and output surpluses for each 
observation. The DEA model employed to compute Farrell TE in the fIrSt stage. for 
unit ~ k = 1 .... , K., is formulated based on Banker, Chames and Cooper82 (BCC; 
1984), variable returns to scale envelopment problems, expressed as the following 
Linear Programming (LP): 
mm a 
a,A 
subject to ax k ~ X A 
VA ~ yk 
eA = 1 
AERK 
+ 
(4.2) 
where x >0 is producer's (N x 1) vector of inputs; y > 0 is producer's (M x 1) vector 
of outputs; X = [x), .... ,xd is an (N x K) matrix of input vectors in the comparison set; 
Y = [yl, .... , yd is an (M x K) matrix of output vectors in the comparison set; A. = 
[A.I," •. ,A.I] is an (K xl) vector of weights or activities variable; e = [1. .... .1] is an (1 x 
K) vector, and there are producers in the comparison set. The data of the producer 
being evaluated are superscripted "k". The optimal solution of the above problem in 
terms of non-negative and bounded to one optimal values 9 allows for the evaluation 
of total slack (radial plus non-radial) for each input as the non-negative scalar SnIt = Xnk 
- XnA.; where n = 1, .... ,N and k = 1, .... ,K. 
Second StaKe 
We focus on estimating N input equations using an appropriate econometric 
technique. The dependent variables are total (radial plus non-radial) Stage 1 slack [x-
XA] > 0 and [VA. - y] > 0; the dependent variables are measures of external variable 
applicable to the particular input. The objective of Stage 2 analysis is to quantify the 
effect of external conditions on the excessive use of inputs. 
II There are other variables which influence the ability of a finn to transfonn inputs into outputs. but they are 
uncontrollable. These variables are the external environment such as ownership, location. or regulatory regime. 
There are two possibilities. first a finn with favorable external environmental variables. and second unfavorable 
external conditions. Due to fact that external environmental variable are inconsistence/unpredictable. the radial 
efficiency score generated by the initial model may have (under)overstaled the efficiency of producers operating 
under (un )f8vorable conditions (Fried et aI., 19(9). 
I~ The use of the CRS specification when not all finus are operating at optimal scale, n.-sults on mca. .. ure of 
Technical Efficiency (TE) that are confounded by Scale Efficiencies (SE). The use of VRS specification permits 
the calculation ofTE devoid ofthcsc SE effects" (Caclli et aI .. 2(05) 
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The N equations are specified as: 
~ = J;(Z:,A,~~ j =~ .... N 
k=~ ... .J( (4.3) 
where E: is unit k's total input slack (radial plus non-radial) for input j based on the 
DEA results from Stage I, Z: is a vector of variables characterizing the 
environmental variables for unit k that may affect the utilization of input j, Pj is a 
vector of coefficients, and u: is a disturbance tenn. Since the total slack for each 
input is censored at zero, we estimate E: using Tobit regressions83 . 
Following Fried et al. (1999), using the efficiency measures derived from the DEA 
estimations as the dependent variables, we then estimate the following Tobit 
regression model84: 
tj = Po + PJETA jl + P2 LTD jl + p)LLPL ~I + P4GDP j~ + e~1 
Where, 
(4.4) 
E ~ = Efficiency scores of banks (dependent variable); subscript k denote individual 
banks, j countries and t time horizon; 
80 = constant; 
ET A = Equity over total assets; 
LTD = Loan over total deposits; 
LLPL= Loan Loss Provision over loans 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Smill) 
E = error tenn 
In previous studies, Tobit was used due to its ability to deal with the characteristics of 
the distribution of efficiency measures and thus provides results that can guide 
policies to improve performance. DEA efficiency measures obtained in the fi rst stage 
are the dependent variables in the second stage Tobit model (equation 4.4). The Tobit 
Il If the total slack for each input is influenced by the same measures of external conditions.. each equation can be 
estimated separately using Tobit regression. 
14 Tobit is used as it can take the censored nature of dependent variables.. which is the efficiency estimations S(;on:s 
ranging from zero to one. thus reportedly yielding consistent estimations. 
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model was first suggested in econometrics literature by Tobin (1958) which is also 
known as truncated or censored regression models85 where expected errors are not 
equal to zero. Therefore, estimation with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
would lead to a biased parameter estimate since 0 LS assumes a nonnal and 
homoscedastic distribution of the disturbance and the dependent variable (Maddal~ 
1983). 
Third Stage 
In this stage we will use the estimated coefficients from the regression in (4.3) to 
predict total input slack for each input and for each unit based on its external 
j = 1, .... ,N 
k = 1, .... ,K (4.5) 
where i: is predicted total input slack for input j based on Tobit regression results 
from Second Stage, Z; is a vector of variables characterizing the environmental 
" 
variables for unit k that may affect the utilization of input j, and Pj is predicted 
coefficients. Predictions on total input slacks are then used to adjust the primary input 
data for each unit according to the differences between maximum predicted input 
" k Maximum " k 
slack, E j and predicted slack, E j ; 
j =1 , .... ,N (4.6) 
k=I, .... ,K 
Using the differences in (4.6), adjust the primary input unit data for each unit, 
j = 1, .... , N 
k = 1, .... , K (4.7) 
~,= Mark {E:}- iJ 
Adjusting the input using equation (4.7) creates an equal base for all DMUs in regards 
to all their non-controllable factor surroundings. Adjusting generates an identical 
pseudo environment which is the least favourable for all DMUs . 
• ~ The model is lruncaltd if the observations outside a specified range are totall) lost and «nsored if one can aI 
least observe the exogenous variables (Amemiya. 1984. pp.3). 
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FinallFourth Stage 
Once the primary input unit data has been adjusted, we re-run the DEA model under 
the initial input-output and generate new radial measures of inefficiency. These radial 
measure scores measure the inefficiency that is attributable to external variables. 
4.5 Analysis and Findings 
This chapter discusses the results obtained from the analysis of efficiency for the 
selected developing countries in the SEA region from years 1999 to 2005. The results 
show a significant relative impact of country specific factors and environmentaJ 
variables on bank efficiency measures, which have particularly important policy 
implications. 
4.5.1 DEA Empirical Results 
In this study, we focus on the ability of firms to obtain maximal output from a given 
set of inputs, in other words, technical efficiency using the input orientation. The 
DEA efficiency scores can then be interpreted to show how much each bank could 
reduce its input usage to, without reducing output, if it were as technical efficient as 
the best practice banks. As shown in Table 4.4, the selected Asian commercial banks 
faced technical inefficiency. On average the technical efficiency is 35 percent over the 
full sample collected for the period of 1999 to 2005. This clearly shows the impact of 
the 1997 financial crisis on the capability of the fmancial sector, commercial bank in 
particular, when facing the biggest downturn in their performances, in terms of 
providing services and generating income. 
Table 4.4: Estimation on Data EDvelo~meDt Analysis (DEAl for full sample 
Data EDvelopment Analysis 
Output Variables: YI Y2 
Input Variables : XI X2 
Underlying Technology assumes variable returns to scale (VRS) 
~--------------------------~~~~--~~----------------------Mean Std. Deviation Min Estimated Efficiencies: 
Technical Efficiency; 
Input Oriented 
where: 
0.354 0.130 0.012 
)'1 = interest income in USD million 
Y2 :: non-interest income in USD million 
XI = interest expenses in USD million 
Xl = non-interest expenses in usn million 
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Table 4.5 reports the average efficiency scores for each country using the basic model, 
without taking into account the specific environmental conditions of each country. 
From 1999 to 2005, each country experienced several changes in their economic 
policies were involved in aggressive fmancial sector restructuring. As explained 
(Chapter 2) there were two different actions taken in order to overcome the financial 
turmoil, first accepting support from the IMF (Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and 
Thailand) and second, capital control (Malaysia). Both methods have improved the 
efficiency of the countries at a different pace and in addition some were left 
imbalanced, due to other economic and political disruptions, for example Indonesia. 
The results of Stage 1, which are based on traditional DEA, are estimated against a 
national efficient frontier comprised of all the observations for each of the selected 
countries for the post crisis period, 1999 to 2005. The estimations produced mixed 
results, showing that the effects of the crisis on each country differed, with some of 
the countries experiencing severe economic contractions, while others saw a more 
modest effect on their domestic economies. 
Table 4.5: Stage 1 Mean Efficienc!, 1999-2005 
National Frontier Technical Efficiency Categorised by Country, Year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Indonesia 0.610 0.783 0.732 0.708 0.764 0.809 0.862 
Korea 0.969 0.954 0.929 0.972 0.962 0.964 0.938 
Malaysia 0.885 0.899 0.894 0.903 0.902 0.908 0.915 
Philippines 0.920 0.77786 0.927 0.858 0.865 0.899 0.966 
Thailand 0.821 0.820 0.890 0.914 0.939 0.946 0.937 
National frontier estimations indicate a lower mean efficiency for Indonesia, while the 
others (Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) show an average of more than 80 
per cent during the period of study. Each country has shown how they have responded 
to their recovery plan, either following an IMF restructuring programme (Indonesia, 
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) or capital control (Malaysia). 
16 "Ibe Philippines experienced a political crisis in the y~ 2000 which ~y imply w~y the e~ciency is low ,in this 
particular year. The political crisis arising from allegalJons of corruption made BgaJnst President ~ ~.~ 
further damaged investor confidence. triggering in~ified downward pressure on th.e Peso. a 400 bas~s POI~t hike 
in policy interest rates and a significant slowdown an growth (IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation With the 
Philippines. Public Infonnalion Notice (PIN) No. 0 II 21. March 13. 200 I ) 
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Malaysia differed substantially to the other countries, the banks held more liquidity 
and the country had lower foreign debts to GDP and a lower short tenn debt ratio 
(Seok Y 0011, 2005). Malaysia showed that they it was more resilient, but this may be 
due to the conditions experienced during the crisis. Korea accepted an IMF bai lout in 
November 1997, with an agreement on a US$55 billion rescue package with the IMF, 
The World Bank and The Asian Development Bank (ADB) contributing US$21 
billion, US$10 billion and US$4 billion respectively. The increase in average 
efficiency in Korea proved the success of the rescue package and restructuring 
programme implemented. For Thailand, the estimation is similar to other studies 
conducted on Thai bank efficiency (for example Charnsan, 2008). 
Looking at the national frontier categorised by year, the average efficiency increased 
steadily between the periods of study. The results reflect the plan announced by 
Thailand's Financial Sector Master Plan where the country enhanced competition 
which led to an increase in efficiency of the banking sector. The Philippines has been 
receiving IMF guidance towards crisis recovery since the debt crisis in 1980. 
However, despite the prolonged plan the Philippines still put in a poor economic 
perfonnance due to its macroeconomic instability and low domestic savings. Refonn 
efforts contributed to political instability and macroeconomic instability stifled 
investment. Nevertheless, the results reveal that the Philippines are among the least 
affected countries to be hit by the crisis. The average efficiency shows fast recovery 
for the country that may due to an ongoing stability process which came about even 
before the crisis erupted. Indonesia reached the lowest average technical efficiency 
score (Tables 4.5), and this result is consistent with Kwan's (2003). 
However, due to each country's different common frontier, these results are unable to 
be used to compare the differences in efficiency between the aforementioned selected 
countries- Indonesia, Korea, Malaysi~ Philippines and Thailand. Therefore it is more 
appropriate to measure efficiency relative to common frontiers in order to enable the 
comparison of banking efficiency score across countries. F or the purpose of 
international comparison, we must first define the common frontier based on the 
traditional approach, in which we exclude the specific environmental conditions for 
each country. That is to say. the common frontier is built by pooling data sets and 
estimating the technical efficiency with two inputs and two outputs. Estimating such a 
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common efficient frontier may be controversial, since one can argue that bank 
technology may vary across countries. Yet, during the period of study we believe that 
the bank technology in the sample countries were neither similar nor were the changes 
as the recovery took place actively. More importantly, common frontier is commonly 
employed in current studies as a way to compare bank efficiency scores over time 
(Drake et aI., 2006; Nakhun and Avkiran, 2009, pp.240). 
The common frontier results in Stage 1 suggest a lower mean efficiency (similar 
results to study done by Nakhun and Avkiran, 2009). Overall, the results show that 
average efficiency levels for each country are lower than the results obtained from the 
national frontiers (Table 4.5). So far the results agree with the presumption that the 
country specific variable is important in explaining efficiency differences and 
neglecting this factor may generate too much inefficiency (for example Dietch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 1998; Drake et al., 2006; Chiu and Chen, 2009; Nakhun and Avkiran, 
2009). 
Table 4.6: Stage 1 Mean Efficiency 
Common Frontier Technical Efficiency Categorised by Country, Year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Indonesia 0.578 0.630 0.583 0.561 0.571 0.572 
Korea 0.844 0.873 0.839 0.864 0.885 0.884 
Malaysia 0.683 0.781 0.801 0.760 0.718 0.714 
Philippines 0.639 0.646 0.692 0.682 0.638 0.755 
Thailand 0.663 0.656 0.771 0.804 0.869 0.912 
2005 
0.631 
0.933 
0.668 
0.730 
0.878 
On average the results show similar outcomes for all the countries and reflect the 
crisis's impact on their performances. The possible explanation for this low efficiency 
estimation in the initial stage (with exception to Korea) is probably due to the 
influence of environmental factors. For example, all the selected countries 
experienced a quiet growth in GDP at the beginning of the crisis and the first few 
years of the recovery period. This was followed by a fluctuation of interest rates 
during the year of study and changes in bank regulations that affected the banks as a 
whole, during the post crisis period. However, the impact of environmental variables 
is tested in the following section. 
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4.5.2 Quantifying tbe Effect of Environmental Variables 
In order to quantify the effects of the environmental variable's impact on the 
efficiency results, we estimate the Tobit regression described in Equation (4.4). There 
are two regression equations, and one for each input. The dependent variables are 
selected environmental variables (ET A = Equity over total assets; L TO = Loan over 
total deposits; and GDP = Gross Domestic Product). In the second stage. these 
variables are chosen to investigate the impact of environmental factors that may 
distort the validity of the initial efficiency analysis. However, theory offers few 
guidelines to which determinants are important and this analysis relies on previous 
empirical studies for the selection of these variables (Drake et aI., 2006; Amadou et 
aI., 2008; Lozano-Vivas, 1998; Dietch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Nakhun and A vkiran, 
2009). 
T bl 47 T bOt C dR 19992005 a e . o I ensore egression, 
-
. . 
Independent Dependent Variables TSEI Variable Coef. Std. Err. 
ETA -2.466··· -7.86 
LTD -0.492··· -4.32 
LLPL 1.212··· 3.87 
GDP 0.005··· 5.14 
CONS 71.27·" 7.43 
SE 103.3··· 1l1.13 
Notes: 
Dependent variables are total radial plus non- radial slacks 
TSE 1 = interest expense (USD million) 
TSE2 = non-interest expense (USD million) 
ETA = equity over total assets (USD million) 
LTD = loan over total deposits (USD million) 
LLPL= loan loss provision over total loans (USD million) 
GNP = gross domestic product (USD million) 
Coef. 
-0.592··· 
-0.181··· 
0.082 
0.002··· 
24.63·" 
48.88"· 
., •• and ••• indicate the significant level of s 10%, 5% and 1%. 
TSE2 
Std. Err. 
-4.03 
-3.37 
0.53 
5.53 
5.46 
144.23 
The Tobit regression results are summarized in Table 4.7. In general, the influence of 
the environmental variables is in line with our expectations. The results demonstrate 
the role of "main conditions" represented here by per capita income, as per 
expectation has a positive sign. This signifies that the development in per capita 
income affects the operating and financial costs which are incurred when supplying a 
given level of services. The results signify that a change in economic policy does have 
an impact on the overall structure of a macroeconomic cycle. The same results can be 
found in a previous study (William and Nguyen.. 2(05). The paper found strong 
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effects of macroeconomic variable measured by GDP per capita The same results can 
also be found in Lozano-Vivas et ale (1998) and Hahn (2007) where both papers 
considered income per capita as influential variables in detennining local banking 
market conditions. Nakhun and Avkiran (2009, pp.247) found that the level of 
economic development is positively associated with bank inefficiency. They argued 
that the result contradicts what is expected in a free market economy. However. since 
the Asian banking systems are highly regulate<L this would suggest that more GDP 
per capita is not necessarily going to lead to more competition and less inefficiency in 
search of profits. 
Second, the variables that describe the solvency of the domestic banking system, 
represented by capital ratio, have a negative sign. The ratio of equity over total assets 
(ET A) is used to capture the bank solvency by looking into bank management and 
risk preferences. Kwan (2003) states that this ratio is expected to have a negative sign. 
since well capitalized banks reflect both high quality management and an aversion to 
risk taking, these bank are likely to be more cost efficient in producing banking 
outputs. The intermediation ratio which is represented by a proportion of total loans 
over total deposits (LTD) of selected banking sectors, are used to reflect the ability of 
different banks in converting deposits into loans. A negative relationship is 
anticipated since the higher the intermediation ratio, the greater the efficiency in the 
financial service provision as it also has significantly lower costs (Carvallo and 
Kasman, 2005). This may reflect development in the legal and regulatory framework 
that supports both the financial intermediation process and lowers the costs to banks. 
In the meantime this regime has incurred vital changes in the development of effective 
secured transaction laws and bankruptcy procedures that are necessary to support 
lending to customers. 
The control variable, ratio of loan loss provision over total loans (LLPL) shows a 
positive sign. This may occur since within the period of recovery, LLPL were 
implemented gradually. but transparently. in order to allow banks time to restructure 
and mobilize new capital and to avoid aggravating credit supply problems. The results 
also found that LLPL and ETA variables are significant in suggesting that banking 
production costs are significant on loan quality and capitalization of the bank as both 
variables capture managerial quality. 
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Overall, the regression suggested that most of the efficiency differences found across 
the selected SEA countries banking systems are due to country-specific variables as 
found in previous studies (Dietch et al., 2000, Lozano-Vivas et al., 1998; Pastor et al .. 
1997; and Casu and Molyneux, 2003). The results also show that most of the variables 
are statistically significant, which confirms that the differences in economic 
conditions are affecting the efficiency. The parameter estimates presented in Table 4.7 
are then used to adjust the initial data set according to equation (4.7)87. 
4.5.3 Re-computed DEA Results 
The final stage is to re-run the initial DEA outputs with the adjusted inputs. The 
results comprise of the composite efficiency index (the radial score) which 
incorporates the effects of environment variables. Table 4.8 represents the descriptive 
statistics of the efficiency scores from stage four. Mean efficiency from stage four 
DEA analyses shown in Table 4.8 suggests that after adjusting for the variations on 
the environmental variable's influences, mean efficiency score has improved 
dramatically. As revealed, the efficiency scores show significant changes in all the 
selected country. 
Table 4.8: Stage 4 Mean Efficiency 
National Frontier Technical Efficiency Categorised by Country, Year 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
1999 2000 200 I 2002 2003 2004 2005 
0.866 0.880 0.821 0.776 0.774 0.765 0.911 
0.967 0.944 0.946 0.936 0.926 0.946 0.960 
0.818 
0.881 
0.869 
0.888 
0.725 
0.829 
0.924 
0.869 
0.816 
0.875 
0.784 
0.918 
0.896 
0.748 
0.826 
0.9)4 
0.86 
0.865 
0.926 
0.956 
0.987 
This result indicates a significant impact after introducing the environmental variable 
to the relative efficiency scores, as it is consistent with previous studies (mostly in 
European countries) where the efficiency increased markedly (Drake et al .. 2006; 
Dietch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-Vivas, 1998; Pastor et a1., 1997: Casu and 
Molyneux. 2003). Compared to the previous cross country studies. besides 
concentrating on European countries, SEA efficiency scores vary during the selected 
17. This data adjustment is considered as Stage 3 of the 4 stage analysis. The third stage is to use the estimated 
coefficients from the regression to predict total input slack for each input and for each unit based on its. external 
variables. These predictions are used to adjust the primary input data for each unit Ik.-cording to the ~Iffcn:ncc 
between maximum predicted slack and predicted slack. This creates a new pseudo data set where the mputs are 
adjusted for the influence ofextcmal conditions (Fried et a1. 1999, pp. 255) 
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period. This result was expected since during the study periO<L all five countries 
experienced different threats towards their economic and political stabilizatio~ which 
indirectly impacted on the whole process of recovery. Bauer et ale (1998) concluded 
that efficiency scores differ considerably, as shown in his study on comprehensive 
comparisons across five different measurement methodologies. 
Table 4.9: Stage 4 Mean Efficiency 
Common Frontier Characterising bI Country and bI Year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Indonesia 0.183 0.630 0.467 0.583 0.445 0.621 0.548 
Korea 0.872 0.873 0.881 0.900 0.905 0.895 0.937 
Malaysia 0.626 0.780 0.826 0.708 0.636 0.682 0.647 
Philippines 0.599 0.646 0.732 0.679 0.657 0.747 0.748 
Thailand 0.711 0.656 0.750 0.756 0.755 0.873 0.788 
Characterising the national frontier results by country and looking into the common 
frontier results in Table 4.9, both show that the efficiency mean on average have 
increased, even for Indonesia (with a slower pace at the beginning of 1999). With 
descriptive statistics explained in Table 4.3, this seems to comply with the assumption 
that country specific variables are an important factor in explaining average efficiency 
differences. Given these findings, it is believed that environmental variables have an 
important role in explaining the differences in banking efficiency. Variations in the 
countries backgrounds give us an uneven increase in efficiency results, compared to 
previous studies. This result corresponds with arguments found in Dietch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000) and Lozano-Vivas (1998), where changes in the average mean 
efficiency scores very much depend on the average country-specific conditions. The 
year 1999 saw the beginning of new policies towards recovery by all the countries. 
Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand progressed towards their commitment 
with the IMF financial program, while Malaysia struggled to overcome the downturn 
by implementing new capital controls. These economies were also soon hit by a 
second shock, the severe recession in the global high tech industry in 200 1. which led 
to further sharp downturns in exports and output growth in most of East Asia 
In the selected period of study (1999 - 2005), per capita growth in this nation has 
enjoyed an income growth of 8.2 percent and through IMF assistance and 
implementation of capital controls; they have fulfilled the need to work towards a new 
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economy and country development after the crisis88. Indonesia seems to have 
improved their performance at a slower pace compared to other effected countries89• 
Restructuring measures were implemented in Indonesia in the year 2000. However. 
the banks still struggled in the aftermath of the crisis and in 2002 bank credit resumed 
expansion. Therefore, Indonesia remains the country slowest to recover and 10 years 
after the meltdown Indonesia's recovery is still among the slowest in the Asian crisis 
affected countries (Azis, 2008, pp. 79). 
During the last few years, the relatively rapid growth of the financial sector 
(inadequately restructured) reflects the presence of excess liquidity and the sector's 
vulnerability. The slow growth of investment explains the economy-wide effects on 
the real sector and the stagnancy or deterioration of some social indicators. The 
investment climate surveys of the World Bank (World Bank, 2007. pp. 31) cite the 
following examples: 
"Even though macroeconomic conditions have greatly improved since the 1997-98 
financial crises, some 42 per cent of Indonesian firms in 2005 still cite concerns about 
macroeconomic instability as a major concern, although this proportion is down from 
50 per cent in 2003. These continued concerns may relate to firms' long memories of 
the crisis and also to occasional episodes of renewed volatility in exchange rates, 
interest rates and inflation in the post crisis period in particular in 2000/0J and in 
2005." 
'~Firms concerns have also been high in the Philippines, where the government IS 
efforts to reduce a large fiscal deficit and huge public debt have been at the centre of 
allention. " 
"Firms were concerned about this sort of policy uncertainty in IndoneSia, the 
Philippines and Thailand." 
"IMF (2006) also notes some deterioration in the World Bank's indicators of 
governance for East Asia over the last decade (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006), 
which may also suggest an increase in policy uncertainty." 
Efficiency scores are relatively high for Korea compared to the other selected 
countries. Korea's efficiency has substantially changed after the inclusion of 
II Yellen (2007). The Asian Financial Crisis Ten Years Later: Assessing the Past and Looling to the: Future. 
Speech to the Asia Society of Southern California. 
wEven though the n.-sults shows that Philippines and Indonesia are low in their recovery pcrfonnanccs.- ~thuk~ 
(2008.pp. 4) states that Indonesia and the Philippines are not an appropriate comparator. Indonc:518 S ~hbca1 
instability and social upheaval. interrupted crisis ~~agement i~ the country during ":,ost of the ~udy pcnod. As 
for the Philippines.. the impact from the 1997 cnsls was relatively small and by mid 1998 their economy had 
already returned to the prc-crisis growth path. 
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environmental variables. This could be partly explained by the observed differences in 
the data of the environmental variables in Table 4.3. This reveals the fact that Korean 
banking has undergone substantial structural reforms since the 1997 financial crisis. 
The recovery in the economy is reflected by the increase in GDP which has helped to 
restore confidence in the fmancial sector and has brought the restructuring and 
mergers plans into reality. 
Malaysia experienced a banking crisis in the 1980s and implemented a reform 
programme to lead them into the recovery of the 1980s downturn. The experience 
contributed towards better institutional and regulatory structures compared to others, 
such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The Malaysian experience of capital 
controls appear to have had a salutary effect, mainly because controls were supported 
by a sound macroeconomic policy framework, bank and corporate restructuring, an 
undervalued currency, credit supervision and time-bound measures. A favourable 
external environment has also undoubtedly helped Malaysia to recover from the crisis. 
Furthermore, Malaysian controls on short-term capitals have been justified in the 
transition period as financial safeguards, the introduction of these measures was very 
timely, with them being implemented just, before the crisis erupted fully (Chirathivat, 
2007; Kawai and Takagi, 2003). 
Even though the Philippines exhibited similar characteristics to the other countries in 
the Asian region, which suffered tremendous effects on their economy and social 
consequences, the Philippines was considered the least affected by the crisis with only 
four distressed financial fmns, two of which were banks and the other two non-bank 
financial institutions, which were eventually closed (Bongini et al., 200 1). The 
analysis show an increased of mean efficiency after the inclusion of environmental 
variables which implies that the Philippines were recovering swiftly and steadily from 
the crisis. The growth rates were positive out of the recovery, besides the downturn in 
global information technology cycle in 200 1; the economy maintained its momentum 
from 2002 onwards. The Philippines have implemented reforms in their financial 
sector since the economy downturn in 1980s and then proceeded with refonns in the 
1990s which enabled the systems to withstand shocks. The embarkment of general 
Banking law in 2000 and Special Purpose Vehicle Acts (SPVs) in 2002 modernised 
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the legal framework governing the banking system and gave incentives for the 
disposal of bank's non-performing loans. 
The stability of the Thai commercial banks has imprOVed greatly. Thailand's banks 
efficiency levels are higher relatively to the other countries with the exception of 
Korea. Looking at the Thai banks performances, the average efficiency increases at a 
constant pace. The results in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 reveal the indication of the 
environmental variables in Table 4.3 during the period of study. Financial 
liberalisation in Thailand began during the late 1980s and accelerated in the early 
1990s. Charnsan (2005) investigated the efficiency of the Thai financial sector after 
the fmancial crisis (1999-2004) by using Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Its fmdings 
indicate that the efficiency in the Thai financial sector, the commercial bank sector, 
and in finance and security companies diminished over the period of 1998-2004, 
while the efficiency in the insurance company sector remained unchanged over the 
period of study. However, a sharp decrease in efficiency in these three sectors 
occurred in the period of 1998-2004. Chamsan (2008) looked into the relative 
efficiency of Thailand's commercial banks during 2003-2006 by using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The analysis indicates that Thai commercial banks 
were efficient during the period of study. 
4.6 Conclusion 
During the 1997 financial crisis, the region was led into financial turmoil which lasted 
until early 2000. This caused an enormous contagion, which started in Thailand and 
then spread into Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines. The impact was even large 
enough to spread outside the region, which brought the world's eleventh largest 
economy, Korea, to the brink of bankruptcy and led to defaults by Russia and Brazil. 
The affected countries introduced corrective measures, to try and contain the 
economic damage caused by the crisis. 
These three counties and Malaysia implemented comprehensive bank restructuring 
strategies which included (1) restoration of the viability of the financial system as 
soon as possible so that it can efficiently mobilize and allocate funds (a core banking 
system must be in place to preserve the integrity of payment systems, capture 
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financial savings, and ensure essential credit flows to the economy); (2) throughout 
the process, provision of an appropriate incentive structure to ensure effectiveness 
and, as far as possible, avoid moral hazards for all market participants, including bank 
owners and managers, borrowers, depositors and creditors, asset managers, and 
government agents involved in bank restructuring and supervision; and (3) 
minimization of the cost to the government by managing the process efficiently and 
ensuring appropriate burden sharing (by distributing losses to existing shareholders)90. 
The IMF provided fmancial support and reform programmes in three worst hit 
countries- Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. However initial hesitation from the 
authorities of these countries created difficulties in the restoration of confidence in 
both the corporate and fmancial sectors. Meanwhile, for Malaysia, the government 
implemented capital control policies and rejected any financial support programmes 
from the IMF. However, these crisis-resolution measures remain highly controversial 
and despite all of the arguments, the countries have recovered from the crisis and are 
finding their way back into economy and financial sector stability. Lim's (1999) 
account is worth quoting at length, as it is representative91 : 
'Following the imposition of capital controls, economic indicators in Malaysia did 
indeed start improving. But they also improved at the same time in the other crisis-hit 
countries which did not impose such controls but maintained open capital accounts. 
All the crisis hit countries' currencies stabilized and strengthened, their inflation and 
interest rates fell, their current accounts moved from deficit into substantial surplus 
and private capital inflows increased, contributing to the replenishment of previously 
depleted foreign exchange reserves. Their stock markets started climbing, and the 
decline in their GDP growth rates moderated sharply and have now reversed with 
positive growth predicted for 1999 as a whole everywhere except Indonesia. 
Until very recently, the recovery in Malaysia actually lagged behind that of its 
neighbours who were IMF patients, particularly in inflows of foreign direct 
investment which fell in 1998 whereas they increased in the other countries (except 
Indonesia). My own opinion is that capital controls in Malaysia were neither 
necessary nor sufficient for economic recovery, just as they have obviously not been 
necessary in the equally if not more impressive recovery of the other crisis-hit Asian 
countries which followed the more conventional IMF policy prescriptions. Indeed 
given Malaysia'S much stronger macroeconomic fundamentals and financial 
institutions before the crisis, one would have expected its recovery to be faster and 
stronger than thaI of lhe olher countries. ThaI Ihis has nol happened suggests lhal 
capital controls-or the heightened political risk which accompanied their 
imposition--may be exerting a drag on recovery through the discouragement of some 
foreign capital inflow'. 
00 IMF Occasional Paper. (1999. pp.29). 
91 Kaplan and Rodrik. (200 I. pp.12.) 
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The aim of this chapter was to provide an empirical analysis of the technical 
efficiency of the selected SEA countries in the recovery peri~ 1999-2005 of the 
1997 Asian fmanciaI crisis, by taking into account the environmental variables that 
are associated in effecting the mean efficiency levels of these countries. Following 
Fried et al. (1999) we used the four stage procedure, to estimate the impact of 
environmental factors in Southeast Asian (SEA) banking six years after the crisis. 
The analysis started by assessing technical efficiency using traditional DEA without 
considering environmental effects, followed by Tobit regression in stage 2 and 3 for 
the adjustment of slacks. Finally, in stage 4 we repeated stage 1 using the new 
adjusted inputs. Our results show that when the common frontier is defined without 
environmental variables, the mean efficiency scores are quite low in comparison. 
Looking at specific-environmental conditions, we found that this result is mainly due 
to the differences in the environmental conditions in which banks perfonn services. 
So, when environmental variables are included in the common frontier. the 
differences in mean efficiency scores significantly increased (except for Indonesia 
which initially started with a lower mean efficiency). The results quite clearly indicate 
that the failure to incorporate slacks formally and directly into the efficiency analysis 
(as in the Bee approach) can sometimes produce inflated and misleading indications 
of relative efficiency (Drake et at., 2005, pp.16). 
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CHAPTERS 
BANKING SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN SOUTH EAST 
ASIA: MARKET POWER, CONCENTRATION AND 
EFFICIENCY 
S.1 Introduction 
Since experiencing the financial crisis in mid-July 1997, Asia's banking sector has 
undergone many dramatic changes. Significant changes can be seen in the banking 
industry through banking operational transformation, the number of branches and 
banks operating in the area, technological development, changes to the institutional 
structure of banking the industry and improvements of the quality of human resources. 
These changes are important in pursuing the goal of improved productivity. The Asian 
financial reforms were undertaken to improve the performance of the banking sector, 
through enhancing competitiveness and efficiency. Structural changes were aimed at 
fostering competition, anticipating productivity and efficiency improvements in 
banks. These changes however, have led to concern about the degree of concentration 
in the banking markets. Although it is important for the policy makers to 
accommodate these changes, it is paramount to find the right policy drivers that allow 
the banking industry to compete efficiently in more competitive markets. 
Banks are the main source of financing in Southeast Asia (SEA). The banking 
industries in the region exhibit similarities in market openness, regulatory stance, 
extent of government intervention, lending policies and the influence of 
macroeconomic policy. Some of these shared similarities became vulnerabilities, 
which caused a systemic crisis in 1997 and this undermined the solvency of this 
region's banking systems. Even though profound changes occurred after the crisis and 
are indeed continually evolving, weaknesses still persist in the area of financial 
reporting, regulation and government interference (Gochoco-Bautis~ 1999; Kane. 
2000: Dobson, 200 I; Bej~ 2010). The transformation that took place in the region has 
conclusively demonstrated the importance to further investigate the market structure 
in the crisis affected countries of Southeast Asia (SEA). 
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This Chapter contributes to the structure and perfonnance literature; in line with 
recent developments, it will expand on the analysis of concentration, competition and 
performance, by investigating the post fmancial crisis periO<L 1999 to 2005. The 
models used in the analysis will concentrate on the five countries that were most 
affected by the Asian financial crisis, Indonesi~ Kore~ Malaysi~ Philippines and 
Thailand, within the aforementioned recovery period. The analysis incorporates 
measures of concentration, market share, technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
The main objective is to test the structure-conduct-perfonnance (SCP) hypothesis and 
the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis. In the presence of panel da~ the fixed and 
random effects (GLS) estimating procedure is employed, although results using a 
traditional OLS method are also reported. 
5.2 Literature Review 
Previous literature has concentrated on the two major approaches in analysing the 
performance of the banking industry: structural and non-structural approaches. 
Structural approaches are based on the traditional industrial organisation (10) theory 
which focuses on both the structure-conduct-perfonnance (SCP) paradigm and the 
efficient structure (ES) paradigm. Non-structural approaches are developed under 
New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. In this chapter we will 
focus on the structural approaches to investigate the market structure and its 
relationship with concentration and efficiency whereas as application of a non-
structural approach is presented in Chapter 6. The following sections present a review 
of the relevant literature on market power theory and the efficient structure (ES) 
hypothesis. 
5.2.1 Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
The traditional industrial organisation (10) approach proposes structural tests to assess 
banking competition. based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model 
suggested by Bain (195 J , 1956). Recent developments have shown that market 
structure analysis has been extensively addressed since Bain's (1951) seminal paper, 
who investigated the relationship between market structure (using market 
concentration and firm's market share) and the exercise of market power. To evaluate 
market structure. the prominent tool used in the structural approach is the structure-
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conduct-perfonnance (SCP) paradigm. The SCP paradigm advocates that market 
concentration fosters collusion among large firms which creates large abnonnal 
profits. According to the SCP hypothesis, there is a direct link between market 
concentration and the degree of competition where a higher market concentration 
allows banks to exploit their market power and thus earn higher profits. In many 
previous studies, a positive and statistically significant relationship has been found 
between market share and bank profitability, while a positive relationship between 
market concentration and bank performance has not been conclusively established. 
The SCP paradigm posits a specific causal relationship between market structure. 
conduct and performance. In particular, market structure determines conduct and 
conduct in turn determines performance. SCP can be characterized accordingly using 
these three major elements (Lee, 2007): 
Structure - This refers to market structure. Variables that can be used to describe 
market structure include seller concentration, degree of product differentiation and 
barriers to entry. 
These variables can be further classified into two groups, namely: 
(a) Intrinsic structural variables - those determined by the nature of products and 
available production and marketing technologies. 
(b) Derived structural variables - those determined by firms and government such as 
barriers to entry, seller and buyer concentration and product differentiation. 
This distinction may be important if intrinsic structural variables are exogenously 
determined~ thus making them suitable candidates as instrumental variables. 
Conduct - This refers to a firm' s behaviour. The variables used to capture firm 
behaviour include pricing strategies, collusion~ advertising, research and development 
and capacity investment. Some have interpreted conduct as whether finns collude or 
compete. 
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PerfontUlnce - This refers to outcome or equilibrium assessed in tenns of allocative 
efficiency. The variables mostly used to measure performance are profitability and 
price-cost margin. 
Figure S.I: The Structure-Conduct-Perfonnance Paradigm 
STRUCTURE 
• Concentration 
• Firm sizes 
• Entry and exit 
conditions 
• Product 
differentiation 
CONDUCT 
• Policy objectives 
... • Marketing 
strategies 
• Pricing policies 
• R&D 
••• 
• Vertical Integration 
t t 
POLICY 
• Competition policy 
• Regulation 
• 
• 
• 
• 
"I 
PERFORMANCE 
• Profitability 
...... • Efficiency 
• Product qual ity 
• Technical progress 
••• 
The SCP paradigm argues that concentration is said to have lowered competition by 
fostering collusive behaviour amongst large banks in the market (Chortareas et al., 
2009). The argument also contends that a highly concentrated market will lead to 
higher loan rates and decreased deposit rates because of lessened competition~ which 
then leads to greater profitability (meaning lower performance in terms of social 
welfare). Analysis of SCP relationships in banking is often used as a way to evaluate 
which type of banking structure best serves the public in terms of both cost and the 
availability of banking services. In general two main objectives have been sought; 
firstly, the attainment of an efficient banking system; secondly, to minimise the 
likelihood of bank failure (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
The empirical analysis of the SCP hypothesis is normally carried out by regressing 
banks' performance (measured by either profit or price) on a measure of concentration 
(such as a n-bank concentration ratio or a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI) and by 
further controlling for other explanatory variables. The theoretical underpinning of 
this model is commonly known as the collusion hypothesis and goes back to the work 
of 8ain (1950, 1951) which was applied to the manufacturing sector. The same model 
was then introduced into the banking industry by Schweiger and Mcgee (1961) and 
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has since been used widely for empirical tests of the impact of market concentration 
on profitability. 
The SCP hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between changes in market 
concentration and finn's financial performances, however, empirical evidence has 
yield mixed results. Among studies whose results are supportive of the SCP 
hypothesis are Ruthenberg (1994), who, using survey data from 1984-88, found that 
concentration increases profitability, especially if barriers to entry are high. Molyneux 
and Teppet (1993) examined the SCP hypothesis for five European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria and Switzerland) 
and found support for the SCP hypothesis. Molyneux and Teppet (1993) also found 
similar results for banks located in Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK. 
Lloyd-Williams et a1. (1994) also established support for the SCP hypothesis for 
Spanish banks in the period 1986-88. Similar results can be found in Burke and 
Rhodes (1985) and their results are consistent with the traditional SCP hypothesis. 
None of the above papers incorporate efficiency measures directly in the model. 
Vander Vennet's (1993) results indicate that in some European countries (Belgium~ 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) collusion appears to be predominant. Despite the 
commonly accepted SCP argument favouring a positive relationship~ empirical 
literature supporting a negative link does exist. In their analysis, which included 11 
European countries over a four year period (1988 to 1991), Goldberg and Rai (1995) 
were among those that found neither a positive or significant relationship between 
concentration and profitability. 
The efficient structure (ES) hypothesis provides a potential explanation of the failure 
to find evidence of a consistent positive relationship between concentration and 
profitability in banking. Smirlock (1985) did not support the notion that concentration 
in banking markets results in monopoly profits being earned. but suggested that any 
effect of concentration reported in previous studies is spurious and probably due to a 
correlation between profitability and the omitted market share variables. According to 
the ES hypothesis~ some firms will earn supernormal profit because of superior 
efficiency. This efficiency is reflected in high market share and markets that contain 
such firms will tend to exhibit higher concentration. It is possible that spurious 
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relationship between concentration and profit will be observed when efficiency is not 
properly considered. 
5.2.2 Efficient Structure (ES) Hypothesis and Relative Market Power 
(RMP) Hypothesis 
A challenge to the SCP hypothesis interpretation is the efficient structure (ES) 
hypothesis (Gilbert, 1984) which explains the relationship between bank 
performances and concentration in terms of efficiency. The efficient structure (ES) 
hypothesis emerged from the criticism of the SCP (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman~ 1977). 
Demsetz (1973) proposed the (ES) hypothesis and suggested that correlation between 
concentration and banking profit is the results of the relationship between the finn~s 
profit and the firm's efficiency. In this case the positive relationship between profit 
and concentration is spurious because efficiency is the variable that actually explains 
profitability and motivates larger market shares (Chortareas et al., 2005). 
The ES hypothesis suggests that some banks may be more efficient than others~ thus 
earning higher profits which may lead to a higher market share, therefore making the 
market more concentrated, this would show that concentration leads to higher profits, 
when in fact both are caused by greater efficiency (Demsetz, 1974; Smirlock, 1985; 
Bresnahan, 1989). Thus, under ES hypothesis, the degree of concentration is not 
considered a reflection of collusive behaviour of banks, but rather a consequence of 
the superior efficiency of banks' firms (Al-Obaidan, 2008). 
The ES hypothesis is usually discussed in two forms, the X-efficiency (ESX) and the 
scale-efficiency (SE) hypotheses. In the X-efficiency hypothesis more efficient banks 
have lower costs, higher profits and a larger market share, because they are able to 
minimise costs to produce any given outputs. In the scale-efficiency (SE) hypothesis, 
some banks achieve better scales of operation and thus lower costs, higher profits due 
to the fact that more scale efficient finns produce closer to the minimum average-cost 
profit. 
A number of studies find evidence to support the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis, 
including: Shepherd (1986), Schmalensee (1987), Timme and Yang (1991). Berger 
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(1995), Sathye (2005), Park and Weber (2006), Byeongyong (2002). Byeongyong and 
Weiss (2008), Chortareas et al., (2009), Seelanatha, (2010). This literature strongly 
contests the use of employing market share variables to proxy for efficiency and 
strongly recommends the use of direct measure of efficiency (Mensi and Zouari. 
2010). 
However, Shepherd (1986) criticizes the ES hypothesis by considering that the direct 
source of market power is the domination of participants over the individual marke~ 
independently of the ultimate sources of such domination; hence the emergence of the 
Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis. The Relative Market Power (RMP) theory 
suggests that only large banks with some 'brand differentiation' can influence prices 
and increase profitability. The RMP theory argues that only large banks and well 
differentiated products are able to exercise market power in order to gain profit on 
non-competitive price setting behaviour (Berger, 1995; Shepherd, 1982). Berger and 
Hannan (1997) used US bank data from 1985 and their findings support the SCP 
hypothesis rather than RMP theory. 
In 1995, Berger asserted the need to include measures of estimated productive 
efficiency in the market power models of bank performance and distinguished 
between X-efficiency and scale-efficiency (SE) hypotheses. Berger tested competing 
hypotheses [SCP, RPM, X-efficiencies (ESX) and scale-efficiencies (ESS)] in the US 
banking sector and found the only variables positively related to profit are the market 
share and X -efficiency. 
To summarise, the SCP approach was largely favoured by researchers in banking 
literature in the 1990s and their findings generate mixed empirical results. The 
analysis of the SCP hypothesis mainly focused on fostering the understanding of 
market structure to help evaluate which type of banking structure best serves the 
public in terms of both cost and the availability of banking services. The early 
literature focused mainly on developed countries, such as the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU). The next Section reviews the literature that investigated the 
SCP relationship in emerging markets. 
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5.2.3 Literature on Developing Countries 
Al-Muharrami and Mathews (2010) analysed the relationship between market 
structure and bank performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GeC) banking 
industry over the period 1993-2002. Al-Obaidan (2008) studied the market structure 
concentration and performance of six oil rich Arab countries that were involved in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GeC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Om~ Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates. Jahangir et al. (2001), using the example of Bangladesh. 
proposed a framework incorporating bank's market concentration, bank's market size, 
bank's risk, and identified the relationships of these variables with bank's return on 
equity. They found that market concentration and bank risk do little to explain bank 
return on equity, whereas bank's market size is the only variable which provides an 
explanation for banks return on equity. 
On studies of performance and market structure include Choy and Kanbur ( 1991) who 
utilized prices as measures of performance in Malaysian banking; Haron (1996) who 
focused on the profitability of Islamic banks in Malaysia; Balachandher and 
Shanmugam (1997) and Balachandher et al. (1999) who analysed the determinants of 
commercial bank's profitability in Malaysia; and Khatib (2005) who tested the 
validity of the SCP framework and ES hypothesis using a robust estimation approach 
in the Malaysian banking market. 
Fu and Heffernan (2009) focused on the relationship between market structure and 
performance in China's banking system from 1985 to 2002. Using panel data 
estimation techniques, they tested both the market-power and efficient-structure 
hypotheses. Park and Weber (2006) identified the major determinants of profitability 
in the Korean banking sector for the period of 1992-2002, by testing the market 
structure hypothesis against the efficient structure hypothesis. The results indicate that 
bank efficiency has a significant effect on bank profitability and supports the efficient 
structure hypothesis. There are also a number of cross country studies, among which 
those of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (200), Shen (2003), Levine (2001) and 
Chortareas et al. (2008). 
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As previously mention~ past literature on Asia has failed to consider the SEA 
region's experience of the crisis or investigate the impact of the crisis on market 
structure. The remainder of this Chapter therefore investigates impact of the Asian 
fmancial crisis and of the reforms that followed it on the relationship between market 
structure and performance in South East Asia in the post crisis period (1999 - 2005). 
5.3 Indicators of Market Structure 
Concentration has been referred to, in previous studies as the degree of controlling the 
economic activity by large firms (Sathye, 2002). The literature on detenninants of 
market concentration in the Industrial Organization (10) can be dated back as early as 
Lerner's (1934) seminal work to Stigler (1964). Hannah and Kay (1997) and Hay and 
Morris (1991) are among those who have narrowed this field down to the theoretical 
aspects of the issues. The concepts of the Industrial Organization have been 
extensively debated in economic literature. The significance of the concentration ratio 
is basically due to its ability to capture structural features of the market. Concentration 
ratios are also able to reflect changes in concentration as a result of banks' exit or 
entry into the market (Tushaj, 2010). 
Despite there being several approaches relating to the measurement of concentration, 
the main elements in measuring them are the number of banks and the distribution of 
bank size in a given market. There are several indicators of market concentration: 
amongst of them are the k-bank Concentration Ratio (CRk), Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HH/), the Hall-Tideman Index (lIT/), the Rosenbluth Index (Rl), the 
Comprehensive Industrial Concentration Index (cel) , the Hannah and Kay Index 
(HKI), the U index (U), the multiplikativ Hause Index (H",), the additive Hause Index 
(Ha) and the entropy measure (E). 
The most common measure used in the literature on market concentration is the 
number of banks in each country, the k-bank concentration ratios (CRk) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HH/). It is not theoretically clear whether a k-bank 
Concentration Ratio (CRk) or the HHI is the most appropriate measure for market 
concentration (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004). The importance of these two 
concentration ratios arises from their ability to capture structural features of a market. 
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Concentration ratios for k-bank are simply called k-bank Concentration Ratios (CR,). 
There are no rules for choosing an appropriate value for ~ so, the number of firms 
included in the concentration index is ad hoc and an arbitrary decision. The index 
ranges from zero to unity. The index approaches zero for an infinite number of 
equally sized banks and it equals unity, if the firms included in the calculation of the 
concentration ratio make up the entire industry. It takes the form: 
n 
CRk = L s. 
. 1 1 1= (5.1) 
Where n is the number of firms92, Sj is the market share of ith firm and s is the total 
market share. This measure is the most commonly used due to its simplicity and 
limited data requirements; it sums up the market shares of k largest banks allocating 
equal weighting to each bank. The argument that supports this measurement is that 
the behavior of the market, dominated by a smaller number of banks, is unlikely to be 
influenced by the total number of firms operating in the market. However, this 
argument has been criticized by Phillips (1976) and many others because it ignores 
size inequalities within the leading group, plus all other firms (which itself is 
arbitrarily defined) and emphasizes only the leading group. However, the competitive 
behavior of the smaller market players might force the larger players to act 
competitively as well. Thus, the simple concentration ration may fail to reflect the 
impact of shifts in the positions of market leader banks (as it attaches equal weighting 
to the k largest banks) and completely ignores smaller ones. Moreover, there are no 
rules for defining the appropriate value of Ie; accordingly. such values are arbitrarily 
established (Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki, 2006). 
Another popular measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHl)93. It also known 
as the full-information index because it captures features of the whole distribution of 
bank sizes. For n firms in an industry with a market of shares S, (i=I, 2 .... , n). the 
HHI is defined as: 
91 in this thesis refer as banks 
9) Ilirschm8ll. 1945 and Herfindahl. 19S0 
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n 
1I11] ~ s.2 
i = 1 1 (5.2) 
HHI can be defined as (1/n) < HHI < 1, where n is the number of banks in the banking 
industry. The maximum concentration of unity occurs in the case of monopoly. 
Minimum concentration of (1/ n) occurs in the case where banks have equal shares of 
(ljn). 
There have been several arguments on the measurement of concentration using HHI. 
Davies (1979) analyzed the sensitivity of HHI in two compound parts: the number of 
banks in the market and the inequality of market shares among the different banks. 
The analysis concluded that the index is less sensitive to changes in the number of 
banks, due to the large number of banks in the industry94. Rhodes (1995) argued that 
at least two different sized bank's distribution can generate the same HHfs. 
Referring to past and even current studies on concentration, HHI, deposits, or total 
assets are generally used. Rose (1999) states "the degree of concentration in a market 
is measured by the proportion of assets or deposits controlled by the largest banlcs 
serving that market. .... The new Justice Department guidelines require the 
calculation of the Herjindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a summary measure of 
market concentration. HHI reflects the proportion of total assets, deposits or sales 
accountedfor by eachjirm serving a given market". In this study, we have used both 
deposits and assets for calculating HHI. In our analysis we present the indicators of 
the market structure for five of Southeast Asia's most crisis affected banking systems. 
Since the 1997 financial crisis, the Asian region has experienced bank consolidation: 
from 1999 to 2005. the number of banks in the selected countries reduced by about 14 
per cent, from 139 banks in 1997 to 119 banks in 2005 (Table 5.1). This broad decline 
94 There have been several studies which proposed to link HHI with other distributional theories b)' presenting it in 
the tenns of moments of the underlying banks size distribution (Adelman, 1969: Kwoka. 1985). 
9\ In the context of hypothetical market analysis. Rhodes (I99S) argues that the inequality of banks' mmct shares 
might differ substantially between markets yieldin~ the same IIHI \alue. He provided evidence that at least two 
different sized banks distributions CM generate the same IIHI by fonning the possibility to calculate the 11111 as 
~ ~ /11111/ for every value of 11111. 
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in the number of banks operating in the selected Asian countries is due to bank 
restructuring programmes. The decline in the number of banks reflects mergers and 
closures of smaller and failing banks worst hit by the 1997 financial crisis. The 
authorities' immediate action of crisis resolution in Korea and Malaysia led to some 
degree of consolidation, but both countries were forced into the second stage of 
reforms, where consolidation plays a central role. However in Thailand and the 
Philippines consolidation proceeded at a slower pace as the combination programmes 
between the government and the IMF left the resolution of the crisis to market forces. 
In Indonesia sixty-eight banks were closed, thirty three were nationalised~ twenty 
seven were re-capitalized, four state-owned banks were merged into one new state-
owned bank and several private banks were also merged (Hamada and Konishi~ 
2010). 
T bl 51 Ch . N b fD ks a e . anges In um ero an • • 
Country 1999 2005 Change 
Indonesia 55 44 -0.20 
Korea 16 14 -0.13 
Malaysia 33 26 -0.21 
Philippines 27 20 -0.26 
Thailand 8 15 +0.88 
Total 139 119 -0.14 
However, a reduction in the number of banks does not directly translate into an 
increase or decrease in concentration, as illustrated in Table 5.2. While the number of 
banks fell substantially in the Asian crises affected countries, the level of 
concentration in their banking industry doesn't seems to have changed much. Almost 
all the countries either experienced a decline in concentration ratio or a small increase. 
In Korea, the active consolidation process reduced the number of banks to 16 in 1999 
(Table 5.1) compared to 27 banks before the crisis. This resulted in HH1d increasing to 
1177 in 2005 (909 in 1999) and HH1a to 1143 in 2005 from 895 in 1999. The increase 
in concentration is also reflected in the increase of the share of total deposits and total 
assets held by the five (5) largest banks in each market (Table 5.2). The market 
concentration ratio in the Malaysian banking industry shows an increasing trend when 
the first phase merger programmes was implemented (1999 to 2002). The HH1d 
estimates~ based on total deposits, increased from 967 in 1999 to 1004 in 2002. The 
same can be seen in tenns of total assets, as the mergers and acquisitions took place 
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with greater support from government to help stabilize the banking market at the early 
stage of the crisis restructuring programme. 
During the second phase (2002-2005), it is possible to detect a decrease in the trend of 
HHla, HH1d and CR5d. Increased concentration does not seem to lead to expansion in 
the market share, even after changes in the market structure and distribution of market 
shares, following the merger and acquisition programmes. 
In the Indonesian banking system, the changes in total assets and deposits do not lead 
to the market to becoming more concentrated, as the HH1a, HH1d and CR5 levels 
continuously fall over the period studied (1999-2005). The same results can also be 
seen in Thailand. In contrast, in the Philippines concentration levels increased to just 
above the 1000 mark, compared to only 939 in 1999. The HH1a was 992 for deposits 
and 939 in terms of assets in 1999. The HHI increased to just above 1000 in 2005. 
showing the banking industry still has enough room for more mergers and 
consolidation without necessarily inhibiting effective competition. 
Overall, banking concentration ratios seems to decrease in aggregate in most of the 
countries during the period of study, 1999-2005. The HH1d and HH1a stands at 408 
and 432 compared to 446 and 435 in 1999. The market share (in terms of deposit) of 
the five largest banks also fell from 36.84 in 1999 to 35.28 in 2005. The results show 
that mergers and acquisitions reduced the number of banks in operation, but have yet 
to increase the overall concentration. 
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Table 5.2: Concentration Measures 
Country Year CR5. BBl. BBl. Avg. Avg. (deposits) (deposits) (Assets) (Assets) (deposits) 
Indonesia 1999 70.81 1651.15 1185.48 634.09 413.64 
2000 78.59 1744.79 178533 242435 1702.98 
2001 73.85 1486.48 1477.83 2713.54 2129.85 
2002 73.23 1420.97 1398.73 255731 2037.39 
2003 67.94 1369.74 1378.01 2402.19 1916.17 
2004 63.32 102627 1020.71 2798.52 2207.14 
2005 60.68 962.55 939.66 3051.97 2450.32 
Korea 1999 55.83 909.18 895.85 35742.93 27463.97 
2000 53.81 877.07 905.19 38854.99 29724.64 
2001 64.26 1223.28 1234.86 46048.28 34486.80 
2002 65.91 1216.24 1230.46 50257.63 36631.31 
2003 6434 1184.03 1176.73 49064.89 35233.46 
2004 64.27 1160.12 1130.18 49110.56 33875.25 
2005 6537 1177.52 1143.44 62132.21 41819.51 
Malaysia 1999 58.24 967.08 979.91 4681.46 3662.79 
2000 58.89 1001.02 998.52 6016.88 4749.23 
2001 59.84 1055.51 1014.44 6681.23 5232.94 
2002 58.75 1004.49 999.78 6858.82 5278.50 
2003 55.23 905.72 916.37 7779.37 5968.29 
2004 56.49 937.87 950.59 9025.60 6684.48 
2005 57.03 956.37 927.07 9687.91 7069.04 
Philippines 1999 63.47 992.97 939.43 2011.74 1440.56 
2000 64.85 1985.95 1032.66 1904.39 1345.09 
2001 67.36 1207.20 1112.79 2205.86 1603.53 
2002 63.11 1063.00 995.97 1985.88 1434.09 
2003 60.19 962.87 910.72 2068.18 1477.09 
2004 58.77 966.83 919.86 2379.67 1727.77 
2005 64.21 1109.44 1055.49 3031.67 2197.89 
Thailand 1999 9439 2424.25 2281.45 9112.56 9529.77 
2000 85.00 1948.87 1665.79 12155.06 8908.67 
2001 74.04 1319.52 1287.79 10619.28 9245.19 
2002 70.51 1244.94 1207.91 11220.87 9726.08 
2003 70.34 1247.72 1220.71 11127.44 9484.92 
2004 69.18 1233.98 1200.07 12201.22 10428.94 
2005 67.87 1187.16 1146.07 13031.33 10902.13 
All 1999 36.84 446.00 435.34 6636.47 5089.86 
2000 31.27 370.73 373.08 8586.52 6539.32 
2001 36.49 463.67 484.55 9897.37 7650.99 
2002 38.03 467.80 497.48 10218.90 7754.56 
2003 37.31 452.69 475.68 10467.26 7842.56 
2004 34.66 404.46 425.30 10987.85 8029.20 
2005 35.28 408.92 432.36 12706.95 9114.05 
Source: Fitchl8CA's 8ankscope database and own estimations. Based on the current screenmg 
guideline in the U.S, the banking industry is regarded as a competitive market if the HHI is less than 
1000, a somewhat concentrated market if it lies between 1000 and 1800 and a very concentrated 
market if more than 1800. 
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At country level however, most of the countries experienced an increase in 
concentration levels in the first few years of the restructuring (1999-2002) and a 
decrease in the second phase of the restructuring process (2002-2005). with the 
exception of Korea and the Philippines96• One explanation for this may be that 
consolidation has only recently begun to fully function in this crisis-effected region. 
Since then the banking industry has mostly been driven by stronger banks being 
forced to absorb weaker ones to ensure continuity in stability, and by mergers of the 
parent companies of foreign banks present in the region (Gelos and Rold6s, 2002). 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) suggested that concentration ratios are not highly 
correlated to measures of market contestability, and therefore capture other aspects 
beyond competition. Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, the figures suggest that 
competitive pressure may be low in some of the banking markets of East Asia because 
of high concentration of bank assets and deposits (Laeven, 2005). OveralL the effects 
of recent changes in the structure of banking systems on market structure are unclear. 
5.4 Methodology and Data 
5.4.1 Methodology 
To empirically test the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP), Relative Market Power 
(RMP) and Efficiency Structure (ES) hypotheses, we use the following equation by 
Berger (1995): 
~ = a + PICONC" + P2MSiI + P3TE" + P4SE" + Xu + E" (5.3) 
where Pit is a measure of bank performance. Specifically, in this study we use two 
measures of performance (Pit): the return of assets (ROA) and the net interest margin 
96 Quoted from studies by Alberto Reyes. Deputy Governor, Central Bank of the Philippines (2001): w[)espite tire 
geMral1y difficult regional conditions which prevailed as a result of tire onset of the ASianfinancWl crisis In 199-. 
the Philippines has emerged as among the most resilient economies in tire region. The lesser impact on tire 
Philippine economy o/the financial turmoil which hit Asia owes much to the cOWll1'y's sound macrcwconomic 
fondDmentals. as well as to the financial reform initiatives implemented by the Central Bank of the Philippint·.~ 
(BSP) even before the Asian crisis struck. Already in the I 980s. measures were being pursued to encoura~e 
greater competition and strengthen supervisory and regulatory systems. In the 1990s. the reform eBOrts ,,'eft' 
intensified A new and more independent central banJc was created in 1993. Restrictions on the establishment of 
new banks. as well as of new branches. were eased Foreign bank. entry was liberalized in 1994. which led to tM 
establishment of 10 new foreign ban1 branches in 1995. Meanwhile. tiglller prudential mt'asuns conlifUlt'J to ~ 
ifflrotiu~d SflCh as a lriglwr ~I 0/ miniMUM capital ~quir?m~n/s. liquidity cover on /OITign C"1II'7Tllcy "ahiltlr~s. a 
cap 011 loans to real estate and "plalions 011 derivatiws trading. Thus. the Philippine banJcs entt'~d tM cn.ns 
period in a relatively wt'll capiIDI~d and robust condition ". 
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(N1M). ROA is ratio computed by dividing the net income over total assets and the 
NIM variable is defmed as the net interest income divided by total assets. The ROA 
measures the profit earned per dollar of assets and reflects how well bank 
management use the bank's real investment resources to generate profits. while NIM 
is focused on the profit earned on interest bearing activities. ROA as a profitability 
ratio and has been used extensively in past literature (Goldberg and Rai 1996: Yu and 
Neus, 2005; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Molyneux and Forbes. 1995: Berger 
1995)97. 
The level of the NIM is considered an important policy variable for indicating how 
efficiently banks perform their intermediary function of collecting savings and 
allocating funds (Aysan et aI., 2010). The NIM is generally defined as the spread 
between interest rates on credits and interest rates on deposits. The margin is a broad 
indicator of price levels that banks offer to their customers. The determination of a 
single price for financial products is not possible, since the banks provide various 
types of services with different prices. 
Broader concepts like net interest rate margins calculated from balance sheet items are 
frequently used to identify price levels in the market. The most common NIM 
measure is the net interest revenue as a percentage of total assets (Ho and Saunders, 
1981; Maudos and Guavera, 2004; Demirgilc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). The specific 
definition of this variable covers the interest rate revenues from all interest earning 
activities like credits, bonds and interbank loans in addition to the aggregate interest 
rate expenses like deposits and credits from other financial institutions and markets. 
However, in many studies it has been observed that the choice of profitability 
performance measures does not significantly affect the empirical results (Okumus, 
2002). 
MS" is the market share (in terms of assets) of bank i at time I. CONCit measures the 
degree of concentration using the k-bank concentration ratio (CR.) or the Herfindahl-
97 Evanoffand Fortier (1988) gave an argument for the ROA as more preferable than other profit measure:' riMy, 
although some banks have used product prices 8.'i independent variables. banking is a multi p~uct busm.cs..o; and 
individual prices may be misleading. Pri~ can only be used if co~ts directly assoc~at.ed ~'Ith these pnco arc 
explicitly accounted for as explanatory vanables. SecondJy the potential for cross SUbsldlzall~ ~"".ecn products 
obviously exists and pricing strategy will differ across markets. The use of profit measures WIll ehmmate most of 
these problems (AI-Muharrami and Matthews.. 2010). 
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Hirschman Index (HHI). In this analysis we included five-bank Concentration Ratio 
(CR5d) in tenns of deposits, HH1d in tenns of deposits and HHI. in tenns of assets. 
Past literature has extensively used the HHI as a proxy for market power in a given 
market (for example Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Byeongyong et al., 2005; Goldberg and 
Rai, 1996; Molyneux, 1999; Yu and Neus, 2005; Chotareas et al., 2009: Seelanatha, 
2009; Park and Weber, 2006; AI-Muharrami and Matthews, 2010). 
TEiI is a measure of technical efficiency and SEit is a measure of scale efficiency. 
reflecting the ability of banks to produce at optimal output levels (economies of 
scale), given similar production and management technology98. To further clarify. if 
SE > 1 means that banks are operating below optimal scale levels and have the ability 
to lower costs by increasing output further, SE < 1 means that banks are operating 
over optimal scale levels and are required to downsize in order to achieve optimal 
input combinations (Fu and Heffem~ 2009). The relationship between scale 
efficiency and profitability is expected to be positive. 
Hence, a significant positive relationship between TE with both ROA and NIM would 
support the suggestion that some banks are more technically efficient than others; as a 
result, these banks earn higher profits and consequently gain higher MS (which 
supports the ES hypothesis). Furthermore, a significant negative relationship between 
technical efficiency and concentration ratio would support the notion that the degree 
of concentration results in anti-competitive bank performance (the SCP hypothesis). 
Alternatively, a significant positive relationship between technical efficiency and both 
ROA and concentration ratios would suggest that the degree of concentration need not 
result in anti-competitive bank performance, but should be considered as a 
consequence of the superior efficiency of bank firms, thus supporting the ES 
hypothesis (AI-Obaidan, 2008). 
We include a vector of control variables (Xii) which includes equity over total assets 
(ETA) and gross domestic product (GDP). The degree of capitalisation is captured 
here as ETA or the ratio of equity to total assets is used to represent bank specific 
characteristics. The relationship between ET A and profitability is expected to be 
<II Sec Chapter J. 
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negative since greater capital means banks are less likely to be involved in risky 
activities, which leads to lower profits. On the other han<L ETA may raise bank 
profitability if higher capital ratio can also reflect lower expected bankruptcy risks 
leading to lower funding costs. In this case, higher capital ratios maybe associated 
with more profitable institutions. 
DennirgUc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and OemirgUc-Kunt et al. (2004) used GOP as 
a general indicator of economic development due to its capability to reflect 
differences in banking technologies and the mix of banking opportunities. GOP is 
expected to have a positive relationship with bank profitability as GOP growth 
supports fmancial sector perfonnance99• An increase in GOP would increase banks 
income, in turn this would allow banks to increase lending and lower defaults rates 
(Brock and Suarez, 2000; Claeys and Vander Venne4 2007). On the other hand. low 
GDP would affect the debt servicing capacity of domestic borrowers and increase 
credit risk. 
The SCP hypothesis predicts that collusive behaviour of dominant firms influences 
the price setting process in the industry, which allows those firms to gain abnormal 
profit. The SCP also suggests a positive relationship between concentration and firm 
performance and uses concentration ratios as a proxy for collusive market power of 
dominant firms. The traditional SCP hypothesis can be verified by finding PI> 0 and 
P2 = 0; and the efficiency hypothesis by a finding that f3t = 0 and P2 > O. Recall that 
under the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis, causation is assumed to run from 
efficiency to profits, and to market structure. More efficient banks should have higher 
profits, so signs of the coefficient of TE and SE should be significantly positive, that is 
p) > 0 and P4> O. Under the market power hypothesis (RPM) a significant positive 
PI confirms the SCP performance, where P2 should be positive if the RPM 
hypothesis holds. 
99 The positive relationship found in studies by Has.'\8l1 and Ba...ttir (2003) and Kosmidou and Pa.. . iouras (200S). 
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5.4.2 Testing for Efficiency Structure (ES) Hypothesis 
The efficient structure (ES) hypothesis states that cost advantage, enjoyed by efficient 
fmns, leads them to have higher profits than inefficient fmns. Efficient firms pass cost 
advantages to their customers through adjusting prices, which leads to a higher market 
share (Seelanatha, 2010). Therefore, it is expected to have the following signs for the 
estimated coefficient of equation (5.3) ifES hypothesis holds: T£>O, S£>O, CONC=O 
and MS=O. 
Following Fu and Heffernan (2009), to test the hypothesis more formally. the 
following functional forms are estimated: 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
where TE measures technical efficiency and SE measures scale efficiency. Under 
technical efficiency (TE), higher profits and a larger market share are determined by 
superior skills in transforming input quantities into output quantities. In the scale 
efficiency (SE), market share and profit come from lower costs determined by an 
optimal scale. These refer to firms that have equally good management skills and 
technologies, but produce at a more efficient scale than others lOO. Since efficient 
firms are expected to have relative cost advantages leading to higher profit, a 
statistically significant positive relationship between firm performance and efficiency 
is assumed. The necessary conditions for the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis to 
hold are that the signs on the coefficient TE and SE are significantly positive in 
equation (5.4) and (5.5)101. In other words, the validity of the ES hypothesis holds 
only if more efficient banks are more profitable, with larger market shares and/or 
higher levels of market concentration (Heffernan and F~ 2005). 
For the purpose of this analysis. we first ran the equation (5.3) with pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method. All the equations are then estimated using both the fixed 
100 We estimated TE and SE using Data Envelopment AnaJysis as explained in Chapter 4. 
101 To ensure the absence of a spurious relationship between profil8bilit) and market structure. both profits ~ the 
market structure variables must be positively related to efficiency. Thus. 8 necessary conditiun for the efficlent-
structure hypothesis to hold is th81 efficiency ha.; a positive effect on market structure. 
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and random effects (GLS102) approaches for panel data in equation (5.3). Hsiao (1986) 
showed that pooled OLS yield biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates because 
omitted cross-section specific variables may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Use of either a fixed-effects model or a random-effects model can solve this 
problem. In our analysis we run both fixed and random effects model 103 . Greene 
(2003) indicates the fundamental advantage of panel data set over a cross-section or 
time-series is that the researcher can allow for differences in behaviour across 
individuals and/or time periods. 
5.4.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
The data for this study is taken from the BankScope database maintained by 
FitchIBCA and Bureau Van Dijk. The observations, which start from 1999 until 2005. 
consist of 915 commercial banks in Indonesi~ Kore~ Malaysi~ the Philippines and 
Thailand. Data is also collected from several other sources; IMF annual reports, 
World Bank Reports, central banks reports from each country and past literature. 
Table 5.3 reports the observations used in the study. The statistics show that Indonesia 
is the country with the highest number of commercial banks followed by Malaysi~ 
Philippines, Kor~ and Thailand. The structure of each banking industry has changed 
due to the implementation of new regulations and government interventions in order 
to maintain and protect the banking industry after the fmancial crisis in 1997 (a 
detailed discussion is presented in Chapter 2). In terms of the number of banks over 
time, the statistics show a significant reduction in the number of banks, particularly 
for Thailand (Bowlin, 1998; Nunamaker, 1985). These changes were due to forced 
mergers and acquisitions implemented as part of the recovery plan. The banking 
market with the largest number of banks is Indonesia (48 banks on average), while 
Philippines has the smallest number (14 banks on average). 
101 Generalised Least Squares . 
10.' The Hausman test is used to identify the optimal model. The results suggest thai the random effects model IS the 
optimal one. 
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Table 5.3: Sample Used For Empirical Analysis (1999-2005) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippine Thailand Total 
1999 55 16 33 27 8 139 
2000 51 17 27 26 12 133 
2001 48 16 26 21 16 127 
2002 47 16 27 25 16 131 
2003 46 17 27 27 16 133 
2004 49 17 26 25 16 133 
2005 44 14 26 20 15 119 
Commercial Banks 340 113 192 171 99 915 
Average number of 48 16 27 24 14 26 banks 
Our Indonesian sample accounted the largest number of banks in the sample country 
and the highest proportion of banking sector assets (averaging 94% over the period). 
In contrast, the country samples that had the lowest number of observations per year. 
Korea (an average of 16) and Thailand (in average of 14), also represented smaller 
shares of banking sector assets (73% and 51 %, respectively). Table 5.5 describes the 
descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis. 
Table 5.4: Bank Year Institution 1999 to 2005 
Commercial 
Commercial Banks Banksl All Banks A verage size of banks 
(1999-2005) All banks (%) (USD millions) 
Indonesia 340 363 93.664 2326.08 
Korea 113 154 73.377 47311.07 
Malaysia 192 207 92.754 7148.12 
Philippines 171 196 87.245 2197.47 
Thailand 99 195 50.769 11520.72 
Total 915 1115 82.063 
Source: BankScope, Annual report from Bank ofindonesla, Bank of Korea, Bank ofThatland, Bank 
Negara Malaysia and Bang)(o Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables, 1999-2005 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 0.99 4.21 
-30.44 66.96 
NIM 247.54 606.75 
-19.38 7047.6 
MS 0.04 0.05 0.0001 0.33 
HHla 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.18 
CR5d* 0.65 0.06 0.54 0.78 
HHld* 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.19 
ETA 11.57 9.55 
-37.03 99.72 
GOP 3140.91 3653.03 745.79 15840 
TE 0.56 0.34 0.01 
SE 0.85 0.16 0.14 
LOGGOP 7.57 0.91 6.611 9.67 
ROA ** 1.99 4.21 
-29.44 67.96 
NIM** 0.03 0.02 
-0.06 0.46 
Note: I!HI. in terms of assets; CR5d * and HH1d* are based on deposits; ROA _ •• return on assets where (I+ROA); 
followmg Claessens and Laeven (2004); NIM _ • * is net interest margin based on NIM over total ~ ETA is the 
ratio of total equity to total assets measure the degree of capitalisation; GDP is gross domestic products; TE is the 
technical efficiency using DEA estimation; SE is the DEA scale efficiency. 
As illustrated Table 5.6, on average, the ROA for the selected countries banking 
systems have recovered from the low points experienced during the crisis. The 
region's banking industry suffered from losses and turned some banks ROA to 
negative. In 1999, Korea and Thailand suffered losses and show a negative average 
value for the ROA. 
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics 11999 and 2005) 
ROA NIM MS ETA GDP 
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 
Indonesia 1.37 2.00 34.06 39.41 0.005 0.008 10.98 16.08 950.54 950.35 
Korea -1.10 1.08 716.04 1719.50 0.07 0.06 4.56 6.00 9549.54 15840 
Malaysia 1.06 0.76 119.50 214.67 0.03 0.04 9.55 10.89 3984.00 4970.0 
Philippines 0.29 1.61 60.96 105.24 0.04 0.05 17.54 12.40 1018.88 1320.0 
Thailand -3.89 1.60 175.17 367.99 0.07 0.07 7.74 11.39 1984.94 2490.0 
Source: Bankscope database and yearly annual reports. 
However, as the economy grew (indicated by the change in GOP) the level of ROA, 
recovered as did the efficiency in almost all of the countries (see Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4 for further discussion). These changes reflected a lower provisioning of 
non-performing loans and indicated that impaired assets had either been resolved or 
taken off bank balance sheet (Adams, 2008). Malaysia and Korea remained the 
countries with the lowest ROA, whereas Indonesia had the highest ROA on average 
followed by Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia's average high ROAs are related 
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to the wide spreads between deposits and lending rates, and a relatively high return on 
government securities holdings. Net interest margins (NIM) have shown increasing 
changes. For the same period of study, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand experienced the 
highest changes in their NIM, while Indonesia and the Philippines experienced 
changes at a slower pace. The NIM may have been lower due to extensive borrower 
defaults on both principal and interest payments that caused net interest income to be 
negative, thus driving NIM lower (Doliente, 2005). Another explanation could be 
high volatility in the business cycle, especially in regions affected by crisis. This 
illustrates how economic uncertainty and asymmetric information may keep margins 
low. 
5.5 Analysis and Results 
S.S.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Prior to estimating the equations, tests were conducted for the presence of 
multicollinearity between the market structure and efficiency variables, concentration 
and market share. The estimated Pearson correlation coefficient is presented in Table 
5.7, which shows the relationship between the different variables used in this study. 
Generally, a correlation matrix shows how these variables move in relation to each 
other and presents such differences as correlations ranging between -1.0 to + 1.0. From 
the estimation, almost all of the correlations were lower than 0.85, meaning there is no 
serious multicollinearity related to this model 104. Table 5.7 shows that the 
concentration ratio (CONC) does not have a significant relationship with ROA or 
NIM. It also reveals that both ROA and NIM are negatively correlated with the 
variable's technical efficiency (TE) and scale efficiency (S£). 
104 The results show very Iinle correlation among variables included in the model. Gujerati (2003) e,"plaincd that if 
the pair wise correlalion between two regresses exceeds 0.8. a mUI1.icol.linearity problem c,"isacd. We also r.l1l a 
variance inflation test (VIF) and the results show very low \Blues. whIch IS k-s..\ than 10. 
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Table: 5.7 Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
------~ -~ 
--
---- -- -------- ----- , 
ROA NIM MS HHI. HHld CR5d TE SE ETA 
ROA 1 
-. ~-------
--
NIM 0.0858* 1 
~ 
-
I 
MS -0.052 -0.1338* 
~~--.--- . -
1 I 
HHI. -0.0265 0.1569* -0.1462* 1 I 
HHld -0.0312 0.1331- -0.1002- 0.8032- 1 
CR5d -0.0082 0.1638- -0.0960- -0.4224- 0.8013- 1 I 
I 
-0.0359 -0.1589- 0.5696- -0.4224-TE -0.3838- -0.4082-
-+--- -
1 I 
SE -0.0654- -0.0934- -0.0761- -0.0844- -0.0104 -0.1049-
-0.0125 
----+ 
t I I I 
_0_" ____ -
• 0.2905- 0.2167- -0.2649-ETA -0.0487 0.0552 0.016 -0.3044-
-0.0491 i t i 
02892-l ~~~~3·r LOG -0.0532 -0.2481* 0.2266- -0.4079-GOP -0.4531- -0.5309- 0.4829-
• • Note. at 5 percent slgmficance level 
...1 ____ 
---
A Hausman test is then carried out to test for the optimal model and the results favour 
random effects. 
Table 5.8: Hausman Test 
Country 
All 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Probability 
(Prob>eh il); 
ROA 
0.0007 
0.1260 
0.6994 
0.6276 
0.9943 
0.9500 
5.5.2 Regression Results 
Decision 
fe 
re 
re 
re 
re 
re 
Probability 
(Prob>ehil)NIM 
0.0315 
0.9255 
0.4307 
0.0836 
0.0090 
0.0955 
Decision 
fe 
re 
re 
re 
fe 
re 
The empirical analysis proceeds as follows: we started by estimating an OLS model of 
equation (5.3) using the net interest margin (NIM) and return on assets (ROA) as 
dependent variables, then estimated the same equation with both random effects (RE) 
and fixed effects (FE) models by panel data. To ensure the absence of any spurious 
relationship between profitability and market structure, both profits and market 
structure need to be positively related to efficiency. Equations (5.4) and (5.5) are then 
used to further investigate the presence of this relationship. A necessary condition for 
the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis to hold is if the sign on TE and SE is 
significantly positive. The results obtained from the OLS estimation of equation (5.3) 
are presented in Table 5.9, where NIM and ROA are the dependent variables and 
concentration (CONC) measures are CR5d (in tenns of deposits) and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHl) in tenns of deposits (HH1d) and in tenns of assets (HHI.). 
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Table 5.11 shows the results from the RE and FE models and summarised the above 
results in Table 5.12 to 5.14. Tables 5.15 report the outcome from the estimating 
equations (5.4) and (5.5) by employing concentration variables (HHla• HHld) and 
market share (MS) as the dependent variables. 
The estimations by country are reported in Tables 5.16 with ROA as dependent 
variable and 5.17 with NIM as dependent variable. The estimation on the necessary 
condition for ES hypothesis by country was show in Table 5.18 to 5.22. 
i) OLS Regression 
Table 5.9 shows the results of the OLS estimations on the pooled sample, 1999-2005. 
The results from OLS estimations reveal weak evidence of a negative relationship 
between market share (MS) and profitability (ROA) and net interest margin (NIM). 
Both report a negative relationship but only significant when NIM is the dependent 
variables. These results indicate that banks with higher market share. gain higher 
profits with lower interest margins. Molyneux and Forbes (1995) argued that finns 
with efficient cost structures can increase their market share (MS) by charging lower 
prices, which explains the expected negative relationship between MS and the net 
interest margin (NIM) 1 05 • The results seem to reject the RMP hypothesis as the signs 
for MS are negative. The impact of concentration (both in terms of asset (HH1a) and 
(CR5d) in terms of deposits) is positively correlated with ROA and significantly 
positive when NIM is the dependent variable. In contrast, for concentration in terms 
of deposits (HHld), the results are negatively correlated to ROA and positively 
correlated to NIM. 
These preliminary results, where the ROA and NIM were positively correlated with 
market concentration and negatively correlated with market share, suggest support for 
the SCP hypothesis lO6• Indeed, our preliminary results seem to reject the traditional 
ES hypothesis since they indicate that concentration (CONC) or market share (MS) 
have significant associations with banks' profitability (ROA) and (NIM). 
I~ Alternatively. if the dominant banks with large market shares ex~rt market po.wer in price setting decisions. a 
positive relationship shouJd exist between the market share (.WS) and mtc:n.'St margms (Bc:rg\."f ct al .. 20(4). 
10& The results are similar to a recent study by Rodriguez (2003) who investigates both market po~cr and 
efficienc), hypotheses for the Mexican banking industry. 
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59 P fi Table - ro ltability and Market Structure: OLS Estimations 
- -Independent 
ROA NIM 
MJarket share (MS) -0.89 -0.04+ 
(3.16) (0.02) 
Concentration by 3.01 0.12·· 
assets (HBI.) (6.20) (0.04) 
Concentration by 
deposits (HHld) 
CR5d in terms of 
deposits 
Technical efficiency 0.74 0.005 
(TE) (0.57) (0.003) 
Seale efficiency (SE) -1.46+ -0.006 
(0.86) (0.01) 
Equity over total 0.14"· 0.0005··· 
assets (ETA) (0.01) (0.00009) 
Log of gross domestic 0.13 -0.005---
product (LOGGDP) (0.186) (0.001) 
Constant -0.03 0.05"· 
(1.80) (0.0116) 
F-test 15.06 16.57 
Prob> F 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.0905 0.0988 
Adjusted-Rl 0.1031 0.0928 
. . Note:Standard error statistics m parentheses 
+ p<O. 10, • p<0.05, •• p<O.O 1, ••• p< 0.00 1 
Dependent variables: 
ROA NIM ROA 
-0.45 -0.04+ 
-1.01 
(3.18) (0.02) (3.19) 
-4.54 0.06 
(6.13) (0.04) 
1.30 
(2.61) 
0.54 0.002 0.73 
(0.56) (0.003) (0.56) 
-1.39 -0.007 -1.48+ 
(0.87) (-12]) (0.86) 
0.13··· 0.0004··· 0.14----
(0.015) (0.0056) (0.015) 
0.05 -0.005··· 0.14 
(0.19) (0.00009) (0.19) 
1.50 0.07"· -0.63 
(1.79) (0.001) (2.74) 
15.12 15.23 15.06 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.0908 0.0915 0.0905 
0.0848 0.0855 0.0845 
NIM 
-0.04· 
(0.02) 
0.04-
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.0]) 
0.0005 
(0.00009) 
-0.004 .•• 
(0.001) 
0.04· 
(0.02) 
15.79 
0.00 
0.0946 
0.0886 
As explained in the ES hypothesis, efficiency influences market share of finns and 
concentration. Therefore, it is necessary that technical efficiency and concentration 
have a significant and positive relationship with both market power and concentration. 
Two supplementary regressions have been tested (equations 5.4 and 5.5) and the 
statistical evidence derived from these has given further supportive evidence to reject 
the ES hypothesis. The results are illustrated in Table 5.10; MS is positively correlated 
to TE but not significantly with SE. The concentrations (HHI. dependent variables) 
were significantly negative with TE, whereas with HHld, the results were significantly 
negative with TE and significantly positive with SE. These results do not support the 
ES hypothesis and fail to support the necessary conditions where TE should have a 
positive relationship with both MS and concentration. 
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T bl 510 N C dO ° , ESh a e • ecessary on ltions or aypothesis (OLS Estimations) • . 
Variables MS 
Technical efficiency 0.07 ...... 
(TE) (0.005) 
Scale efficiency (SE) -0.02· 
(0.009) 
Equity over total -0.0006-
assets (ETA) (0.00015) 
Log of gross domestic -0.003+ 
product (LOGGDP) (0.0018) 
Constant 0.04·· 
(0.01) 
F-test 118.00 
Prob> F 0.00 
R-squared 0.341 
Adjusted-R2 0.338 
.. Note: Standard error statIStiCS m parentheses 
+p<O.lO, • p<o.05, •• p<o.Ol, ••• p< 0.001 
HHI. HHI~ 
-0.03 , •• 
-0.02--· 
(0.0025) (0.0025) 
-0.002 0.02·· 
(0'()046) (0.0047) 
-0.0006 ...... -O'()003 ,-
(0.00007) (0.00008) 
-0.008 ,. 
-0.01 
(0.0009) (0.0009) 
0.20-.....- 0.21'" 
(0.007) (0.007) 
89.27 80.48 
0.00 0.00 
0.298 0.261 
0.293 0.251 
GOP growth and ETA have been included into the regression model as control 
variables. The results indicate that profitability (ROA and NIM) has a significant 
positive relationship with ETA, but shows that GOP is not significant. On the other 
hand GOP has a positive impact on ROA but seems to have a weak and statistically 
negative impact on NIM. A positive relationship between GOP growth and 
profitability indicate the importance for economic development for financial 
performance. Carbo-Valverde and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2007) findings show a 
negative relationship between margins and GDP growth, suggesting that economic 
growth fosters lower margins. 
ii) Fixed Effect and Random Effects Regressions 
We estimated the SCP equation using both the fixed effect (FE) and random effect 
(RE) models. The results obtained from fixed and random effect are quite similar. 
These are presented in Table 5.11 and summarised in Tables 5.12 to 5.14. Table 5.12 
summarises the estimation results from Table 5.11 with regards to the relationship 
between market structure and concentration with dependent variables of profitability 
(ROA) and (NIM). With ROA as a dependent variable, we did not find any evidence 
to support the SCP as concentration is always negative. This suggests an inverse 
relationship between ROA and concentration. Moreover. the MS coefficient is 
significantly negative in the majority of cases, thus indicating that greater market 
share also reduces banking profitability. Goddard et aI. (2001) suggested that a 
negative value in the market share could be treated as a sign that on average. smaller 
banks were more profitable than larger ones. 
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Table 5.11: Profi 
------------
--
----- -.. ------
Variables ROA ROA 
FE RE FE 
MS -7.652 0.636 -7.151 
15.52) (6.13) 15.493 
HHI, -10.20 -4.666 
(8.78) (7.04) 
HHI. -12.32+ 
(6.285) 
CR5d 
TE 0.150 0.460 0.0714 
(0.64) (0.58) (0.643) 
SE 2.555+ -0.0489 2.693+ 
(1.44) (1.15) (1.44) 
ETA 0.268--· 0.214-·· 0.272 0 _. 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
LOGGDP 0.841 0.259 0.852 
(1.14) (0.37) (1.04) 
Constant -8.271 -2.030 -8.214 
(9.44) (3.16) (8.45) 
F-test 22.09 22.58 
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald-test 120.03 
Prob> cbtl 0.000 
LM test 0.0084 
-------
Note: Standard error statistics in parentheses 
• p<O.IO.· p<0.05.·· p<O.OI, ••• p< 0.001 
RE 
1.324 
(6.14) 
-9.578 
(5.83) 
0.362 
(0.57) 
0.180 
(1.15) 
0.216··· 
(0.02) 
0.175 
(0.36) 
-0.977 
(2.96) 
122.66 
0.000 
0.0073 
ROA 
FE RE 
-8.011 0.550 
(15.52) (6.15) 
-3.859 -0.896 
(3.82) (3.21) 
0.0768 0.504 
(0.65) (0.58) 
2.486+ -0.161 
(1.44) (1.14) 
0.269"· 0.215·--
(.025) (0.02) 
1.050 0.305 
(1.08) (0,38) 
-8.439 -2.282 
(9.79) (4.11) 
22.03 
0.0000 
119.51 
0.000 
0.0078 
NIM NIM NIM 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
-0.155--
-0.142 -0.155-- -0.138-- -0.15"- -0.140--
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
0.103-- 0.0738-
(0.03) (0.03) 
0.039+ 0.0282 
(0.02) (0.02) 
0.037-- 0.029· 
(0.01) (0.01) 
-0.0008 0.001 -0.0008 0.0009 -0.00011 0.0016 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) .00227 (0.002) (0.002) 
0.0117- 0.007 0.0132- 0.0087+ 0.0125- 0.0078 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.00023·· 0.0003·· 0.00021 0.0003·- 0.00022r 0.0003 --
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00008) 
0.0127·' 0.00196 0.0080 -0.000082 0.0104-- 0.00134 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
-0.0823- 0.00619 ·0.0401 0.0258 -0.0782- -0.00047 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (.036) (0.026) 
5.76 4.47 5.22 
0.000 0.000 0.0003 
30.00 25.40 28.76 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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bl S 12 S fR I Ta e: . ummary 0 esuts . . 
Variables ROA NIM 
FE RE FE RE 
Market sbare negative positive significant significant 
(MS) negative negative 
Concentration negative negative significant signi ficant 
(H HI.) by assets positive positive 
Concentration significant negative signi ficant positive 
(HN/d) by deposits negative positive 
CR5d negative negative significant significant 
positive positive 
The significant negative relationship of market share with NIM rejects the RMP 
hypothesis. The results reveal weak evidence of a positive relationship between 
concentration and interest margin (NIM) both under FE and RE. 
Overall, estimation results show a positive relationship between the coefficients of 
technical efficiency (TE) variables and scale efficiency (SE) variables with profitability 
(ROA). However, these preliminary results do not support the efficient structure 
hypothesis as the market structure (MS) is negatively correlated to the ROA and NIM and 
either MS or concentration are significant. Neither of these reflects the necessary 
conditions applied for accepting the (ES) hypothesis (Table 5.13). Technical efficiency 
(TE) has mixed results with NIM. Nevertheless, scale efficiency (SE) has a significantly 
positive relationship with NIM. Scale efficiency seems to have a much more important 
role, thus showing that there is evidence that scale efficiency (SE) produces greater 
profitability, although it still does not support the ES hypothesis. 
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Table: s .13 Summary of Results (Continued b) 
Variables ROA NIM 
FE RE FE RE 
Technical efficiency 
(TE) with: 
a) concentration (HHIJ positive positive negative by assets positive 
b) concentration (HHld) positive positive negative by deposits positive 
c) CR5d positive positive negative positive 
Scale efficiency 
(SE) with: 
a) concentration (HH1a) positive negative significant signi ficant by assets positive positive 
b) concentration (HHId) significant positive significant significant by deposits positive positive positive 
c) CR5d significant negative significant significant positive positive positive 
Table 5.14: Summary of Results (Continued c) 
Variables ROA NIM 
FE RE FE RE 
Equity over total assets 
(ETA) with: 
a) concentration (HHIJ significant significant significant significant 
by assets positive positive positive positive 
b) concentration (HHId) significant significant significant significant 
by deposits positive positive positive positive 
c) CR5d significant significant significant 
significant 
positive positive positive positive 
Log or gross domestic 
product (logGDP) 
with: 
a) concentration (HHIJ positive positive significant positive by assets positive 
b) concentration (HHId) positive positive significant negative by deposits positive 
c) CR5d positive positive 
signi ficant positive 
positive 
Table 5.14 shows the bank specific factors used to explain the region's banks' 
perfonnance, the degree of capitalization, calculated as equity over total assets (ETA) is 
generally significantly positive for both ROA and NIM. These results imply that if 
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greater capital is available, increase profitability is experienced. Bigger capital 
availability will encourage banks to increase their portfolio of risky assets, in the fonn of 
loans and securities (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2(03). As observed by Chortareas et al. 
(2010), higher capital ratios can give higher incentives to shareholders to monitor 
managers' operations and strategies thereby indirectly encouraging profitability. The 
macroeconomic control variable, GOP, shows an overall significantly positive 
relationship to ROA when NIM is used as the dependent variable. This result is quite 
reasonable for the region, considering they are in the process of rebuilding their banking 
industry after their crisis experience. Certainly, for these capital scarce countries, the 
demand for capital will rise as the economy grows. 
As far as the efficient structure hypothesis is concerned, none of its versions seem to 
support as it fails the necessary conditions (Table 5.15). 
Table 5.15: Necessary Conditions (ESl Hypothesis 
Variables MS 
FE RE 
Tecbnical 0.006··· 0.0065··· 
Emciency (TE) (0.002) (0.002) 
Scale efficiency -0.005+ -0.002 
(SE) (0.003) (0.004) 
Equity over total -0.0001·· -0.0002··· 
assets (ET A) (0.00006) (0.00006) 
Log of gross 
-0.011··· 
-0.004· domestic product (0.002) (0.002) (LOGGDP) 
0.126··· 0.0631··· 
Constant (0.02) (0.02) 
F-test 9.56 
Prob> F 0.0000 
Wald-test 30.22 
Prob> cbi2 0.000 
LM test 0.0000 
. . . Note: Standard error statistics In parentheses 
+ p<O.1 O. • p<O.05 ••• p<O.O I •••• p< 0.00 1 
HHI. 
FE RE 
-0.003 -0.016··· 
(0.003) (0.003) 
0.027'" 0.036·" 
(0.006) (0.005) 
-0.0001 + 
-0. 0004··· 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
-0.065··· -0.020··· 
(0.004) (0.002) 
0.596··· 0.254"· 
(0.03) (0.01) 
127.23 
0.0000 
359.81 
0.000 
0.0000 
HH1d 
FE RE 
-0.008' -0.017··· 
(0.004) (0.003) 
0.033"'· 0.022··· 
(0.008) (0.005) 
0.0002 -0.0002·· 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
-0.054··· 
-0.012"· 
(0.006) (0.001) 
0.503··· 0.209··· 
(0.04) (0.009) 
54.12 
0.0000 
269.98 
0.000 
0.0012 
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iii) Cross Country Regressions 
Table 5.16 shows the results obtained county by country: Indonesia (ROA_I), Korea 
(ROA_K), Malaysia (ROA_M), Philippines (ROA_P) and Thailand (ROA_n. We do 
not find evidence to support the two market power hypotheses (SCP and RMP) as the 
I f h . ffi' 107 (H'H" . va ue 0 t e concentratIOn coe JClent 1a In terms of assetsl~ is always negative 
(with the exception of Korea). This again suggests an inverse relationship between 
concentration and profitability. Moreover, the market share is negative in the majority of 
cases, thus indicating that greater market share also reduces banking profitability. 
Looking at the signs and significance of the coefficient for efficiency, technical 
efficiency (TE) and scale efficiency (SE), the preliminary results do not support the 
efficient structure (ES) hypotheses. TE appears to be significantly positive in Korea 
(under the random effect approach), and the Philippines, whereas, for SE significant 
positive results were found in Thailand. 
Looking at the control variables, ETA is positive in some of the countries (particularly 
Indonesia and Korea), while GOP growth seems to affect the Asian crisis region in 
different ways. The results lead us to conclude that GOP growth has no significant 
relationship with profitability and contributed less to the banks' performance in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The positive impact of GOP growth supports the 
argument of a positive association between growth and financial sector performance, this 
is also confirmed by Kosmidou (2006) and Hassan and Bashir (2003). GOP is expected 
to have an impact on the demand for bank loans, whereby a rise in bank loans would 
increase the bank's profitability. The negative effect may reflect the poor performance of 
bank loans during the economic downturn (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and 
Metzemakers, 2004) which reflected the economic conditions of the region during the 
period of study. 
I07°rhe SCP hypothesis can be verified by finding a positive and statistically significant v~~ of H/~I ~ a \aJuc of M~ 
:lusl to O. Conversely. the RMP theory is oonfmned if MS is fo~d to be posit.iv~ and stallstlcally slglllficant. ° • 
I Since the estimation using HHI is based on assets and depoSItS. both give SImIlar ~ults to the A:-conccn~lOn l\:\cI 
of the five large banks in terms of deposits. For summarization we used the HHI In terms of a.'\.SCts to diSCUSS the 
comparison results by country. 
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T bl S 16 M ket St ctu P ri a e - ar ro re- e ormance and Efficiency: By Country ROA 
- -
Variables 
ROA I ROA K ROA M ROA P ROA T 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
MS 35.16 11.98 -2.96 -3J)9 -9.67 5.13 -13.18 -7.18 -18.36 3.75 (43.01) (14.79) (10.13) (3.39) (18.58) (3.84) (14.62) (8.11) (36.10) (16.n) 
RRI. 
-28.56 -25.29 39.00··· 37.97··· -39.78 -26.06 -10.86 -11.45 -98.86-- -121.9-" 
(24.08) (22.27) (9.73) (9.57) (49.81) (47.78) (13.23) (12.82) (32.20) (30.51 ) 
TE -1.55 -.744 1.295 2.00+ -1.21· -O.8T 1.01- 1.04- 0.122 -0.238 (I.59) (1.44) (1.39) (1.20) (0.53) (0.48) (0.44) (0.43) (1.69) ( 1.86) 
SE 2.39 -0.73 -3.16 -3.18 0.65 0.94 0.36 0.25 lO.4f 12.88" (2.88) (2.20) (3.40) (3.00) (0.12) (1.08) (1.53) (1.48) (4.98) (4.86) 
ETA 
0.34··· 0.27··· 0.15· 0.18·· 0.031 0.041· 0.002 0.007 0.25· 0.16 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.148) (0.10) 
LOG -1.67 -2.53 0.63 0.58 -1.216 -1.069 1.261 1.259 -2.345 0.167 
GOP (3.86) (3.56) (0.88) (0.83) (1.51) (1.467) (0.963) (0.946) (3.384) (3.594) 
11.47 20.40 -7.55 -7.74 16.22 12.50 -6.218 -6.565 21.47 -3.436 Constant (29.73) (27.24) (9.49) (8.45) (16.81 ) (16.28) (6.921) (6.781) (24.77) (26.n) 
F-stat 1] .59 7.69 
Wald 67.00 56.01 Test 
.. . Note: Standard error statistics In parentheses; 
+ p<O.IO, • p<0.05, •• p<O.OI, ••• p< 0.001 
1.76 2.50 6.21 
14.47 15.52 
Table 5.17 reports the results of our regressions when net interest margin (NIM) is the 
dependent variable. The results do not indicate any significant positive relationship 
between concentration (CONC) and market share (MS) except for Korea and Malaysia 
where, under the fixed effect model, both show a significant negative impact on NIM. 
Meanwhile, the concentration ratio shows a positive but insignificant impact on almost 
all the countries accept for Indonesia and the Philippines. The relationship between 
concentration and market share is very weak during the period of study, 1999-2005. The 
results show a positive value for the concentration level and a negative sign for market 
share in Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand. These results conclude that bank 
concentration has a positive relationship with bank spreads, thus supporting the SCP 
hypothesis in the specific case of these countries. 
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32.53 
bl S 17 Ma k t Structu P rfi dEffi Ta e . r e re- e ormancean lcien~: ~ Country N1M . • 
NIM I NIM K NIM M NIM P NIM T 
FE RE FE RE FE --~-~---~.-. RE FE RE FE RE 
MS -0.23 -0.13 
-0.10"" 
-0.028 -0.25""0 
-0.0113 -0.025 -0.074 -0.170 -0.042 (0.15) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.()6) (0.02) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11 ) (0.04) 
HHI. 
0.14+ 0.14+ 0.03 0.04 0.236 0.178 -0.0105 -0.0030 0.0647 0.051 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.187) (0.118) (0.128) (0.10) (0.09) 
-0.01 -0.01 0.01""0 0.01""" 0.001 0.001 -0.01 0.002 0 0.01· TE 0.01 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.118) (0.004) (0.01) (0.005) 
SE 
0.01+ 0.01+ 
-0.01 -0.003 -0.01 00 -0.01 00 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.02 
(0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) (0.01 ) (0.01) 
0.0002 0.0002 0.001 0 0.001"" ~.00019 -7.58e-06 0.001.00 0.00 I·'· 0.0004 0.001 ... ETA (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001 ) (0.0002) 
LOG 0.024+ 0.02+ 0.009
0
• 0.011 0" 
GDP (.014) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) 
!constant -0.15 
-0.15 -0.07" -0.1"·" 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) 
F-stat 1.78 19.53 
Wald 11.38 106.44 Test 
Note: Standard error statistics in parentheses; 
+p<O.IO,· p<0.05,·· p<O.OI, ••• p< 0.001 
-0.02·" -0.02"0 0.03" 0.02"" 0.020 
(O.005J (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.01 ) 
0.15" 0.16" -0.18"· -0.14" -0.16· 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
9.45 4.18 5.12 
40.69 22.01 
Looking at the signs and significance of the coefficients for TE and SE, our preliminary 
results fail to reject the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis for Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand. Tests for two supplementary regressions have also been run. The statistical 
evidence derived from these two regressions has given supportive evidence to reject the 
ES hypothesis with the exception of Korea (results are summarised in Tables 5.18 to 
5.22). 
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0.01 
(0.01 ) 
-0.12 
(0.07) 
40.78 
T bl S 18 Effi· t St tu (ES) h th· I d a e · leleo rue re lYP01 eslS- o ooesia • 
· 
INDONESIA 
V.riables MS HHI. 
FE RE FE RE 
TE 0.005· 0.008··· 0.003 -0.0003 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
SE 0.0017 -0.002 -0.004 -0.0005 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
ETA -0.0001 -0.0001· -0.00006 -0.00005 (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.0001) (0.00008) 
LOG -0.006+ -0.008· -0.132'" 
-0.13 .. •• 
GDP (0.0031) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.054· 0.0711·· 1.042··· (1.036)··· (0.023) (0.025) (0.040) (0.033) 
F-stat 2.55 248.88 
Wald Test 15.62 1273.56 
. . Note: Standard error StatiStiCS an parentheses; FE IS fixed effect; RE IS random effect; 
+p<O.IO,· p<0.05,·· p<0.01, ••• p<0.001 
T bl S 19 Em· t St t (ES) h th· K a e · leleo rue ure lYPOl eslS - o rea • 
· 
KOREA 
Variables MS HHI. 
FE RE FE RE 
TE 0.025+ 0.0333· 
0.0401·· 0.0210· 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) 
SE -0.079· -0.0854· -0.0744· -0.0542· (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.025) 
ETA 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0006 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
LOG -0.038··· -0.042··· 0.0141 0.0239·· 
GDP (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
0.480··· 0.505··· 0.0177 -0.075 COQS~Dt (0.086) (0.094) (0.090) (0.076) 
F-stat 5.93 6.21 
W.ld Test 23.28 28.71 
. 
Note: Standard error statistics in parentheses; FE IS fixed effect; RE IS random effect; 
+ p<O.IO. • p<O.05, •• p<o.O 1, ••• p<O.OO 1 
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Table 5.20: Efficient Structure (ES) hypotbesis - Malaysia 
MALAYSIA 
Variables MS RRI. 
FE RE FE RE 
TE 0.003 0.004+ -0.005""" -0.003-(0.002) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
SE 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.00241+ (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001 ) 
ETA -0.0003" -0.0003" -0.00007 -0.00004" (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00002) 
LOG -0.005 -0.006 -0.023""" -0.024""0 
GOP (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant 0.0781" 0.0792
0 0.297"·" 0.305---
(0.036) (0.039) (0.014) (0.012) 
F-stat 2.48 85.24 
Wald Test 11.05 402.13 
. . . Note: Standard error StatiStiCS lD parentheses; FE IS fixed effect; RE IS random effect; 
+ p<O.1 0, • p<0.05, •• p<O.O I, ••• p< 0.00 I 
T bl 5 21 Em' t St t (ES) b th' Ph T a e . IClen ruc ure typo1 eslS - Ilppmes . . 
PHILIPPINES 
Variables MS HHI. 
FE RE FE RE 
TE 0.004+ 0.005· -0.004 -0.0016 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SE -0.0022 -0.004 0.0044 0.002 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) 
ETA -0.0002+ 
-0.0003+ 0.00022 0.00001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00007) 
LOG -0.0014 -0.002 0.010 0.006 
GOP (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0056) 
Constant 0.054 0.062 
0.022 0.051 
(0.041) (0.045) (0.046) (0.038) 
F-stat 2.54 1.54 
Wald Test 12.75 2.25 
Note: Standard error statistics in parentheses; FE is fixed effect; RE IS random effect; 
+ p<O.lO, • p<O.05, .. p<o.O J. ".p< 0.00 I 
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T bl S 22 Em· t St ctu (ES) h h· a e . IClen ru re typot eslS - Thailand . . 
THAILAND 
Variables MS HHI. FE RE FE RE 
TE 0.004 0.007 -0.004 -0.0002 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
SE 
-0.0578-- -0.0609--
-0.014 0.0037 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) 
ETA -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.00004 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0001) 
LOG 0.004 0.007 -0.017 -0.0346·· 
GOP (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011 ) 
Constant 0.077 0.0542 
0.280·· 0.387··· 
(0.088) (0.102) (0.099) (0.081 ) 
F-stat 3.29 3.39 
Wald Test 15.24 14.15 
.. Note: Standard error StatiStiCS In parentheses; fe IS fixed effect; re IS random eff~ 
+ p<O.10, • p<0.05, .. p<O.OI, ... p<O.OOl 
5.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter presents a study of market structure, performance and efficiency in the 
Asian region after the financial crisis (1999 to 2005). The banking sector in Southeast 
Asia (SEA) has experienced substantial changes during the past decade, especially after 
the 1997 financial crisis. One of the most relevant changes was the transformation of the 
banking industry, where each country implemented Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) 
programmes which reduced the numbers of banks operating in the region. Following 
Berger (1995) this study tested the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, accounting 
also for market power, technical and scale efficiencies. Technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency were then regressed against concentration and market share to establish 
whether the higher order conditions for the efficiency structure hypothesis are satisfied. 
Our results seem to reject the traditional SCP paradigm in SEA banking but also uncover 
evidence of strong relationships between profitability and the banks' capital ratios. The 
results are consistent with AI-Obaidan (2008), Chortareas et al. (2009) and Seelanatha 
(2010). The empirical investigations in terms of profits (ROA) and NIM show results that 
the RMP and SCP hypotheses do not hold. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that 
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concentration and market share are associated with NIM, while TE is not found to be 
significantly related to either profits or NIM, thereby failing to support the ES hypothesis. 
In contrast, when the estimation is run again by country, Korea is the only country found 
to support the ES hypothesis. The results suggest that high market concentration, with a 
small number of large banks in the industry, has intensified competition. The results also 
reject the traditional SCP and RMP hypotheses for all the countries with ROA as the 
dependent variable. In terms of NIM as the dependent variable, the country estimates for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand indicate that bank concentration has a positive 
relationship with NIM, thus supporting the SCP hypothesis in the specific case of these 
countries. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY 
IN SOUTH EAST ASIAN BANKING 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, most of the South East Asian affected countries 
have actively reformed their regulatory framework and restructured their financial 
sectors. Mergers and acquisitions have created a new era of consolidation, which has 
raised concerns about competition in their banking sectors. Increased banking 
competition was expected to provide welfare gains by reducing monopoly rents and cost 
inefficiencies. A higher degree of competition is expected to result in lower monopoly 
power of banks and therefore lead to a decrease in banking prices. However, from a 
policy point of view, how these structural developments may influence the efficiency of 
the banking sector is still an open question. 
This chapter analyses the relationship between competition and efficiency in our sample 
of SEA countries during the post crisis period, 1999 to 2005. The analysis presented in 
this chapter is motivated by several factors. Firstly, previous literature has concentrated 
on the effects of concentration, competition and market structure of the banking industry 
in developed markets (Molyneux et aI., 1994; Hempell, 2002; Biker and Groeneveld, 
2000). Our study contributes to the literature by looking at bank competitive behaviour in 
Southeast Asia during the post crisis period. Secondly, this study provides a cross country 
analysis on SEA bank competition by utilising a non-structural approach. the Panzar and 
Rosse H-statistic. As mentioned earlier, the literature on cross country comparisons on 
SEA is very limited. With the emergence of consolidation in the banking sectors through 
the planned restructuring, competition is an area that needs to be looked into, especially 
after the region has experienced crisis and recovery. 
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6.2 Methodology and Data 
In Chapter 5, we investigated the SCP and the limitations of SCP approaches which 
indicate that the structure may not be the only important determinant on the level of 
competition. Developments in the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) have 
proposed new techniques that infer the competitive conduct of market participants 
directly without needing information on market structure. The NEIO provides several 
approaches to examine market power and to quantify the degree of competition in the 
market place (Martin, 1993). 
There are two main methods within these approaches that are used in the empirical 
analysis of banking: the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic method and the Conjectural 
Variations (CV) approach (Iwata, 1974; Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982). Whilst both the 
SCP paradigm and the Panzar and Rosse method are reduced-form analyses, the conjectural 
variation approach is a structural approach. The Panzar-Rosse approach has been extensively 
utilised in evaluating competition in mature banking systems in North America, for example 
U.S. banking system study by Shaffer (1989); in Canada, Nathan and Neave, (1989) and in 
various European countries, for example, Molyneux et.al. (1994) look into banking systems 
in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom; and Molyneux et al., (1996) at 
Japan. Vesala (1995) concentrates on Finland; Coccorese (2002) on Italy, De Brandt and 
Davis (2000) investigate banking competition in France, Germany and Italy; Egli and Rime 
(1999) look at Switzerland; Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) at Greece; Bikker and Groeneveld 
(1998) to the EU-15 countries; Hempell (2002) at Germany; and Maudos, Pastor and Perez 
(2002) at Spain. 
More recent interest in the Panzra-Rosse modelling approach has been fostered by its use in 
the analysis of competition in emerging markets' banking systems, for example Gelos and 
Rold6s (2002) on Central Europe and Latin America; Belaisch (2003) on Brazil: Yildirim 
and Philippatos (2002) investigate the countries in Central and Eastern Europe; Levi Yeyati 
and Micco (2003) in Latin America; and Zambrano and Luis (2003) in Venezuela. Cross 
country studies include Claessens and Laeven (2003) and Bikker and Haaf (2002). Following 
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this established strand of the literature, we employed panzar and Rosse approach for the 
following analysis. 
6.2.1 Panzar and Rosse H-statistic 
The new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) approach provides non-structural tests 
to circumvent the problems of measuring competition encountered by traditional 
industrial organisation approaches lO9• Claessens and Laeven (2004) argue that the actual 
behaviour of a bank is not only related to market structure, but also to barriers to entry 
influencing the likelihood of the entry of new competitors and therefore the behaviour of 
incumbents forecasting such an entry. The competition measures from the New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO) include; the Panzar and Rosse (P-R) model, which 
provides an aggregate measure of competition, and the Lerner index, an individual 
measure of market power. For the purpose of this chapter we concentrate on the Panzar 
and Rosse (1977; 1987) method. 
Panzar and Rosse (1977) develop a test that examines whether firm conduct is in 
accordance with the models of perfect competition, imperfect or monopolistic 
competition, or monopoly. The Panzar and Rosse test is also known as the revenue test. 
This test is based on empirical observation of the impact on firm-level revenues of 
variations in the prices of the factors of production that are used as inputs in the 
production processes of a group of competing firms. Built into the test is an explicit 
assumption of profit-maximizing behaviour on the part of the firms. 
Panzar and Rosse show that the H-statistic, defined as the sum of the elasticity of a firm's 
total revenue with respect to each of its factor input prices, differs under perfectly 
competitive, imperfectly competitive and monopoly market conditions. The intuition is 
straightforward in the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. but more 
complex in the intennediate case of imperfect or monopolistic competition. 
109 The Panzar-Rosse approach has been widely applied to assess competitive conditions in the banking ?stetnS o~ ~ 
United Stales. Canada and Japan sina: the early 19805. with later work focusing on E~. countncs. ~ltlOO 
economies and a few studies focusing on the Asian region. Most of these banking systems exhIbIted char*:tcrulICS of 
monopolistic competition (Bikker and Haaf. 2(02). 
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The Panzar and Rosse (1977) H-statistics indicate the nature of the market structure 
under certain assumptions11O as shown in Table 6.1. It investigates the extent to which a 
change in factor input prices is reflected in (equilibrium) revenues earned by a specific 
bank. The Panzar and Rosse (P-R) model is derived from a reduced form revenue 
equation and measures the sum of elasticity of total revenue of the firm with respect to 
the firm's input prices. The test is derived from a general banking market model, which 
determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of banks, by maximising 
profits at both the bank level and the industry level. 
This implies, first, that the bank (i) maximises its profits, where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost (Bikker and Haaf, 2002, p.2193): 
(6.1 ) 
Where Ri refers to the revenues and Ci to the costs of bank (i) (the prime denoting 
marginal), Xi is the output of bank (i), n is the number of banks, Wi is a vector of m factor 
input prices of bank (i), Zi is a vector of exogenous variables that shift the bank's revenue 
function, ti is a vector of exogenous variables that shift the bank's cost function. 
Secondly, at the market level, it means that, in equilibrium, the zero profit constraint 
holds: 
(6.2) 
This can be summarised in the following equation with • indicating equilibrium values: 
(6.3) 
110 (I) hanks an: profit maximizing. single product firms facing normally distrib~ted re\enuc. Wld ~st f~ions; ( 2) 
banks produce revenue using labour. capital and deposits (intermediated funds) as mputs; (3) ~lgh\.'1' mput pn~.arc. not 
&.uociated with higher quality services that ~)pcratc higher. ~\,\.'flUC; ~~ (4) banks arc \0 long ~ .,eqUIhbrlUm, 
Nonetheless. product differentiation is allowed In the monopolistIC compt.."btton model (Gclos and Roldos. .. (02). 
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Where R;the revenue of bank (i) is W, is a vector of m factor input prices of bank (i). 
Market power is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices blV
o 
is 
reflected in the equilibrium revenue SR;- earned by bank (i). According to PR model it 
provides a measure of "H-statistic" which ranges between 0 and 1 of the degree of 
competitiveness of the industry: 
(6.4) 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that the H-statistic is negative (H ~ 0) for a neoclassical 
monopolist, or a perfectly collusive oligopolist (Cartel). The profit maximizing 
monopolist sets the output price so that it operates at an output level where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. Marginal cost is linearly homogeneous in input prices (so a 
1% increase in all input prices leads to precisely a 1% increase in marginal cost), so if the 
monopol ist tries to pass the increase in marginal cost on to consumers, its output quantity 
will decrease more than proportionally since a monopolist always operate on the elastic 
portion of its demand function. Consequently, the gross revenue of the monopoly will 
decrease, and the H-statistic is negative. 
A H-statistic which is instead significantly greater than zero indicates that the revenue 
function facing the individual firm depends either implicitly or explicitly upon the 
decisions of its actual or potential rivals. Panzar and Rosse (1987) introduce the 
interdependence among banks into a structural model through the hypothesis that free 
entry and exit result in long-run equilibrium where the zero profit constraint holds at the 
market level. They show that the H-statistic is equal to one (H = I) for a competitive 
price-taking firm in long-run equilibrium. In long-run competitive equilibrium, banks 
face a perfectly elastic demand curve which is tangent to the minimum point of their 
average cost curve, where production technology is characterised by CRS and marginal 
cost equals average cost. When the prices of inputs increase, banks. as price takers in the 
output market, incur a loss even at their profit-maximizing level. This is because total 
revenue cannot cover total costs. As a result. some banks will have to exit from the 
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market place, the industry supply curve shifts upward and price therefore increases. 
attracting new entry Competitive exit and entry adjust the level of output price until the 
surviving banks face a demand price adequate cover the new higher marginal cost 
(average cost). Free entry and exit make the output price an endogenous variable. 
although it is out of the control of individual banks. When the market settles down into a 
new long-run equilibrium the total revenue of the surviving banks increases by the same 
percentage as the average cost, that increases by the same percentage as input prices. 
Finally, Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that the H-statistic takes a value between zero and 
one (0 < H < 1) if a bank is operating under monopolistic competition in long-run 
equilibrium. Different from monopoly, the perceived demand curve facing the individual 
finn under monopolistic competition depends upon the prices (quantities) of the 
substitute products in the market. The perceived elasticity of demand is a nondecreasing 
function of the number of rivals since an increase in the number of rivals increases the 
closeness of the substitutes among market participants. The entry or exit of additional 
products in response to profits or losses will cause the movement of the demand curve 
until, in long-run equilibrium, zero economic profits are achieved. The revenue of each 
finn will increase less than proportionally to changes in input prices. A summary 
interpretation of the H-statistic is given in Table 6.1. 
The critical feature of a P-R model, besides being static model, is that the banks or firms 
need to be observed in long run equilibrium. The long run equilibrium test is carried out 
using the H statistic where it measures the sum of elasticity of the return on assets (ROA) 
with respect to input prices. Values of H statistic equal to zero would indicate 
equilibrium, while less than zero would mean disequilibrium. If the results shown are not 
in long run equilibrium, it is correct that H < 0 no longer proves monopoly, but it also 
remains true that H > 0 disproves monopoly or conjectural variations in short run 
oligopoly. 
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Table 6.1: The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic111 
Parameter region Competitive environment test 
.. f alnGTR 
H-statlstlC = a I ,GTR = gross total revenue; w = factor prices j=1 nw. 
J 
H~O - Monopoly, perfectly collusive oligopolist (panzar and Rosse. 
1987) 
- Profit maximizing finn facing a fixed demand curve in short run 
competitive equilibrium and conjectural-variations short-run 
oligopolist (Shaffer, 1983). 
- H is a decreasing function of the perceived demand elasticity 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1987). 
k 
Market in long run equilibrium: aln PF .. 1: al = 0, PF=profitablhty (Shaffer. 1983) j_1 nw. 
- J 
O<H< 1 - Monopolistic competition in long run equilibrium. 
- Free entry (Chamberlinian) equilibrium excess capacity. 
H= I - Perfect competition in a long run equilibrium (Rosse and Panzar, 
1977). 
- Free entry equilibrium with full (efficient) capacity utilization. 
The Panzar and Rosse methodology assumes that banks are treated as single product 
firms and is consistent with the intermediation approach to banking, where banks are 
viewed mainly as financial intermediaries. The P-R model is considered a valuable tool in 
evaluating market conditions owing to its simplicity and transparency without lacking 
efficiency (Delis, 2009). The main advantage of the P-R model is data requirements, 
which are less demanding, compared to other approaches, since it relies more on bank 
total revenue and input price (does not require data on output price and quantities). Since 
H statistics do not contain any specific hypothesised definition of the market structure, it 
is robust with respect to any implicit market definitions (ShafTer. 2004; Kasekende et aI., 
2(09). The non-necessity to define locations of the market a priority implies that the bias 
caused by the misspecification of market boundaries is avoided; hence for a bank that 
operates in more than one market, the H statistic will reflect the average of the bank's 
conduct in each market (Delis, 2008, p. 4). Under the P-R model. utilising the bank level 
III Soun:c:s: Matthews et aI. (2007): Ahi. (2002); Panz.ar and Rosse. (1977) and (1987): Shaffer. (1982); NalhIn and 
Neave. ( 1989); and Molyneux et aI .• ( 1994). 
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data allows for bank-specific differences in the production function. The assumption of a 
single product firm is also consistent with the intermediaries approach to banking (De 
Bandt and Davies, 2000). 
Besides its advantages, P-R models also have several limitations. The first drawback is 
that it assumes that market participants are price-takers in the input market (Kasekende et 
aI., 2008). This method also assumes that reduced-form revenues are not affected by 
shifts in the market's demand curve in a long-run competitive equilibrium in the long-run 
a perfectly competitive industry gives rise to a horizontal industry supply curve (the 
supply curve of the input factors). The second problem of the Panzar and Rosse method is 
related to its requirement of long-run equilibrium for the identification of the models of 
perfect and monopolistic competition. Since the H-statistic is not reliable for samples that 
are not in long run equilibrium, the empirical estimation of the reduced-form revenue 
function requires a separate test for long-run equilibrium 1 12. This brings in new 
econometric difficulties. Cross-sectional estimation rarely, if ever, yields consistent 
estimates of structural parameters since the large number of heterogeneous firms has to 
be fully controlled for (Schemalensee, 1989). The use of panel data allowing for fixed 
effects for individual firms would be a solution for controlling for unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms. However, for an accurate identification of the H-statistic it is 
necessary to ensure that the market is in long-run equilibrium at each point in time. Put 
another way, if the market proves to be in long-run equilibrium in some periods and is in 
disequilibrium in other periods, the estimated H-statistic derived from the panel data 
cannot be used to indentify the models of perfect and monopolistic competition. Indeed, 
as shown by ShatTer (1983), any profit-maximizing firm facing a fixed demand curve, 
even in a short-run but not long-run competitive equilibrium, will exhibit H < 0113• 
An additional disadvantage is related to the economic interpretation that one can infer 
from the magnitude of the derived H statistic (Bresnahan, 1989). As argued by ShatTer 
III The empirical test for long-run equilibrium was developed by Shaffer (1982). It is rested on t~c foll?~~~ stalcmcnl: 
"competitive capital markets will equalize risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such thaI. In cqulhbrium. ralC'i of 
return should not be correl8lcd statistically with input prices" (Molyneux ~I al.. 1994. p. 449). 
") Ka.~kende et aI .• 2008 
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(2004), although the sign of H is informative, the specific value of H (apart from the 
long-run competitive equilibrium value of 1) carries an ambiguous interpretation under 
existing theoretical analysis. This is because the H-statistics does not map directly into 
any static or dynamic oligopoly equilibrium concept. Overall. the application of the 
Panzar and Rosse method in the banking industry suggests that the banking market. in 
both developed and developing countries, is generally characterised by monopol istic 
competition. This result implies that product differentiation is one of the characteristics of 
banking production. Any investigation of the degree of competition in the banking 
industry will therefore need to allow for the heterogeneity of products (Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007). 
6.2.2 Model Specification 
We estimate the following reduced form revenue equations on pooled samples for each 
country 114: 
InTREV=a.+~ In PI, it +f3;z InP2,it +133 InPJ,it +11/nET ~t +12 In A Slit +1J /nTLA;t + 
141nLLP4t +&it (6.5) 
For t = 1 ... T, where T is the number of periods observed and i = 1. .. .1, where I is the 
total number of banks. The dependent variable is InTREV, which is In of total revenue 
over total assets (proxy for output price for loans). Molyneux et al. (1994) and Bikker and 
Haaf, (2002), treat interest as dependent variable whereas Casu and Girardone (2006). 
Nathan and Neave (1989) and De Bandt and Davies (2000), argue that the differences 
between interest and non-interest income is becoming less significant in more 
competitive environments. Recent developments in the banking industry have shown 
great interest in accounting non-interest income along with non-interest income from fee-
based products and otT balance sheet activities to total revenue (Casu and Girardone, 
20(6). 
114 We followed a similar specification of dependent variables to Laeven (2006). Casu and Girardonc: (2~) and 
Clacsscns and Laeven (2004). The empirical application of the P-R approach usually assumes ~-hllC'M1t~ In the 
specification of the marginal revenue and cost functions. /" denotes the natural logarithm. For c:stimaaioo purpose.. the 
log-specification is intended to avoid hetcroskcdasticity (R07.8S. 2007). 
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Output variables are treated as dependent variables and divided by total assets in order to 
account for the differences in banks' sizes. InP) is the average cost of labour (personnel 
expenses/total assets); InP2 is the average cost of deposits (interest expenses! total deposit 
and money market funding); and InP3 is the ratio of other operating expenses and 
administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). 
Bank specific factors are used to give an overall view of the banking industry and act as 
control variables at individual bank's levels, we include (1) InET A. the ratio of total 
equity to total assets (to control for different risk propensities); (2) InAST, logarithm of 
total assets (to control potential size effects); (3) InTLA, ratio of total loans to total assets 
(to show the proportion of loan over total assets); and (4) InLLPL, ratio of loan loss 
provision over total loans (as a proxy for bank risk). The H-statistics measures are 
calculated as the sum of the input prices coefficient P,+P2+P3' 
An important feature of H-statistic is that the test must be undertaken on observations that 
are in the long-run equilibrium (Nathan and Neave, 1989). According to past studies 
(Molyneux et ai., 1994; De Bandt and Davies, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002), the 
equilibrium test is based on the proposition that in competitive capital markets, risk-
adjusted rates of return will be equalized across banks. We estimate the equilibrium test 
by recalculating the P-R H-statistic by replacing the dependent variable total revenue 
over total assets, with the natural log of return on assets (ROA): 
In ROA = a. + 13. In P1,it + 132 In P2,it + 133 In P3,it + Y. In ETA it + Y 2 In ASTit 
+ Y3InTLAit + Y 4 In LLPL it + &it (6.6) 
Following Claessens and Laeven (2004), the measure of ROA is (1 +ROA) which allows 
for an adjustment for any negative values due to losses in any year. The long-run 
equilibrium test measures the sum of the elasticity of return on assets with respect to 
input prices. If the E-statistic (p,+ Pl+ P3) = 0, the banking market is in long run 
equilibrium. If rejected, the market is assumed not to be in equilibrium (Claessens and 
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) 
Laeven, 2004). We test whether E = L 131 is equal to zero again using the F- test. If 
1=1 
rejected, the market is not in equilibrium, and if accepted, then it indicates that in 
equilibrium prices of input are not related to banks returns on assets. 
6.2.3 Accounting for Bank Efficiency 
Recent research investigating financial sector competition has expanded to include more 
studies on developing countries. However, as highlighted earlier there is a lack of 
literature that investigates the competitive conditions in Southeast Asia. especially after 
the experience of the 1997 financial crisis. In this section, we add efficiency 1 15 variable in 
the detenninants of competitive conditions. 
InTREV = a + p,ln P',it + P2 1n P2,it + pjln Pj,it + y,ln ETAit + Y21n ASTit + yjlnTLAiI + 
Y4 1n LLPLii + Y5 1n EFF + 6it (6.7) 
The equilibrium test has to be carried out again, recalculating Panzar and Rosse's H-
statistic, replacing the dependent variable total revenue over assets with the natural log of 
return on assets as shown in equation (6.6). 
6.2.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
Our sample includes banking institutions in five countries in Southeast Asia: Indonesia. 
Korea. Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand from 1999 to 2005. Bank-level data are 
obtained from the 8ankScope database. The data used in this Chapter are the same used 
in this thesis empirical analyses and are described in detail in Chapter 4. The DEA 
efficiency scores used in equation 6.7 relate to the estimation of efficiency which 
includes the impact of environmental variables. 
Table 6.2 reports the banks observations used for each country. It is clear from the table 
that the countries with the largest number of banks in the sample are Indonesia (around 
'" The efficiency estimation is cstimated using the four stage analysis a..; IX'1' u~-d in Chapter -'. 
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51 banks on average per year) and Malaysia (27 banks on average). In contras~ the 
countries that have the lowest number of bank observations per year are Korea and 
Thailand (both have 16 banks on average). The peculiarities of the banking markets in 
selected Asian countries can be inferred by looking at the average size of banks in tenns 
of total assets. The average bank in Korea is around four times larger than the average 
Thai bank in our sample. Philippines and Indonesian banks have the smallest banks in our 
sample. One can see that the sample is reasonably representative, our sample accounts 
for 98% of total banking sector assets in Indonesia and 93% in Malaysia. Our Thai 
sample provides the lowest coverage accounting for 56% of total banking sector assets 
over the period. Table 6.3 presents some descriptive statistics. 
Table 6.2: Sample Used For Empirical Analysis 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippine Thailand Total 
1999 64 17 33 27 13 154 
2000 53 17 27 26 16 139 
2001 49 16 26 21 17 129 
2002 48 16 27 25 16 132 
2003 48 J7 27 27 17 136 
2004 49 17 26 25 16 133 
2005 44 14 26 20 15 119 
Total Commercial 355 114 192 171 110 942 
Banks 
Commercial 97.79 74.05 92.75 87.24 56.41 84.48 
Banks/All Banks 
(%) 
Average number of 51 16 27 24 16 134 
banks (1999-2005) 
Average size of 2519.35 46911.34 7148.12 2197.47 11209.16 69985.44 
banks (USD 
millions) . 
Source : Bankscope, Annual report from Bank of Indonesia, Bank of Korea, Bank of Thadand, Bank 
Negara Malaysia and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
is 
.is 
ii 
.ii 
TREV 
p. 
P1 
P3 
ETA 
AST 
TLA 
Mean 
365.096 
121.679 
533.397 
]54.369 
0.096 
0.011 
0.108 
0.030 
11.026 
9791.377 
51.666 
Std. Dev. 
842.977 
281.104 
1381.590 
488.554 
0.073 
0.007 
0.602 
0.073 
11.717 
21799.980 
18.599 
Min :\tal 
0.300 7637.000 
-0.800 2645.800 
0.300 14279.600 
0 5466.100 
-0.368 1.061 
0 0.123 
0.005 12.678 
-0.005 1.009 
-129.210 99.720 
6.500 201215.100 
0.620 89.820 
LLPL 0.014 0.270 -5.133 4.182 
ROA 0.84] 4.519 -30.440 66.960 
Note: ix [interest expenses]; nix [non- interest expenses (personnel expenses + Administration Expenses»; 
ii (interest income); nii [non-interest income (other operating income+ fee/commission income)]: TREV 
[total revenue over total assets]; PI [the ratio of personnel expenses over total assets acted as average labour 
cost]; P2 [the ratio of interest expense over total deposits and money market funding]; P3 (the ratio of other 
operating expenses and administrative expenses over total assets]; ETA [the ratio of total equity to total 
assets]; AST [total assets]; TLA [the ratio ofloans to total assets]; LLPL [the ratio ofloan loss provision to 
total loans]; ROA [ return on assets). 
6.3 Analysis and Results 
Following the recent empirical literature on competition in banking markets, we 
estimated the H-statistics using an unbalanced panel series data framework. Due to some 
countries samples being too small, we are only able to implement this approach by 
pooling country-level data over several years. As a consequence, we can only estimate 
changes in competition over time, across all countries in the region and not for individual 
countries. The regression models are estimated using a fixed effects estimator. 116 
Table 6.4 details the regression results. The estimated H-statistics for all the selected 
countries is 0.479, indicating a monopolistic competition. Such results are confirmed by 
the country level estimations. The value of H-statistics ranges from 0.663 in Korea to 
116 The Hausman tcst was used to choose between fixed (FE) and random effect (RE). FE is reasonable with panel data 
and it gives consistent results. RE may give a better P-vaJue as they are a more etlicient estimator. The HBLL~man test. 
tests the null hypothesis that coefficient estimated by the efficient RE estimators are the same as the ones estlln81cd b) 
the consistent FE estimator. We found that they are a significant P-vaJue. Prob) chil is smaller than O.OS.thcrcforc it is 
safe to usc FE. 
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0.060 in Malaysia. F-test results indicate that the hypothesis for H-statistic is equal to 
zero (monopoly) is rejected in all countries. Therefore the hypothesis of I <H<O 
(monopolistic competition) holds in all the selected countries. The results are consistent 
with the study by Claessens and Laeven (2004) and other studies on developing countries 
(AI-Muharammi et ai., 2006; Parera et aI., 2006). 
The results also imply that the banking sector earned revenue under monopolistic 
competition and any form of conjectural variation oligopoly and monopoly can be clearly 
rejected. During the period of study, Malaysia turned out to be the least competitive 
country and Korea the most competitive followed by Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
Table 6.4: H-Statistic Fixed Effects, 1999-2005 
Indonesia Korea Mala~sia Phili22ine Thailand All 
InP. 0.080 0.084 -0.025 0.054 0.189 0.044 
(0.076) {O.OSI) (0.862) (0.164) {0.1I9) {O.416~ 
InP1 0.424·" 0.505·" -0.057 0.428'" 0.180
m 0.300" 
{0.383~ {0.089~ (0.078) {0.088} {0.060} {0.02Jl 
InP3 0.130· 0.074' 0.142"· 0.160 -0.085 0.135 
{0.056} {0.037) {0.036~ {0.184} (0.084) (0.021} 
Ineta -0.082 0.222"· -0.273· • 0.046 0.133' -0.020 
{0.074l (0.058} {0.075~ {O. II 9} {0.07U (0.0312-
Inast -0.224- - -0.018 -0.177· 0.047 -0.547 • -0.110 
{0.067} {O.llOl (0.088) (0.137) (0.128) -~U-- .. 
Intla 0.253 -0.380 0.27t' -0.015 0.348'" 0.155 
- - -~ -------- .. -------.-
(0.041) {0.194} {0.137} (0.126) (O.09JJ._ (0.OO3) 
Inllpl 0.025· 0.030 -0.020 0.046 0.011 0.014 
(O.015} (0.018) (0.218) (0.029) (0.017) {O·OO9L. 
constant 0.641 1.356 -1.568 -0.548 1.556 -0.420 
{0.655) (1.162) (1.005) (1.457) (1.021) (0.390) 
H - statistic 0.633 0.663 0.060 0.642 0.283 0.470 
{0.631} {0.662} {0.030} (0.612) (0.279) (0.129} 
Ftest 
(H stat = 0) 40.990 15.270 14.310 9.440 3.050 52.56 
Ftest 
iH stat = I} 249.040 285.070 548.140 50.790 212.770 910.84 
Equilibrium 
Test:F value 
for H=t(} 1.36 3.45 1.46 1.56 1.96 0.600 
Notes:' p<O.IO. "p<O.05, "'p<O.OI; Standard errors in parentheses. 
Because Malaysia has been aggressively involved in consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions (as illustrated in Table 6.5), it has drastically reduced the number of banks 
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operating in the country, which possibly led to lower competition among banks. These 
results are in line with those by Suffian et al. (2006, pp.16). Their findings indicate that 
even though the results pointed to the monopolistic competition in the banking sector. it does 
not show any indication of changes in the market in recent years. 
T bl 65 B ki G . M I ft a e • an ng roups ID a aysla a er Consolidation . . 
Anchor Bank Merger Groups 
Malayan Banking Bhd. Mayban Finance Bhd., Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd., Phileo 
(MayBank) Allied Bank Bhd., Pacific Bank Bhd., Sime Finance Bhd. and 
Kewangan Bersatu Bhd. 
The Bumiputra - Commerce Bumiputra-Commerce Finance Bhd. and Commerce International 
Bank Bhd. Merchant Bankers Bhd. 
RHB Bank Bhd. RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Bhd., Delta Finance Bhd. and 
Interflnance Bhd. 
Public Bank Public Bank Bhd., Public Finance Bhd., Hock Hua Bank Bhd., 
Advance Finance Bhd. and Sime Merchant Bankers Bhd. 
The Arab Malaysian Bank Bhd. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd., Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank 
(AMMB) Bhd., Bank Utama Malaysia Bhd. and Utama Merchant Bankers 
Bhd. 
Hong Leong Bank Bhd. Hong Leong Finance Bhd., Wah Tat Bank Bhd. and Credit 
Corporation MaJaysia Bhd. 
Perwira Affin Bank Bhd. Affin Finance Bhd., Perwira Affin Merchant Bankers Bhd., BSN 
Commercial Bank Bhd., BSN Finance Bhd. and BSN Merchant 
Bank Bhd. 
Multi-Purpose Bank Bhd. International Bank Malaysia Bhd., Sabah Bank Berhad, MBr 
Finance Bhd., Bolton Finance Bhd., Sabah Finance Bhd., 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers Bhd. and Amanah Merchant Bank 
Bhd. 
EON Bank Bhd. EON Finance Bhd., Oriental Bank Bhd., City Finance Bhd .• 
Perkasa Finance Bhd. and Malaysian International Merchant 
Bankers Bhd. 
Southern Bank Bhd. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd., Cempaka Finance Bhd., United Merchant 
Finance Bhd., Perdana Finance Bhd. and Perdana Merchant 
Bankers Bhd. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
Despite generally difficult regional conditions, which occurred as a result of the onset of 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Philippines has emerged as one of the most resilient 
economies in the region. The country started its pursuit to encourage greater competition 
and strengthen their supervisory and regulatory system in the 1980s which became more 
intensive during the 199Os. During the Asian crisis. the Philippines followed the policy of 
mergers and consolidations in order to create a stronger financial system and create well 
managed banking institutions. Even though big mergers have increased market 
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concentration, overall competition levels are stable since market shares have remained 
relatively dispersed among the remaining players. The commercial banking industry 
seems to be progressing into further consolidation without necessarily inhibiting effective 
competition (Reyes, 200 I, pp.116). 
Thailand's H-statistic is just 0.263 which is low for a country that has received financial 
support from the IMF. This result is in line with Kubo (2006); he evaluated Thailand's 
banking competition using Bresnahan's (1989) conjectural variation model. Thai land has 
implemented two big changes, and both had an impact on the degree of competition in 
the country's banking industry. The first change relates to the ownership structure of 
financial institutions through nationalisations and liquidation of distressed banks; this was 
coupled with the abolishment of restrictions on the foreign ownership of commercial 
banks in order to invite foreign banks and investors to recapitalize the distressed banks. 
The second big change relates to financial authorities' attitude towards entry in the 
banking sector. Kubo (2006, pp.21) concludes that in spite of the aforementioned changes 
in the competitive environment of the banking industry in terms of ownership structure 
and regulations, our estimation results reveal the possibility of a decline in competition. 
Table 6.4 also reports the results relative to the control variables. An analysis of the sign 
and significance of the regression coefficients indicates that the price of funds is always 
positive for all the countries (with the exception of Malaysia) and statistically significant 
in most countries. The price of labour shows a positive sign and is not statistically 
significant in all the countries (with exception of Malaysia). The impact of the price of 
labour and the price of capital seem to be minimal compared to the price of funds (again 
with the exception of Malaysia). Nevertheless, these results are consistent with previous 
studies, which found that the impact of capital factor input prices varies by countries and 
it is the least important variable of H-statistics (Casu and Girardone, 2006; Molyneux et 
aI., 1994; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Sufian et ai., 2007). One explanation for this 
occurrence may due to the poor quality of capital expenses and fixed assets data (Casu 
and Girardone, 2006). 
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The coefficients of ETA are positive in Kor~ the Philippines and Thailand whereas they 
are negative in Malaysia and Indonesia. The results suggest that during the years of 
recovery, well-capitalised banks are exposed to riskier operations and may hold more 
equity as a safety measure, which in tum decreases the cost of funds. Regulatory changes 
during the process of recovery may force high risk banks to carry more equity. AST (total 
assets) is used to account for differences in bank sizes, which may lead to lower total 
revenue per unit of assets and can be considered as a proxy to economy of scale (De 
Bandt and Davies, 2000; Shaffer, 2002). The coefficient has a negative sign in almost all 
the countries (except the Philippines) which suggests that the larger banks seem to be less 
efficient compared to smaJler banks. 
Loan over total assets (TLA) results show a mixed outcome too with a positive sign in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, whereas a negative sign was reported in Korea and 
again in the Philippines. The inclusion of loan loss provision has provided positive results 
to all the countries (the exception being Malaysia). Past literature reports mixed results on 
the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable. The coefficient can be negative if 
banks spend more resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring, and 
consequently fewer problem loans at the expense of higher operating costs (Mester, 
1996). The coefficient of this variable can be positive if banks have a high ratio of loan 
loss provisions to net loans, indicating poor loan quality this calls for higher operating 
costs related to credit risk and loan loss management (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
6.3.1 The Panzar- Rosse H-statistic and Efficiency 
The inclusion of efficiency as one of the independent bank specific variables in the 
calculation of the H-statistics is motivated theoretically because it can be assumed to be 
one of the exogenous variables that shift the bank's costs (Casu and Girardone, 2006: 
Bikker, 2004). The crisis experience and the restructuring that took place during the 
process of recovery significantly changed the way banks operate in the SEA region. The 
impact of these changes reflect changes in the degree of efficiency levels of each country 
and the inclusion of efficiency may account for significant changes to the measurement 
of competition and reflect the success of the recovery programme In each country. 
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Interestingly the value of the H-statistic decreases in the country which reported the 
highest efficiency level country (Korea) and in the country the least affected by the crisis 
(the Philippines). On the other hand, the results show an increase in the value of the H-
statistic in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. 
As detailed in Chapter 2, Indonesia was the country worst hit by the crisis. It had a 
significant impact on commercial banks both publicly and privately owned, as indicated 
by the number of bank failures during and after the crisis. Creed (2000) highlighted the 
weaknesses in Indonesia's banking systems which are: it is prone to excessive loan 
concentration, weak management systems and inadequate information. As a result. the 
Indonesian government proposed financial Iiberalisation as a strategy to increase bank 
efficiency, performances and competitiveness. Through a new restructuring programme, 
it was assumed that a more competitive environment would encourage banks to be more 
efficient by lowering costs and increasing revenue with better allocation of resources 
(Viverita, 2008). The major financial restructuring actions taken by the Indonesian 
government were through mergers and acquisitions, which were also considered to be a 
way of achieving performance improvements (Delong, 200 I; Houston et aI., 200 I ). 
Indonesia's government have also made changes to their competition policy since the 
1997 crisis in the hope that the new policies would attract more involvement from foreign 
investors to assist Indonesia's banking sector to improve on its pre financial crisis 
condition. Competition policy plays an important role in increasing competitiveness and 
economic efficiency and this has motivated Indonesia to make substantial changes in raising 
competitiveness. As shown in Chapter 4, Indonesia's commercial bank efficiency has 
increased throughout the period studied and the inclusion of efficiency variables has further 
proven that the changes and recovery plans made in Indonesia have helped to develop a more 
efficient and competitive banking environment. 
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Table 6.6: H-Statistic Fixed Effects 1999-2005 with DEA 
Indonesia Korea Mala;t:sia Phili2pine Thailand All 
I"P. 0.131" 0.083 0.037 0.181 0.285" 0.106'" 
{0.066l, 0.051 0.097 0.182 0.1' I 2.66 
I"P1. 0.435- 0.495'" -0.062 0.398'" 0.269'" 0.324-
(0.033) 0.091 0.078 0.089 0.059 12.550 
,,,P3 0.142"· 0.062 0.137'" 0.055 -0.034 0.140 ..... 
(0.048} 0.039 0.022 0.195 0.077 6.940 
Ineta -0.095 0.225'" -0.268'" 0.001 0.075 -0.052 
(0.0632- 0.058 0.074 0.123 0.066 -1.490 
Inast -0.166* • -0.015 -0.160' 0.034 -0.465··· -0.093-
(0.058) 0.110 0.088 0.146 0.118 -2.310 
Intla 0.248"· -0.387* 0.250' 0.028 0.080 0.151 ..... 
(0.035) 0.194 0.137 0.129 0.112 4.880 
Inllpl 0.240· 0.033 -0.024 0.043 -0.002 0.010 
(0.013) 0.019 0.022 0.030 0.016 1.110 
Ineff 0.457"· -0.109 0.196 0.331 0.536'" 0.425'" 
(0.059) 0.128 0.143 0.214 0.137 8.62 
Constant 0.996· 1.222 -1.298 0.311 3.171 ...... 0.141 
(0.567} 1.175 1.020 1.553 1.014 0.380 
H - statistic 0.708 0.640 0.112 0.633 0.520 0.570 
(0.173} 0.173 0.038 0.173 0.180 0.117 
Ftest 
(D stat = 0) 0.380 2.780 3.190 0.810 0.410 67.520 
Ftest 
{H stat = 1) 0.120 1.080 2.630 0.070 0.240 965.270 
Equilibrium test: 
F value for 
H=O 1.31 3.82 2.33 1.87 1.64 0.45 
Notes:' p<O.IO, "p<O.05, "·p<O.OI; Standard errors in parentheses. 
The H-statistics for Indonesia increased from 0.633 to 0.708 after the inclusion of 
efficiency variables and have a positive relationship with TREV, thus leading us to reject 
the monopoly hypothesis and the conjectural variations oligopoly hypothesis. To 
summarise, Indonesia's commercial banking revenues behaved as if earned under 
monopolistic competition. The same conclusion can also be reached for Malaysia and 
Thailand. 
Thailand's banking sector underwent tremendous changes since the financial crisis in 
1997. During the post crisis reforms, family ownership in a number of banks was 
replaced with state and foreign ownership and also regulations were relaxed to allow new 
entrants into the industry. These changes have had a huge effect on bank efficiency, 
leading to a substantial increase (see Chapter 4) and also boosted their competitiveness in 
the sector. The improvements in Thailand's banking competitive conditions were crucial 
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for the industry to adapt and improve all their operations. In the past ten years the 
structure of Thailand's banking sector has changed, domestic banks no longer dominate 
the industry; in fact the banking system has increased the share of foreign ownership of 
Thai banks. Wonglimpiyarat (2008) suggested that the higher level of competition in 
Thailand's banking industry is the result of (l) the rise in non-banks in retail banking 
which mostly involve credit card and personal loan business and (2) the heightened 
competition from foreign banks. 
The H-statistic results for Malaysia also show positive changes after the inclusion of 
efficiency. This is again consistent with Claessens and Laeven (2004) and other previous 
studies (AI-Muharrami et aI., 2006; Parera et aI., 2006). 
Korea also experienced significant consequences of the financial crisis and for the past 
decade it underwent financial deregulation and restructuring. Prior to the crisis, the 
concentration ratio increased significantly (see Chapter 5) due to consolidation and bank 
closures. Inclusion of efficiency variables has slightly decreased the H-statistic from 
0.663 to 0.640. The process of restructuring that took place after the crisis, has 
significantly increased the concentration ratio. The entry of foreign banks and an increase 
in foreign ownership of domestic banking may have helped to maintain Korean banks' 
competitiveness. Finally, the results for the Philippines also indicate a decrease in H-
statistic following the inclusion of efficiency in the dependent variables. However, 
efficiency maintains a positive relationship with total revenue. 
To validate our analyses, we conducted an equilibrium test (Equation 6.6). The results 
indicate that banking systems are in not in long run equilibrium. I f the market is in 
equilibrium, the dependent variable will have no correlation with prices of input factor. 
For both analyses (with and without efficiency), it is possible to reject rejected the 
hypothesis of H = 0 even though the value of H is close to zero. It may be inferred from 
the findings that the selected SEA commercial banks were in long run equilibrium before 
the crisis and fell into disequilibrium during the crisis period. However, the systems 
appear to have made rapid adjustment to a new equilibrium which is similar to what 
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Molyneux et aI., (1996) found with Japanese commercial banking and Park (2009) on 
Korean commercial banking. 
6.4 Conclusion 
During the past ten years there have been many studies analysing the 1997 financial crisis 
which have arrived at many different conclusions on the cause and consequences of the 
event. However, very few studies have concentrated on the relationship between 
competition and efficiency during the post crisis period. Our aim was to investigate the 
relationship between efficiency and competition in the selected countries. 
The structural changes in SEA have improved the region's banking industry perfonnance 
which has been significantly affected by regulatory changes which spurred a trend 
towards consolidation, resulting in the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions. To 
investigate the impact of increased efficiency on the competitive conditions in SEA 
banking markets, we employed the non-structural Panzar and Rosse statistic. 
The estimated H-statistic for the five selected SEA countries is 0.570, thus indicating 
monopolistic competition. Such results, confinned by the by country estimations, are 
consistent with the current literature. When the DEA efficiency scores were included in 
the bank specific factors, we found that the overall results have only decreased slightly 
almost to no effect. On the other hand, the values of the H-statistic for each country have 
increased with the exception of Korea and the Philippines. An analysis of the sign and 
significance of the regression coefficient indicates that the DEA efficiency scores are 
negative in Korea, whereas they are positive in all the other selected countries although 
insignificant (with exceptions of Indonesia and Thailand). This indicates that Korean 
banks were the most efficient but generated the lowest total revenues. These results may 
be explained by the fact that banks that show the highest inefficiencies and incur higher 
cost might be able to generate greater profits than more cost efficient banks. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary 
Past literature has highlighted the importance of understanding the relationship between 
bank performance and efficiency. Recent economic reforms and regulatory changes, 
characterized by deregulation and concomitant prudential re-regulation, have attracted 
much research interest. Despite this being an area of interest for many years and policies 
being adopted widely by developed and developing countries, the existing literature 
seems to have conflicting views of banks performance and efficiency, which creates gaps 
that are open to further research. The 2008 economic crisis that has affected countries 
around the globe and has led to arguments as to best policy options to improve the 
soundness of banking systems include future strategies regarding the implementation of 
new regulation and policy frameworks. 
The main objective of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of the changes 
surrounding the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, concentrating on the banking 
sector. In particular, the thesis has examined the following three main research issues: 
efficiency, concentration and competition. The specific case analyzed is the experience of 
the six Southeast Asian (SEA) countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand) most affected by the 1997 financial crisis, over the period of 1999 to 2005. The 
period being considered is the recovery period, in which each country proceeded with 
restructuring and reform programs, in order to bring back their stability and 
competitiveness in the financial sector. 
We chose to carry out our empirical investigation in the SEA banking sector. because its 
reform experience is particularly suitable for addressing our research questions. As 
outlined in Chapter I and detailed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the selected SEA banking 
sectors were undergoing various changes and facing new controls on operational 
activities. These changes illustrate an important point in the world economy and provide 
some indications to policy makers to aid in making better decisions towards sustaining 
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the banking industry and understanding the impact of these changes on the affected 
countries and region. The determination to strengthen the region' s financial sectors can 
be seen in three significant areas. Macroeconomic policy frameworks have been 
strengthened, particularly the substantial accumulation of foreign reserves, the 
transparency of policies has increased, which is reflected in the routine disclosure of 
external debt and reserve information by Asian authorities and corporate governance has 
improved through the reform of regulatory and supervisory systems. Despite substantial 
changes of the SEA region's banking system, during the transfonnation period, there is a 
paucity of empirical literature analyzing the impact of these reforms on the region' s 
efficiency, market structure, competition and concentration. The SEA experience has 
therefore provided a valuable opportunity to develop a better perspective on the impact of 
financial reforms and changes in policy, concentrating on the characteristics of banks' 
efficiency, competition and concentration. 
In Chapter 4, we examined the efficiency of the Southeast Asian banking sector in the 
post-crisis period (1999-2005) using non-parametric techniques (DEA) for the 
measurement of efficiency. The findings suggest that all the countries were detennined to 
embark on structural changes and reforms to strengthen their banking sectors and to 
accommodate the changes into their regulatory environment. The results also suggest that 
crisis-resolution in the region is varied and may have created conflicting arguments. 
However, despite all the complications, the region has recovered and so far, is smoothly 
adapting to its fresh environment with new regulatory policy and strict prudential nonns. 
The inclusion of environmental variables has proven to be significant and improved the 
mean efficiency in most of the selected countries. The method used has utilized slack and 
proven that slacks have an important role in evaluating managerial efficiency. Overall, 
our findings provide empirical evidence of the positive effects of reform on efficiency. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the performance of the countries since the recovery, this is still 
considered to be progressing, and there is no doubt that the process is still exposed to 
many obstacles created either by the recent developments in the global economy or by 
development within the countries' political and economic situations. The structural 
changes in SEA have improved the region's banking industry performance. Most 
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significantly, regulatory changes which spurred a trend towards consolidation. resulting 
in the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions. These changes were expected to stimulate 
efficiency, enhance competition and increase market concentration. 
In Chapter 5, we investigated the second research question by looking into the 
relationship between market structure and profitability of banks. This is of concern to 
bank administrators and banking regulators. Most importantly, regulators need to 
consider the possible impact mergers may have on the combined banks' profitabi I ity and 
the viability of its impact on consumer welfare. In Chapter 5, we tested the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) and relative market power (RMP) hypotheses, and extended 
the test for the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis with technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency. Technical efficiency and scale efficiency were regressed against concentration 
and market share in order to check that the efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis 
conditions were satisfied. We used DEA for estimating both technical and scale 
efficiency based on the method applied in Chapter 4. Our OLS regression supported the 
RMP and SCP across the selected countries but did not support the ES hypothesis. 
The findings that emerged from the GLS estimations, however. failed to support the SCP, 
RMP and ES hypotheses. The findings failed to support the theory that efficiency has a 
positive effect on market structure, which is a necessary condition for the ES hypothesis 
to be accepted. Once we separated the countries and ran the analysis on a country by 
country basis, our results uncovered evidence supporting the ES hypothesis but only in 
Korea. Each of these countries has utilized restructuring programs, involving mergers 
and acquisitions between weaker and stronger banks, to create a more stable banking 
industry. The SCP paradigm advocates that market concentration fosters collusion among 
large firms, which creates larger profits and it may be this that generated higher 
concentration levels in each country, within the period of study. The outcome of these 
findings is likely to be due to strict changes in the banking regulatory system, especially 
in countries previously affected by crisis. These countries came from lower income 
markets or an environment of low stability and weaker regulations. The policy reforms 
have increased bank efficiency and performance~ however. efficiency alone does not 
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provide a strong basis for the banking industry to support higher competition. Asian 
banking needs to remain soundly regulated and become more competitive so as to 
support increasing demand in the market. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we attempted to answer our third research question: what is the 
impact of the post-crisis financial restructuring on competition in the banking sector of 
the selected Asian countries? Based on financial restructuring surrounding the Asian 
region, measurement of concentration and competition are important elements in welfare-
related public policy towards banking market (Bikker, 2002). We applied the same 
method of DEA for the measurement of efficiency and used the Panzar and Rosse H-
statistic to provide an aggregate measure of competition. Although the concentration of 
banking in the region showed an increased trend within the study period (Chapter 5), so 
did the competition level. However, the degree of competition decreased slightly once 
we controlled for efficiency changes. We found evidence that the most efficient banking 
systems, Korea and Thailand, are also among the least competitive. This result seems to 
indicate that the early reform programs in the region have pushed banks into becoming 
more efficient, but increased efficiency does not result in a more competitive banking 
system. 
Summarizing the entire body of evidence presented in this thesis, the detected 
improvements in efficiency, driven by changes in the banking industry and economy in 
the Southeast Asian region during the post crisis period, support the idea that financial 
restructuring and reforms have had a positive effect on the selected crisis affected 
countries. The analysis on concentration indicates stronger concentration along with 
improvement in the degree of competition. These findings suggest that financial reforms 
successfully stimulate efficiency to increase or even improve competition and 
concentration. 
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7.2 Discussion on Findings 
Crisis in the global financial system has significantly impacted on many banking sectors. 
These crises have brought major losses and the need to raise additional capital privately 
or through the respective national governments. This thesis concentrated on the 1997 
financial crisis and specifically looks into the years of recovery, 1999 to 2005, analysing 
three main research questions: 
I) What was the impact of environmental variables on the efficiency of Asian banking 
sectors after the 1997 financial crisis? 
2) Did increased concentration in the sector bring about increased profitability but 
decreased efficiency of Southeast Asian banks? 
3) What is the impact of the post-crisis financial restructuring on competition in the 
banking sector of the selected Asian countries? 
The following discussion will outline what this analysis of efficiency, competition and 
concentration can contribute to wider policy debates in the provision of banking services. 
7.2.1 The Efficiency of Asian Banking Sectors after the 1997 Financial Crisis 
Within the banking efficiency analysis literature there is a dearth of studies which have 
considered how banks have 'survived' the Asian financial crisis of the late 199Os. 
Considering the profound changes that have occurred in the region's financial systems 
since then, such an analysis is both timely and warranted. 
The financial crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997 raised various issues regarding the 
efficiency and the safety of local banking industries. After the crisis, bank regulators 
implemented several measures to reform the banking system with the aim of providing 
efficient banking services to the economy on a sustainable basis (Garcia.. 1997). First. 
some governments decided to avoid closure of distressed banks by recapitalizing them. 
This process was accompanied by changes in management, ownership and governance. 
Second, Asian governments also avoided closure of banks by encouraging or even 
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forcing safe banks to merge with distressed banks (Hawkins and Turner. 1999; Hawkins 
and Mihaljek, 2001; Gelos and Roldos, 2004). This consolidation process contributed to 
restore the financial viability of distressed banks even if it is not clear whether merging a 
weak bank and a strong bank, can actually create a strong bank (Hawkins and Turner. 
1999). However, such interventions could still be more cost-effective than a government 
bailout or takeover. Third, Asian governments have facilitated the access of foreign 
investors in order to import international best practice and technological benefits (Choi 
and Clovutivat, 2004). Finally, many other restructuring processes were also 
implemented such as the replacement of underperfonning bank managers and revision of 
managerial incentives. 
The aim of this analysis was to assess the implications for banking sector efficiency 
resulting from the restructuring process imposed on banking industries in Southeast Asia 
after the 1997 financial crisis. The study also highlighted the importance of other factors 
(environmental variables) that affected efficiency measures. Within a regional approach 
involving five countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) we find 
that Asian banks generally benefited from increasing returns after the crisis period. As 
discussed in section 7.1, the findings of the analysis suggests that the various financial 
reforms that took place in the region after the 1997/1998 crisis had a positive impact on 
increasing the efficiency perfonnance of banks over the 1999 and 2005 period. However, we 
observe persistent differences in efficiencies across countries. Efficiency scores are 
relatively high for Korean banks and low for those in Indonesia and the Philippines. The 
results of our investigation show that such differences can be explained by various bank 
specific characteristics. 
Overall the main outcome from this study is that financial sector reforms were successful 
in improving the efficiency of the commercial banks in Southeast Asia. As discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2, each country has actively involved in refonn programs through the 
support of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and domestically-led reform strategies in 
Malaysia. A strong regulatory and supervisory system has been shown to be necessary to 
deal with financial crises and promote the efficient functioning of financial markets 
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(Caprio and Klingebiel, 2(02). Therefore the challenge is to formulate an appropriate 
regulatory framework that enables the banking system to be more resilient to insolvency 
which successfully implemented in these affected countries (see Chapter 2 for changes in 
banking regulations). In addition the timing, sequencing and speed of restructuring 
measures are also important (Khatkhate, 1998 and Alawode and Ikhide, 1997) as are 
measures aimed at removing various market distortions (Eatwe II , 1996; Mavrotas and 
Kelly, 2001). Overall, the broad reform process appears to have been successful in 
increasing efficiencies of the banking sector. 
7.2.2 Competition and Concentration 
The financial sector crisis that broke out in 1997 disrupted the structure and functioning 
of the industry around the Asian region and affected the world economy. In order to 
preserve investors' confidence and restore viability, policymakers responded to the crisis 
in the banking sector with liquidity and capital injections, implicit and explicit guarantee 
schemes as weJl as direct rescues and asset purchases. Policymakers backed major 
mergers aimed at rescuing distressed institutions and many restrictions on entry and 
operations were lifted. These changes affected industry concentration and the intensity of 
competition. 
The results from our study raise two important implications for policymakers in 
Southeast Asian countries. On the one hand, the ongoing consol idation and banking 
restructuring process in these countries does not appear to have led to lower competition. 
Reductions in restrictions on banking activities, particularly on foreign bank operations 
(see Chapter 2 for changes in banks regulations) appear to have resulted in higher levels 
of competition. Increased competition is also shown to reduce bank risk-taking. 
Therefore, competition policy, which has been launched in Southeast Asia, can be viewed 
as a policy action aimed at strengthening the stability of the banking systems. 
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7.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis concentrated only on five Southeast Asian countries (1ndonesi~ Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) which were badly affected by the 1997 financial 
crisis. We looked at the region during the recovery process, which took place between the 
years 1999 to 2005. This may be considered the first exploration into Southeast Asian 
cross-country study after the restructuring took place. Data permitting, new regulatory 
changes will make it possible to expand the models employed here by using interest 
margins, foreign bank entry, and the ongoing changes in bank ownership/structure. The 
strategies of reforms during the period of study may be of interest as a comparison to the 
global crisis that presently affects the world economy. 
Evidence measuring the level of competition in banking systems is scarce. Most studies 
of competition and the factors driving it have been conducted at the country level. 
because bank-level data sets comparable across countries were not available until 
recently. The literatures available shows that competition varies greatly across countries~ 
but the extent of the variation depends on the data sets used and the period analyzed. It is 
hoped that further study would analyse more recent consolidation and the role of foreign 
banks in the region, especially focusing on the implications for systemic risk in the light 
of the 2008 credit crisis. 
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